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This dissertation examines the politics and practices of contemporary management of 
waste from electrical and electronic equipment (e-waste or WEEE) in Germany. 
Contrary to predictions that the digital revolution would lead to less resource-intensive 
and thus more sustainable societies, this study documents the opposite. Global 
consumption of digital technologies such as personal computers, cell phones and iPods 
is exacting significant environmental and health costs. Through ethnographic and 
archival research this project reconstructs how social actors, including policymakers, 
multi-national firms and informal recyclers, transform discarded technologies once 
they are placed on the curb. The resulting analysis shows how the environmental and 
social impact of a technological artifact extends over its entire lifecycle. 
Germany’s reputation for exemplary waste management and, more generally, 
environmentalism, coupled with its status as Europe’s largest e-waste producer and 
exporter, makes it a powerful site to examine the tensions and contradictions between 
national attempts to address e-waste and the existence of globalized licit and illicit e-
waste networks that unequally distribute the associated pollution and wealth across the 
globe. 
This project integrates, builds on and extends scholarship from the fields of 
Science and Technology Studies and Development Sociology. Such an integration is 
necessary to analyze how the afterlife of electrical and electronic equipment is shaped 
	 
by and reinforces uneven global political, economic and ecological relationships in a 
postcolonial context. Equally important, this work engages with recent debates in the 
social sciences on the boundaries between technology, society and ecology, the co-
production of the social and the material, as well as the relationship between 
globalization and the environment. It reworks and extends key concepts in the social 
studies such as fetishization, the black box, technological systems and regimes of 
perceptibility while proposing new concepts including the notion of “unmaking” and 
“the green box.” As countries across the globe are struggling to manage their e-waste, 
this study of Germany offers important clues to the challenges associated with 
developing efficient and responsible e-waste management systems. Furthermore, this 
project provides a concrete ethnographic and archival study of the effects and 
limitations of national formulations of environmental policies in an uneven globalized 
economy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: MAKING, UNMAKING AND REMAKING 
About This Mac 
I wrote this dissertation on a white MacBook that I bought in June of 2008, right 
before I went to Ghana to conduct preliminary research on the informal recycling of 
electrical and electronic equipment. My laptop is the most important tool I own. I use 
it to write and research, calculate and communicate. I also use it to keep in touch with 
my family and friends, watch movies, listen to music, shop, and document my life 
through pictures and videos. I use it all day, every day. 
My computer has a 32.5 cm screen. It is white, sleek and weighs roughly 2.25 
kg. I click on the “About This Mac” tab under the Apple icon and learn that my 
computer is a Mac OS X Version 10.5.8 with a 2.1 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo Processor. I 
have 1GB of memory and 667 MHz DDR2 SDRAM. The “More Info” tab reveals that 
my Mac is a 4,1 model with dual Cores, an L2 Cache of 3MB, and a Bus Speed of 
8000 MHz. On the left side of the window are countless tabs for retrieving more 
technical information about my computer’s hardware and software. This information 
is largely indecipherable to me. 
There seems to be an endless supply of technical information at my fingertips. 
Yet there is no tab that tells me about the Foxconn and Inventec factories in Shenzhen, 
Chengdu or Chongqing where my computer was probably manufactured.1 I cannot 
click on a button to find out about the tantaline mine in the northern Katanga district 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo where workers extract coltan–a key 
component in my computer’s capacitor. No “More Info” button discloses the origins 
                                                 
1 A number of recent news reports have focused on the social costs of ICT equipment manufacturing. 
For instance, see the New York Times’ “iEconomy” series (“The iEconomy,” 2013). See also the Daily 
Telegraph’s exposé (M. Moore, 2012). 
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and composition of the flame-retardant white plastic cover stained by years of eating 
while working. Nor does it allow me to taste the acrid smoke in Agbogbloshie market 
in Ghana where children burn computer casings. That governments, the recycling 
industry, environmental organizations and informal waste handlers are presently 
engaged in an intense struggle over the toxic and valuable innards of my computer is 
far from a mouse click away. 
This Dissertation 
Things—be they commodities, technological artifacts or everyday objects—are more 
than their physical form; they are crystallizations of socio-environmental relations and 
processes. These relations often extend across the globe, making and remaking 
particular places, relationships and institutions. Marxist political economists and 
scholars in the field of science and technology studies (STS) have written extensively 
on the social and environmental dimensions of production and use. In the pages that 
follow, I extend their work by reconnecting discarded ICT equipment with the social 
and environmental relations in and through which they are constituted. 
I conducted ethnographic and archival research on discarded ICT equipment in 
Berlin between 2008 and 2011. In the pages below I describe and analyze what 
happens to discarded cell phones, computers and MP3 players once they are placed on 
the curb in Berlin, Germany. I reconstruct the everyday practices that make up ICT 
recycling on the ground—describing the actors involved, their relationships, the places 
they work, and the various ways in which they physically and discursively transform 
discarded digital equipment. I also analyze how these actors relate to each other and 
how existing local, national, regional and international infrastructures shape and are, 
in turn, shaped by the disposal process. 
	3 
The Problem 
Waste from electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE or e-waste) is a shorthand 
term that refers to a wide range of discarded technologies, such as washing machines, 
microwaves, hair dryers, light bulbs and vacuum cleaners. Items such as computers, 
cell phones, iPods and televisions fall under the rubric of electronic equipment. The 
European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have all declared 
e-waste a priority waste stream. As a result, concern over e-waste over the past twenty 
years has grown among governments, NGOs, scholars and the media in Germany as 
well as the rest of the world. 
The discourse on e-waste hinges on four points: abundance, toxicity, the 
uneven distribution of the environmental and health costs of disposal, and most 
recently, e-waste’s potential value. According to the United Nations, global annual 
generation of WEEE runs anywhere between twenty and fifty million metric tons 
(Schwarzer, De Bono, Guiliani, & Kluser, 2005). Globally, e-waste represents the 
fastest growing waste stream. 
A combination of rapid technological development, planned obsolescence—
that is, the fact that technologies are “made to break” (Slade, 2006)—coupled with 
perceived obsolescence, drive the exponential growth in e-waste production. As an 
executive of a large computing firm described during an interview, 
. . . people’s consumption habits also change. My parents, I think, bought in 
their entire life, maybe two TV’s and two radios. I’m not sure how many I’ve 
bought in my life. You might think about how many you bought. So that’s also 
happened. I think that my father had to pay two months’ salary for his first TV. 
And if you have to pay two months’ salary, you don’t discard it after two 
years. But now, I think, there are some people who can buy a TV from one 
hour’s salary. . . . No, but you can get them for 60 Euros. If you then move, 
you think, “Should I really keep it? No, come on.” Then again, it goes back to 
habit. If you take mobile phones, that’s the perfect example—the average life 
of a mobile phone is less than one year. Average usage time, not lifetime. We 
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need to be very clear on the wording. (personal communication, March 9, 
2010) 
This ICT industry executive makes a critical distinction here between a 
product’s lifetime and its usage time. He draws attention to perceived obsolescence’s 
growing role in driving e-waste production. 
The use of electrical and electronic equipment has grown exponentially in 
Germany since the 1960s. Recent studies estimate that Germany alone produces 
somewhere between 1.1 and 1.8 million metric tons of e-waste each year (Deutsche 
Umwelthilfe, 2006; Huisman, Magalini, Kuehr, & Maurer, 2007).2 This translates to 
approximately 13 kg per resident, per year. Add business e-waste and the amount 
generated per resident jumps to 20 kg per annum. 
Emerging markets in the developing world are not exempt from this trend. A 
report by UNEP and the United Nations University (UNU) estimates that, in certain 
emerging economies, e-waste production could grow by up to 500% over the next 10 
years (Schluep, 2009). 
E-waste’s toxicity is also cause for great concern. Electronic goods contain 
noxious compounds such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC plastics), plastics rich in 
brominated flame-retardant, lead, mercury, cadmium, manganese and cobalt (Puckett 
et al., 2002). Older equipment can be tainted with arsenic. These substances can be, 
and often are, released during disposal and recycling. NGOs have published numerous 
reports characterizing the e-waste issue as an impending environmental crisis of epic 
proportions (Cobbing, 2008; Leonhardt, 2007; Puckett et al., 2002). The German 
media as well as numerous English-language newspapers and magazines followed 
suit, stressing this waste stream’s potential hazardousness (Bitala, 2008; Denkler, 
                                                 
2 See Deutsche Umwelthilfe 2006 report for a breakdown of estimated quantities of e-waste arising 
annually by category. 
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2006; Engelhardt, 2008; Granatstein, 2008, 2008; Höges, 2009; Pelley, 2008; Walsh, 
2008, 2009; Wray, 2008). 
Besides concerns over e-waste’s sheer volume and potential danger, the 
uneven distribution of health and environmental costs associated with disposal are 
routinely the subject of NGO and media indignation. Their reports evoke powerful 
images of electronic dumps in China, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Ghana, which they 
assert represent some of the most toxic places in the world. They suggest that e-waste 
is the latest form of toxic waste dumping and that it displaces the environmental and 
social costs of the developed world’s high-tech lifestyle to some of the most 
disadvantaged and vulnerable places. 
Yet discarded equipment is also valuable. Over the past five years, scavengers, 
exporters, municipal waste authorities, waste handling firms and mining companies 
have become increasingly interested in e-waste as a potential source of revenue. E-
waste has multiple values. Functional equipment is reusable, and thus holds value in 
second-hand markets. In addition, technologies can be mined for spare parts and base 
metals such as copper or aluminum. They are also a source of precious metals and rare 
earth elements. In fact, e-waste’s potential value has led to a recent shift in popular 
discourse. In the early to mid 2000s, the talk was of toxicity, dumping and danger. 
Phrases such as “vergiftete Flammen,” (poisoned flames) (Reinbold, 2008) and 
“Höllenfeuer der Hightech-Welt” (hellfire of the high tech world) (Bitala, 2008) were 
commonplace in media accounts. Around 2008–2009, right around the time of the 
world economic crisis, phrases such as “Gold-Berge auf Müllhalden” (Gold in the 
trash heap) (Bojanowski, 2010) and of “Gold in der Tonne” (gold in the bin) (V. P. 
Chancerel, 2009) and “Schätze im Elektroschrott” (treasures in e-scrap) (Entdecken, 
2011) became popular. 
	6 
The Place 
The specific point of departure for this study is Berlin. The capital is Germany’s 
largest city with a population of over three and a half million. It also hosts the 
country’s oldest municipal waste management authority, the Berlin Stadt Reinigung 
(BSR). Moreover, Berlin is home to the country’s largest immigrant scavenger 
population. 
Formal and informal networks of disposal and trade link the city to the rest of 
the world. Disposal of end of life equipment is organized along a complex and 
interconnected global division of labor and environment. Discarded electrical and 
electronic equipment, in the form of reusable goods, spare parts, scrap, metal-rich 
components and toxic waste does not remain in Germany. It circulates and crisscrosses 
the globe. Thus, although the point of departure for this study is Berlin, I 
conceptualize the city as a node in a complex of social, economic, cultural and 
environmental relationships that are global in scale (Hart, 2002; Hopkins, 1978; 
McMichael, 1990; Tomich, 1994). In thinking of Berlin as a node constituted by its 
relationships to other places and, in turn, constitutive of other places, I seek to unsettle 
the tendency to reify the tidy boundary of the city or the country in my study. 
Furthermore, Germany embodies a paradox. As a supposedly model country, 
Germany has a long-standing reputation as a global leader in solid waste management 
and, more recently, e-waste handling (Schreurs, 2002). This reputation is well 
deserved. Germany recognized and addressed the e-waste issue in the mid 1990s, 
through its first electronic waste policy called the IT-Altgeräte-Verordnung (ITV). The 
country also played a pivotal role in the development of European-wide guidelines, 
specifically the European Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive 
(WEEE Directive) and the Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS 
Directive), the two most comprehensive and forward-looking e-waste policies the 
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world.3 In 2005, Germany transposed these EU directives into national law through 
the Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act (ElektroG).4 Member states have 
substantial leeway in how they interpret the European directives into national policy. 
Germany’s national e-waste policy stands out as stringent and comprehensive. 
However, despite the country’s forward-thinking e-waste policies and 
extensive waste handling infrastructure, Germany is not only Europe’s biggest e-waste 
producer, but also most likely its biggest exporter. Germany can only account for 
twenty to at best fifty percent of its electronic and electrical waste each year (Huisman 
et al., 2007). While some of this refuse goes to landfills, many suspect that the 
majority is exported. A recent report by Ökopol—a German environmental policy 
think tank—estimated that up to 216 000 metric tons of e-waste flows out of Germany 
to the developing world each year (Sander & Schilling, 2010). It is these staggering 
export rates that prompt environmental groups such as Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH—
German Environmental Relief) to provocatively dub Germany the “waste export world 
champion” and argue that the country’s supposedly model environmental laws are 
actually causing more harm than good by incentivizing export (Leonhardt, 2007). 
Thus, e-waste, and its exportation, is of enormous practical relevance in Berlin, 
Germany and beyond. Relatively little is known about this modern detritus, how it is 
handled, regulated, represented and where it ends up. In a time when countries around 
the world are struggling to manage their e-waste, this study of Germany offers 
important clues to the many legal, policy, ethical and environmental challenges 
                                                 
3 The WEEE Directive regulates collection and recycling of EEE. Its objective is to minimize the 
quantity of electric and electronic equipment (EEE) in the waste stream and to harmonize the disposal 
of waste from electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE or e-waste) across European nations. The 
RoHS directive restricts the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment, 
specifically, lead, mercury, cadmium, chromium, VI Polybrominated biphenyl (PBB) and 
Polybrominated diphenylether (PBDE). 
4 Gesetz über das Inverkehrbringen, die Rücknahme und die umweltverträgliche Entsorgung von 
Elektro- und Elektronikgeräten.  
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associated with developing efficient and responsible e-waste management systems. 
Moreover, this study of e-waste in Berlin offers a concrete ethnographic and archival 
study of the limits and effects of national formulations of environmental policies in an 
uneven and globalized economy. As the recently failed climate negotiations in 
Copenhagen make evident, such insights are critical, perhaps now more than ever. 
The Theories 
Beyond its immediate policy relevance, this study makes a number of theoretical 
contributions. Located at the intersection of development studies and the socio-
historical studies of technology, my analysis builds on, reworks and extends 
scholarship in these interlinked fields. In recent years, scholars in development studies 
have shifted their attention to the interplay between uneven global political-economic 
relationships and the environment (J Martinez-Alier, 2005; McMichael, 2009; Peet & 
Watts, 2004). Building on the field of political ecology, development sociologists have 
analyzed how access to environmental goods such as minerals, lumber and water, on 
the one hand, and the burdens of environmental bads such as toxic waste and pollution 
on the other hand, are mitigated by and reinforce patterns of poverty, wealth and 
power (Bryant & Bailey, 1997; J Martinez-Alier, 1995; Ribot, 1998; Robbins, 2004). 
By analyzing how Northern environmental policies and consumption patterns both 
rely on and affect the developing world, this dissertation adds to this literature. My 
study of ICT waste also contributes to the field of development sociology by explicitly 
engaging with waste and technology, two topics that often remain marginal to the 
field. 
At the same time, recent scholarship in the STS subfield of envirotech has 
made important inroads for understanding the intersection between technology and the 
environment (Pritchard, 2011; Stine & Tarr, 1998). Drawing on this work, I explore 
how a focus on waste refines our understanding of key analytic tools from the field. 
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Specifically, I examine how analyzing the global afterlife of digital technologies 
extends three central STS concepts: the black box, materiality and technological 
systems. I address the first two concepts below. My discussion of technological 
systems follows in Chapter 2. 
The Black Box 
The conceptual separation of things—be they artifacts or commodities—from the 
social, cultural, economic and environmental relationships in and through which they 
are constituted is a key theme in both Science and Technology Studies (STS) and 
Marxist political economy. Social scientists and historians of technology use the 
concept of the “black box” to describe, analyze and, to some extent, undo the 
reification of technologies. 
Engineers originally used the concept of the black box to refer to technologies 
that are widely used with little or no knowledge on the part of the user about how they 
function (Sismondo, 2003, p. 97). In this sense, a washing machine, toaster or a 
computer is a black box; very few of us know or deem it necessary to know how they 
work; yet we use them on a day-to-day basis. During the 1980s, STS scholars 
borrowed the concept to highlight how various actors render invisible the historicity 
and thus contingency of a scientific fact or a technological item. Where for STS 
scholars opening the black box of science involves recognizing that scientific truths 
are products of political struggle and compromise, taking a technology out of the black 
box means appreciating that there is no external, inherent standard towards which 
technological change inherently strives. That is, to take a technology out of the black 
box is to appreciate how racial and gender ideologies, cultural norms and political and 
economic relationships shape the development, design, production, adoption, and use 
of technologies as well as the meanings they take on (Pinch & Bijker, 1984; Scharff, 
1992). 
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Marxist political economists do similar work, though they focus on the broad 
category of commodities and replace the image of “taking something out of the black 
box” with the notion of defetishization. Marx introduced the concept of “commodity 
fetishism” in Das Kapital (Marx, 1996). The notion of the fetish refers to how 
commodities take the form of “extremely obvious, trivial thing[s]” in capitalist 
societies. The tendency to portray commodities as essential and immutable entities 
severed from social relations is deceptive and dangerous, warned Marx, it makes 
partial and incomplete representations of things seem real. Marx saw the commodity 
as a microcosm or “economic cell” of capitalism. Consequently, commodity 
defetishization was a powerful way to unlock the mysteries of capitalist societies 
(Marx, 1996). 
Not only do the black box and fetishization give the analyst the tools to peer 
behind the veil of the phenomenal, but they also bring in time and space. As long as 
actors and analysts focus on the relationship between reified things, their 
understanding of artifacts and commodities—as well as institutions, structures, or 
concepts, for that matter—remain ahistorical and aspatial (Watts, 2009). However, the 
moment the connection between the process of making and the object of analysis—be 
it sugar (Mintz, 1986) or the bicycle (Pinch & Bijker, 1984)— is made, spatial and 
temporal contingency becomes apparent. In this way, the act of connecting production 
with the commodity or artifact has political implications. If humans located in 
particular places and times make things a certain way then they can also, at least to 
some extent, remake them. 
Invisibility, Waste and Wasting 
Both STS and Marxist political economy—in particular the subfields of the Social 
Construction of Technologies (SCOT) (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987; Pinch & 
Bijker, 1984) and commodity chain analysis (Collins, 2005; Koponen, 2004; Leslie & 
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Reimer, 1999; Ribot, 1998) help illuminate the connections between production and 
the commodity or artifact. They also provide the tools to analyze why and how certain 
actors conceptually and physically separate these two things. 
Scholars in the emerging field of discard studies frequently complain that their 
particular discipline—be it sociology, political-economy, geography, anthropology, 
philosophy or history—overlooks waste. For instance, sociologist Martin O’Brien 
laments, 
It is as if, for the discipline of sociology in general, and for sociological theory 
in particular, nobody ever throws anything away or ever carries out the bin-
bags for a “waste management authority” to deal with. It is as if, when you go 
to a shop, restaurant, club or place of work, you work, consume, or take your 
leisure without ever producing rubbish or detritus of any kind. Sociology treats 
“waste” as if it were literally immaterial, as if it existed in a world apart from 
the one we inhabit in our daily, routine lives. (O’Brien, 1999a, p. 62) 
This provocative statement highlights a serious limitation. It is also a bit of an 
exaggeration. Things are not as dire as O’Brien suggests. Social scientists, including 
sociologists, have written quite a bit about waste, and for quite some time.5 In 
particular, the past twenty years have witnessed a dramatic growth in scholarly 
engagement with garbage and the creation of a new multidisciplinary field called 
“discard studies” is proof of this.6 This new wave of scholarship centered on waste 
contradict claims about waste’s invisibility in social scientific literature (Åkesson, 
2006, p. 42; G. M. Hawkins, 2003, p. xiv; S. Moore, 2008, p. 602). 
                                                 
5 Anthropologists have engaged with waste. Margaret Douglas dealt with the issue in her seminal book 
Purity and Danger (1966). Michael Thompson wrote Rubbish Theory (1979). Later Rathjee and 
Murphy published Rubbish! (1992) and started the Garbage Project at the University of Arizona. 
Historians have also written extensively about waste, in particular in the past 15 years (Barles, 2005; 
Clark, 2005; Melosi, 1981; Stine & Tarr, 1998; Strasser, 1999; Zimring, 2005). Geographers have also 
published on the subject (Gregson, Crewe, & Metcalfe, 2005; Gregson, Metcalfe, & Crewe, 2007; S. 
Moore, 2008) as have sociologists (Gille, 2007; Weinberg, Pellow, & Schnaiberg, 2000). 
6 See http://discardstudies.wordpress.com. 
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In Rubbish Values: Reflections on the Political Economy of Waste (1999b) 
O’Brien directs his criticism at what he claims is political economy’s almost exclusive 
focus on production and consumption and their neglect of waste. Yet, as for 
sociologists in general, political economists cannot be accused of entirely ignoring 
refuse. Marx and Engels, for instance, engaged with waste in multiple instances, most 
notably through their theory of the metabolic rift. The theory of the metabolic rift 
describes and explains the rupture in town-country relations that go hand in hand with 
capitalist production. Whereas prior to capitalism organic “wastes” were returned to 
the soil, urbanization and industrialization rendered what had been a relatively circular 
production system linear—large amounts of resources where extracted from rural 
areas and transported to urban centers where they were consumed and eventually 
became garbage. The result was an accumulation of waste in urban centers and 
resource depletion in the countryside (Foster, 1999). The theory of the metabolic rift 
captures what Sabine Barles calls “the invention of waste” during the nineteenth 
century (Barles, 2005). It historicizes the concept of waste as a modern invention. 
As sociologist of waste Zsuzsa Gille (Gille, 2007, p. 25) points out, waste was 
also an important topic for Marxist political economists of the 1960s and 1970s such 
as Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1966). Baran and Swezy wrote about what they 
believed was the tendency of capitalism to be wasteful. More recently, the field of 
environmental justice has engaged with waste as an environmental issue. The politics 
and economics of landfill and waste incinerator sitings are key objects of study in this 
field. This literature provides important insights for how and why the poor often carry 
the health and environmental burdens of waste processing (Bullard, 1990; Di Chiro, 
1996; Pellow, 2004; Szasz, 1994). While much of this scholarship engages with 
domestic US waste, environmental justice scholars have also written on transnational 
waste flows (Clapp, 2001, 2002; Okereke, 2006; Pellow, 2007, 2008). 
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There is less engagement with waste in STS. The majority of biographies of 
technologies or studies of a technology’s lifecycle end with consumption. Still, waste 
is not entirely absent. For instance, historians of technology such as Martin Melosi 
(Melosi, 1981, 1994) and Joel Tarr (Tarr, 1996, 2002) document the development and 
implementation of waste water and solid waste treatment systems in the US, as do the 
more recent studies by Sabine Barles (2005) and Carl Zimring (2005). Historian of 
technology, David Edgerton (2007), in turn, writes about the persistence and revival of 
“old” technologies. Christina Dunbar-Hester centers her work on the repair and reuse 
of obsolete computers and FM radios (Dunbar-Hester, 2008). Allison MacFarlane, 
among others, has worked on nuclear waste (MacFarlane, 2003). More recently, Finn-
Arne Jørgenson (2011) published a study on recycling systems in Scandinavia. The 
key here, however, is that the focus in STS is often less on technologies as waste than 
on the technologies of waste management. 
Thus, the problem is not that waste is entirely absent. This realization is likely 
what led O’Brien to amend his initial position. In a subsequent essay to Rubbish 
Values, O’Brien clarifies his complaint that sociologists assume that “nobody ever 
throws anything away” (1999a, p. 62). He explains that his critique is actually not so 
much that waste is entirely absent, but that the focus tends to be on the object of waste 
instead of the act of making, circulating and using waste, as well as the social 
construction of the category of waste. In other words, O’Brien takes issue with how 
these scholars represent garbage as a solid, given, unchanging thing. In light of this, he 
urges sociologists to engage with the “social process by which things become ‘waste’ 
and the social relationships that sustain and organize wastes as wastes” (O’Brien, 
1999b, p. 269). 
More recent studies echo this emphasis on the process of making and using 
waste. For instance, Gille calls for “a shift from waste to wasting” in social scientific 
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analysis (2007, p. 18). Similarly, Gregson et al. (2007) stress the importance of 
focusing on “practices of divestment” rather than on the wasted object (p. 2). Hence, 
as these waste scholars underscore, the problem is not so much the invisibility of 
waste as the conceptual and empirical disconnect between waste and the social process 
of wasting. 
Unmaking 
Another way to frame the issue is to argue that more work needs to be done to connect 
the process of unmaking with the made. Like wasting, unmaking draws attention to the 
social and material processes that transform technologies once they are initially 
discarded. Both unmaking and wasting highlight that the “afterlife” of an object is a 
process that involves people, things, relationships, environments and structures all 
situated in particular places and times. However, I privilege unmaking over wasting to 
avoid what Kevin Hetherington refers to as “the conceptual slippage that equates 
disposal with waste” (2004). Wasting can suggest finality whereas unmaking captures 
the true complexity of an artifact’s afterlives.7 
Gregson et al. have put forth the concept of “divestment” as an alternative to 
disposal in order to underline that objects can and often do retain and regain value 
after they are thrown away. While I see the concept of divestment as a step in the right 
direction, I am not entirely satisfied with the term because it subtly suggests passivity. 
Unmaking, in contrast, immediately brings to mind the people who unmake objects, 
the places in which they work, and accentuates the process of change. 
                                                 
7 Though I stress that discarded objects can regain value and thus challenge the finality implicit in the 
term wasting, I want to acknowledge that some things do become waste. Not all wastes are social 
constructions (Gille, 2007).  
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Moreover, though I may be splitting hairs, divestment still retains an air of 
unidirectionality. It also reinforces the conception of a total separation between 
systems of production and disposal. What I want to stress is that making and 
unmaking are simultaneous, overlapping and mutually constitutive processes and 
categories. Not only is the line between a technology’s production, use and unmaking 
phase fluid, but the lifecycle of a commodity is anything but linear.8 Artifacts, 
materials, people and knowledges travel back and forth between networks of ICT 
making and unmaking. For instance e-waste handlers extract copper, plastic, glass, 
platinum, and tantalum during the process of unmaking. These recovered materials are 
raw materials for new production. Not only are valuable materials transformed into 
new products, but toxic elements such as brominated flame-retardants or mercury also 
seep into production systems through contaminated landscapes, waterways or 
materials. At the same time, the process of physical transformation creates its own 
forms of refuse. For instance, the harvesting of platinum from circuit boards often 
creates toxic materials that have no value in today’s economy. 
In brief, a single artifact fractures into multiple entities as it is unmade. 
Importantly, the materiality of production, use and unmaking stages of an artifact or 
commodity’s lifecycle overlap. For instance, the depletion of rare earth elements 
necessary for production of ICT equipment results in e-waste taking on new meanings. 
This also leads to new transportation practices and routes, new patterns of energy use 
and pollution, the development of new technologies and trade relations as well as new 
waste products, to name a few things. 
As Douglas and Lawson (2000) explain, 
                                                 
8 In this case, we can apply Hughes’ concept of seamlessness to think in terms of seamless lifecycles. 
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Declining resource quality [. . .] means that, behind the surging direct resource 
flows [. . .] there is a shadow material economy of energy and waste flows 
which also has expanded in volume and spatial extent. These hidden material 
flows surrounding the production of a given unit of energy or metal can be 
many times larger than the direct flows: for example, around 18 billion tons of 
material are dug up and displaced to produce the roughly four billion tons of 
coal mined each year; and for every ton of copper produced, nearly 200 tons of 
earth must be moved, sorted and processed. 
Thus, unmaking makes it possible to challenge discrete, linear representations and 
understandings of the various stages of a technology’s lifecycle.9 The term facilitates 
the transcendence of the conceptual boundary that in conventional parlance separates 
the systems of production and disposal. 
In a 2008 call for papers for the Annual Meeting of the American Association 
of Geographers, Jennifer Bair and Marion Werner invited scholars to examine the 
ways in which “hidden circuits of waste and pollution make global orderings of 
production possible” (Bair & Werner, 2011).10 As Bair, Werner and other scholars 
working on networks of disarticulation show, taking the permeability between systems 
of making and unmaking into account opens up new areas of research for political 
economy in general and for commodity chain analysis in particular. How are systems 
of unmaking and making connected? How have these relationships changed over 
time? Why and by whom has the connection between these systems been concealed 
or, to put it slightly differently, what orderings has the dichotomy between making and 
unmaking reinforced? Thinking in terms of unmaking opens up space to consider 
these critical questions. 
                                                 
9 Importantly, while this dissertation works to reconnect making and unmaking at the conceptual level, I 
recognize that systems of making and unmaking are often as distinct in practice as they are in theory. 
The rupture between relations of making and unmaking are historically specific, and I engage with this 
separation in Chapter 3 titled The Circular Economy.  
10 As I discuss in Chapter 3, the German notion of Abfallwirtschaft (waste economy) attempts to capture 
this complexity. 
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Materialities 
Theories of materiality from STS help draw attention to how discarded technologies 
are not mere social constructions. They have distinct material properties that shape the 
cultural meanings they take on, who handles them and how and where they end up 
(Callon, 1985; Crosby, 1988; G. Hecht, 1998; Igler, 2004; Latour, 2004; Law, 1987; 
Mitchell, 2002). For many years, the specter of technological determinism haunted the 
fields of STS and the history of technology. Technological determinism stands for the 
idea that technological development is driven by an independent inherent logic and 
that technology determines social change. The fear of determinism led STS scholars to 
emphasize technologies as social constructions. While the constructivist perspective 
furthered understandings of how social relationships shape technological development 
in many complex ways they failed to pay adequate attention to how the material 
characteristics of technologies can also influence social processes. 
Critical of this theoretical gap, a handful of scholars, most notably Actor 
Network Theorists such as Callon (1985), Law (1987) and Latour (1987) called for a 
re-engagement with the material. They argued, as Trevor Pinch later aptly 
summarized, that “the social world is a world built of things, social action is through 
and through mediated by materiality, and social theory will remain impoverished 
unless it addresses this materiality” (c.f. Mitchell, 2002, p. 479; Pinch, 2008, p. 479). 
This new materialism distinguishes itself from determinism, because rather 
than focus on the material in isolation it highlights the interactions between the social 
and material as co-constitutive dynamic categories (Allen & Hecht, 2001; Bakker & 
Bridge, 2006; Callon, 1985; Castree & Braun, 2001; Latour, 2000; Pritchard, 2011; 
Thrift, 1996; Whatmore, 2006). 
The field of discard studies has also experienced a material turn. In her book 
on postsocialist Hungary, Zsuzsa Gille critiques the social scientific literature on waste 
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for overlooking the materiality of refuse. She also takes issue with how waste scholars 
of the past have conceived of waste’s material composition “as a backdrop or spur to 
social action” (Casper 2003 in Gille, 2007, p. 26). Gille argues that it is precisely 
because policymakers and analysts overlook waste’s material composition that waste 
management policies are often ineffective. Her notion of the “hybridity of waste,” 
(idem) which alludes to waste’s simultaneous social and material dimensions, makes it 
possible for me to conceive of discarded technologies as at once cultural and physical 
products. 
Like Gille, I maintain that e-waste’s distinct materiality shapes and constrains 
its afterlives. For instance in Chapter 4, I show how the material composition of e-
waste is an important actor in the struggle over who can glean value out of discarded 
technologies and who is responsible for the toxic components of this waste stream. E-
waste’s complex materiality also plays an important role in the character of 
transnational shipments of e-waste, as I illustrate in Chapter 5. It is precisely because 
e-waste contains certain materials that it flows to certain places and not others. In 
Chapters 3 and 5, I also explain how and why e-waste’s rapidly changing materiality is 
a serious obstacle for regulators, and has played a significant role in the failing of 
German and European e-waste policies. 
In turn, my focus on discarded technologies extends the concept of materiality 
in three ways. First, examining discarded digital equipment makes evident that a 
technology’s materiality is unstable. The social actors who unmake e-waste 
continually alter technologies physically. They break them apart or add new parts to 
repair them. In addition, they discursively or representationally transform them. The 
same discarded computer or cell phone can mean different things in different places 
for different people. Thus, in both physical and discursive regards, materiality is 
always temporally and spatially specific. 
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Second, a focus on discarded ICT equipment invites us to probe the analytical 
implications of relying on such a broad notion of the material. A careful look at e-
waste shows that at any given time and in any given place objects can have multiple, 
and at times contradictory, materialities (Bakker & Bridge, 2006). Particular historical 
actors bring to light or conceal the heterogeneity of the materiality of discarded 
technologies. For instance, until recently, environmental groups and German 
lawmakers have tended to almost exclusively focus on the hazardous materiality of 
discarded technologies whereas others such as development organizations and the 
Solving the E-waste Problem (StEP)11—a global network of industry, government and 
academic representatives—have for some time underscored the potential value of the 
materials in used and end-of-life digital equipment, particularly as market value for 
certain components and materials in e-waste has increased (see Chapters 3 and 5). In 
other words, representations of e-waste’s materiality are always multiple, selective and 
strategic. 
Just as in her book on the Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the 
Remaking of the Rhône, Sara Pritchard questions whether it is important to distinguish 
between biophysical and technological materialities (2011), my work examines what 
is lost when analysts rely on the broad category of the material to refer to all that is not 
social. Since any object can have multiple, potentially contradictory and shifting 
materialities, it becomes imperative to understand why historical actors and analysts 
choose to highlight particular material characteristics and not others. In other words, is 
not enough to assert that the material is important but to interrogate which material 
characteristics of any technology, if any, actors and analysts draw attention to. It is 
also critical that analysts examine when and why they do so (Pinch, 2008). The case of 
                                                 
11 For more information on the StEP Initiative see, http://www.step-initiative.org. 
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e-waste shows that we need to think in terms of strategic social constructions of 
materialites.12 The material is not self-evident or singular just as representations and 
meanings are not. 
Conclusion 
Attention to the processes of e-wasting creates new possibilities for social scientific 
inquiry. It creates space to think about how actors, places, institutions, materialities, 
(infra)structures and relationships shape various acts of unmaking. It also opens up the 
space to analyze how these processes of unmaking, in turn, create, maintain and 
reinforce particular relationships and arrangements. 
Scholars who readily use phrases such as “disposal society” or “throwaway 
culture” assume that in today’s modern consumer society, an object simply vanishes or 
dematerializes once it’s original user no longer wants it. As Gregson et al. (2007) 
explain, however, the throwaway society thesis, popularized in the 1950s “refuses to 
acknowledge that discarding (the act) is a spatially, socially and economically 
differentiated process, one that can be anticipated to connect in myriad ways to the 
making of social relations, identities, and distinction” (p. 683). In other words, the 
moralizing narrative of disposability hides a complex world. A key argument of this 
dissertation, thus, is that this hidden world of wasting is just as complex as the world 
of production and consumption, and very much worthy of social scientific analysis. 
Throughout the course of my research, I often met incredulous gazes when I 
explained my dissertation project. “You are a sociologist, right? Is there enough 
material for an entire dissertation on discarded ICT equipment? Is that not more of 
topic for engineers?” Despite these individuals’ disbelief that the afterlives of 
                                                 
12 The idea of strategic social construction stems out of a conversation with Sara B. Pritchard on the 
February 28, 2013. 
	21 
technologies is a worthy topic for a sociologist, despite their firm conviction that 
wasting is a clear-cut, boring and worthy technical matter, I propose that disposal of 
ICT is anything but straightforward and clear cut. What follows below is a story in 
which the things we throw away do not merely disappear. Instead the digital 
technologies we attempt to get rid of keep on living, transforming in form and 
meaning by the people who handle them, shaping the lives and environments they 
encounter as they move through space and time. 
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CHAPTER 2: SEAMLESS GEOGRAPHIES 
Overview 
In this chapter, I argue that the STS concept of technological systems is useful for 
analyzing e-waste originating in Berlin. Conceptualizing a discarded technology as a 
technological system, rather than a discrete artifact, makes it possible to take it out of 
the black box. My focus on e-waste, enriched by insights from the field of 
development studies, in turn, extends understandings of technological systems. At the 
same time it outlines a fundamental problem with the current literature on the “global” 
e-waste problem. In their studies of e-waste, scholars invoke “local” and “global” 
perspectives to avoid reifying the city or nation-state as a unit of analysis. Historians 
and social scientists of technology often do the same in their analysis of technological 
systems. Yet both these literatures often continue to work with a rigid and binary 
understanding of these geographic categories. Philip McMichael’s notion of 
incorporated comparison offers a way out of this dualistic thinking. Building on 
McMichael’s relational understanding of space, I make a case for “seamless 
geographies” in technological systems in general and studies of e-waste in particular. 
The notion of geographic seamlessness reframes a place such as Berlin—the point of 
departure of my study—as a node within a larger social, political, economic, and 
environmental complex of relations rather than a place that can be understood in 
isolation. 
Science and Technology Studies and Development Studies 
Though I am a development sociologist by training, this methodological chapter 
focuses primarily on the interplay between STS and development studies. I bring these 
two literatures in conversation with one another as a way to promote critical 
engagement with science and technology in my field. Development sociologists make 
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several important contributions for the sociohistorical study of technologies. For 
instance, they challenge the modernist tendency to reduce development to a question 
of access to technologies. Countless case studies show that development is a 
multifaceted and contested cultural, social, political, economic, environmental process 
in which technologies certainly play an important, though not determinant, role. 
Despite these important insights, however, development sociologists often fail 
to directly engage with the social construction of science and technology. This 
oversight leads to discussions in which scientific “facts” and technological artifacts are 
taken at face value. For instance, recent studies on development and climate change 
rarely acknowledge the social construction of the scientific information they cite 
(Martinez-Alier, 2005; McMichael, 2008). Others in the field perpetuate Marx’s 
determinist understanding of technological development. Such limited understandings 
of technologies permeate otherwise critical analyses of North-South relations and 
inequality. 
Naturally, there are important exceptions to this rule, such as Timothy 
Mitchell’s Rule of Experts (2002) and Michael Goldman’s Imperial Nature (2006). 
These development scholars show how expertise and scientific knowledge are 
outcomes of social and historical relations. I seek to build on these important works by 
exploring the ways in which STS perspectives—in particular the idea of technological 
systems—can enrich my analysis of the global networks of unmaking originating in 
Berlin. At the same time, I strive to maintain a critical perspective on the relationship 
between development and technology as promoted by development sociologists. 
Technological Systems and the Seamless Web 
In Networks of Power (1983), Hughes describes and compares the development of 
electric supply systems in Germany, England and the United States. What made 
Hughes’ study unique was that rather than focus on a singular technology as was 
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common practice among historians of technology, he thought of larger technological 
systems. 
Hughes also stressed the co-productiveness of the social and technological 
through his notion of the “seamless web” (Allen & Hecht, 2001; Hughes, 1983, p. 2). 
In his book, Hughes explains that the making of a technological system is 
simultaneously political, economic, cultural and social. For instance, Thomas Edison’s 
invention was successfully adopted because he was at once an inventor and a system 
builder. The system Edison built consisted of individuals, institutions and 
technological artifacts (Law, 1987, p. 112; Sismondo, 2003, p. 77). 
Several scholars have reworked and extended Hughes’ notion of technological 
systems and seamlessness. Most notably, Gabrielle Hecht points to the mutual 
conditioning of technologies, culture and politics. She explains that technological 
systems are material and social as well as cultural and political (Hecht, 1998, p. 5). 
Historians of technology often give lip service to the mutual conditioning of these 
categories, claims Hecht. However, in practice, most studies concentrate on how 
culture and politics shape the production and use of technological systems. Often great 
pains are taken to avoid talking about how technologies influence cultures for fear of 
slipping into technological determinism (G. Hecht, 1998, p. 9). In response, Hecht 
stresses the importance of “opening the black box of culture and technology 
simultaneously” and with equal weight (G. Hecht, 1998, p. 10). 
Sara Pritchard adds that, because they seek to avoid environmental 
determinism, STS scholars rarely analyze the mutual articulation of technologies and 
the environment (Pritchard, 2012a, p. 224).13 They treat the environment “as an 
                                                 
13 According to Pritchard, Hughes recognizes, at least to some extend, how the environment influences 
the development and working of technological systems. However, Hughes does not develop this point. 
Further, he repeatedly slips into talking about technologies and the environment as distinct categories 
(Gille, 2007).  
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unproblematic, ahistorical backdrop to studies of technological change, inferring that 
nature and technology are distinct, and that the environmental factors and ecological 
processes play no role in technological development” (Pritchard, 2011, p. 12). An 
antidote to this problem is Pritchard’s “envirotechnical system.” This concept 
highlights the “historically and culturally specific configurations of intertwined 
‘ecological’ and ‘technological’ systems, which may be composed of artifacts, 
practices, people, institutions and ecologies” (Pritchard, 2011, p. 19). 
Following Hughes, Hecht and Pritchard, my 2008 MacBook is a technological 
system. Its designers used a computer to create it. It was manufactured with the help of 
a circuit board printer and a soldering iron, to name but two examples. Further, I could 
not use my computer for its intended purpose without wireless networks and electrical 
supply systems. My computer is also a crystallization of knowledges, people, 
environments and institutions. By knowledges I refer to, among other things, the 
information on how to assemble a semi-conductor and how to design my computer’s 
shell so that it appeals to me. The people included in the system range from coltan 
miners in Rwanda to workers at the Foxconn manufacturing plant in China to 
designers in Silicon Valley. The environments in which these individuals work and 
from which the raw materials and energy necessary for the production and use are 
extracted are also part of the system, as are institutions ranging from governing bodies 
such as the WTO and national governments to multinational corporations and 
environmental and social justice NGOs. 
Technological System of Unmaking 
Though the concept is often used for technologies that are in use, I apply the notion of 
technological systems to underscore how a discarded digital artifact is part of a 
network of interrelated and interactive human and non-human components. 
Specifically, I include the following elements in the technological system that forms 
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the basis of my analysis: designers and manufacturers of ICT equipment, their 
knowledge about how these technologies work, regulatory bodies ranging from the 
Berlin municipal government to the Secretary of the International Basel Convention, 
waste management companies, recycling facility workers and their knowledge about 
the recycling process, entrepreneurs who collect, reuse, recycle and export e-waste and 
their expertise, environmental and development NGOs as well as discarded computers 
and the technologies, such as acid baths and integrated smelters, used to dismantle 
them. 
Hughes’ notion of seamlessness informs my analysis of the process of 
unmaking. I engage with the political and technological dimensions of unmaking as 
coproductive. The STS idiom of coproduction highlights the mutually articulating 
relationship between two seemingly distinct categories (Jasanoff, 2004). In the case of 
e-waste this means that various interests and ideological commitments shape how ICT 
equipment is designed, which impacts how, by whom and with what consequences 
these artifacts can be unmade (see Chapter 3). For instance, manufacturers strive to 
maximize profit. The ideology of profit maximization leads producers to incorporate 
planned obsolescence into their designs. In fact, efforts to render ICT equipment more 
environmentally sustainable almost entirely focus on the use-phase. This approach to 
greening ICT does not challenge the profit imperative because it does not confront the 
role consumption plays in waste production. On the contrary, it encourages consumers 
to perpetually purchase newer, more efficient and greener technologies as they come 
on the market. Individuals can continue to purchase new “green” devices. Greening 
technologies by making them last longer would be less compatible with capitalist 
social relations as it would result in reduced consumption. Consequently this approach 
is rarely, if ever, brought up in discussions of how to green the IT industry. 
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Moreover, specific interests and cultural norms shape the structure and 
workings of networks of unmaking (see Chapters 4 and 5). The established networks, 
in turn, reinforce social and cultural norms. For instance, technologies are 
manufactured so that it is difficult to extract valuable materials out of them once they 
become waste. The only options are to use techniques such as acid baths and fire—
which are environmentally catastrophic—or expensive integrated smelters to which 
only a handful of wealthy countries have access. The dominant narrative on unmaking 
represents informal e-waste recyclers as irresponsible, ignorant, polluting criminals. In 
contrast, formalized high tech e-waste recovery and recycling firms are represented as 
responsible and green. What results is a technological system of unmaking that is 
shaped by and reinforces North-South inequalities. 
Pritchard’s insight pertaining to the mutually conditioning and inextricable 
relationship between environmental and technological systems provides me with the 
conceptual tools to engage with the materials and energy embedded in discarded ICT 
equipment. This involves addressing the environmental impact of formal and informal 
disposal practices—that is, the fact that unmaking equipment can and often does 
release toxic components into the air, soil and water. It also means analyzing 
competing representations of the environmental impact of unmaking practices as I do 
in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Moreover, it makes it possible to draw attention to the often imperceptible 
“naturalness” of ICT equipment. In taking discarded ICT equipment out of the “black 
box” of dematerialization as I do in the conclusion, I problematize, as Pritchard does, 
the static binary conception of technology and nature that runs through much STS 
scholarship (Pritchard, 2011, p. 21). Finally, highlighting how people, artifacts, 
knowledges, institutions and the environment interact to shape the unmaking of ICT 
equipment brings politics and power back in. The physical artifacts and environments 
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in which they are produced and used are embedded in and reinforce cultural norms, 
ideologies and uneven relationships.14 
E-Waste: A Global Problem 
There remains a tendency among STS scholars to equate the boundaries of 
technological systems with that of the city of the nation-state. For instance, Thomas 
Hughes compares Germany, France and the United States. Underlying his analysis is 
the subtle notion these three national systems are discrete units.15 It is true that such 
national or comparative studies make important contributions for understandings of 
how “distinctive approaches to system building emerged in response to particular 
political, geographical, and institutional conditions” (Hecht, 2009, p. 8). However, 
such an approach also runs the risk of black boxing the relationships and networks 
between these seemingly separate places. 
However, a focus on e-waste pushes against common assumptions about the 
geographic boundaries of technological systems. I draw on the field of development 
                                                 
14 Alone, the concept of technological systems runs the risk of remaining primarily descriptive. Hecht 
and Pritchard counteract this by underscoring how systems are embedded in and reinforce political 
systems, power arrangements and particular ideologies. Specifically, Hecht’s “technopolitical regime” 
draws attention to how “people, engineering and industrial practices, technological artifacts, political 
programs, and institutional ideologies, which act together to govern technological development and 
pursue technopolitics” (G. Hecht, 1998, p. 16). Pritchard’s “envirotechnical regime” stands for “the 
institutions, people, ideologies, technologies, and landscapes that together define, justify, build, and 
maintain a particular envirotechnical system as normative” (Pritchard, 2011, p. 23). By adding the term 
regime, both scholars stress that specific people or institutions, with particular interests create and make 
use of technological systems for particular purposes (idem). In other words, existing uneven power 
relations shape and are reinforced by technological systems. 
15 More recently, Hecht and Pritchard have begun to recognize the limitations of stopping at a country’s 
borders in their analysis of technological systems. For instance, since the publication of her seminal 
book The Radiance of France (1998) increasingly extended her analysis of nuclear technological 
systems. Her most recent book, Being Nuclear, explores uranium production in Africa and traces the 
flows of this radioactive mineral across the globe (G. Hecht, 2012). She has also recently published an 
edited volume entitled Entangled Geographies (2011) that addresses the global dimensions of the 
history of technology. Pritchard’s work is shifting towards analyzing at France’s relationships to its 
colonies (Pritchard, 2012b). 
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sociology to challenge this problematic methodological assumption. As the same time 
I seek to unsettle the assumption among scholars writing about e-waste, in particular 
those writing about transnational flows, that the categories “developing” and 
“developed,” “import” and “export,” and “local” and “global” are separate and 
discrete. 
The realization that discarded electrical and electronic equipment rarely stays 
in one place has inspired policymakers and analysts to increasingly commit to taking a 
global perspective on e-waste (Kahhat et al., 2008; Widmer, Oswald-Krapf, Sinha-
Khetriwal, Schnellmann, & Böni, 2005). More often than not, however, these “global” 
studies are limited to formal comparisons of e-waste management policies and 
strategies between countries. 
For instance, in their essay entitled “A comparison of electronic waste 
recycling in Switzerland and in India” (2005), Sinha-Khetriwal et al. begin by 
justifying their selection of Switzerland and India as case studies. Switzerland is 
chosen for its oldest and most extensive industry-wide e-waste disposal system. 
According to the authors, the country represents “the best opportunity to study the 
evolution of an e-waste management system” (p. 493). In contrast, India houses the 
fastest growing markets for electronics consumptions and has an extensive informal 
recycling industry. It also functions as important market for obsolete computers. The 
first section of the text, devoted to describing the conditions in each country, reads 
more like a tribute to Switzerland and an indictment of India. The authors elaborate on 
the virtues of the highly organized, efficient and effective Swiss system. India’s 
recycling system, on the other hand, is “abysmal” (p. 492). We are reminded that India 
has a weak government that is unable to effectively restrict illegal import of e-waste. 
The e-waste recycling industry, which has evolved “organically” in India, is informal, 
indiscriminate, disorganized and highly polluting (pp. 499–500). 
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Fundamentally descriptive, the article only briefly questions why the two 
countries manage their waste in such disparate ways. According to the authors, the big 
difference between India and Switzerland is the cost of labor. There is no incentive to 
mechanize and develop a more efficient recycling system in India because labor is so 
cheap. The authors, however, do not explore why labor is so much cheaper in India 
than in Switzerland. They leave out any mention of uneven contemporary trade 
agreements. Cheap labor in India appears as natural as Switzerland’s ranking as 
number 7 on the Environmental Sustainability Index. Because Sinha-Khetriwal et al. 
operate with an ahistorical and spatially-bound epistemological stance they are unable 
to see how the rapid rate of e-waste generation, the uneven labor costs they describe, 
the export and import of toxic e-waste, as well as the discursive and material 
construction of Switzerland as a clean and green, rationalized and modern place and 
India as a dirty, polluted, ‘organic’ and backward space are products of historically 
specific social relations. The authors fail to acknowledge that there is nothing essential 
about Switzerland that makes it inherently capable of managing e-waste in a more 
socially and environmentally sound manner. Nor is it ‘natural’ that India has a more 
informal, polluting e-waste management system. 
While they have made vital contributions to understandings of how local 
customs, socio-economic structures and existing infrastructure shape the ways in 
which e-waste is handled in particular places, these studies remain state-centric. They 
have not, as of yet, taken a truly transnational perspective and engaged with places as 
points a larger complex or system (Burawoy, 2000; Hart, 2002; McMichael, 1990; 
Tomich, 1994).16 The absence of a relational perspective that emphasizes the 
                                                 
16 The Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Science and Technology (EMPA), which is at the 
forefront of research on e-waste, almost exclusively produces e-waste country assessments. These 
assessments focus on how e-waste is handled in various countries without much acknowledgement of 
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seamlessness between these apparently distinct places has sometimes even led to 
rather problematic, developmentalist studies that seek to understand how, for instance, 
a country such as India can “learn” from a country like Switzerland (Sinha-Khetriwal, 
2005) without taking the countries’ historical positions within a stratified global 
political-economic complex into consideration.17 In fact, the idea that e-waste should 
be handled on a country-by-country case is popular among many scholars, 
policymakers and NGOs. The danger of such approaches is that they perpetuate the 
idea that the e-waste problems faced by particular places, be they Berlin, Dehli or 
Acrra, are spatially bound, the outcome of factors endogenous to particular societies. 
A Relational Perspective 
A world historical perspective helps address some of the limitations listed above. 
Specifically, Philip McMichael’s incorporated comparison is a useful antidote to 
bounded studies and comparative approaches that reify geographic and temporal 
boundaries of the objects of study (1990). Formal comparison takes two cases and 
attempts to isolate their commonalities and their differences as a means to extract 
general lessons. In contrast, an incorporated comparative approach highlights the 
relationship between “cases.” In other words, instead of asking how Switzerland and 
India are similar and different in their management of e-waste, as Sinha-Khetriwal et 
al. (2005) do, an incorporated comparison perspective investigates in what ways 
                                                                                                                                            
how these countries relate to each other. More more on EMPA’s country assessments, see 
http://ewasteguide.info/ewaste/case-studies. 
17 A relational approach represents a commitment to a particular way of seeing or interpreting the 
world. To think relationally is to see people, institutions, societies, cultures, events, places, concepts, 
knowledge, and so forth as outcomes or products of interactions rather than as self-contained, 
unchanging, static, or ‘natural’ things. Thinking relationally also involves seeing the interaction or 
relationship itself as a product or outcome. That is, a relational approach acknowledges the ways in 
which core and periphery, for example, far from discrete entities that ‘interact’ to produce particular 
outcomes, are themselves products of interactions as are the relationships between them. In brief, a 
relational approach invites us to see the world as a continually changing outcome of infinitely 
interconnected layers of interaction.  
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Switzerland is Switzerland because India is India (Tomich, 1994). This approach 
underscores the seamless connection between the various places that make up a 
technological system. Such a relational perspective helps me underscore how 
Germany’s ability to be a “model” “green” country when it comes to e-waste is 
directly related to the “inability” of other places such as Ghana to resist the import of 
toxic substances. Likewise, it helps me underscore that places such as the Congo that 
exports coltan and China that manufacturers motherboards, monitors and keyboards 
are intimately linked to Germany, though this connection often remains imperceptible. 
I do not specifically compare two places in this dissertation, as is usually the 
case among those who use the methodological tool of incorporated comparison. 
Instead, I build on and draw from the nuanced understanding of space and time that 
underlies incorporated comparison. Human geographer Doreen Massey explains that 
many social scientists tend to operate with a rigid and fixed idea of the spatial 
boundaries of their objects of study. Such an approach is problematic, explains 
Massey. She writes, 
The particular mix of social relations which are thus part of what defines the 
uniqueness of any place is by no means all included within that place itself. 
Importantly, it includes relations which stretch beyond—the global as part of 
what constitutes the local, the outside as part of the inside. Such a view of 
place challenges any possibility of claims to internal histories or to timeless 
identities. The identities of place are always unfixed, contested, and multiple. 
And the particularity of any place is, in these terms, constructed not by placing 
boundaries around it and defining its identity through counter position to the 
other which lies beyond, but precisely (in part) viewed this way are open and 
porous (Massey, 1994, p. 5). 
In other words, places such Berlin do not have solid boundaries. Relationships 
and processes within and across particular locations shape these places, be they 
cultural, political, economic, physical or environmental. Particular locations are not 
created in opposition to other places as much as they are constituted by relationships 
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to these other places (Massey, 1994, p. 121). Such a relational understanding of 
space—where space and social relationships continually co-produce each other—
makes it possible for me to avoid the trap of reifying the boundaries of Berlin in my 
study. 
Importantly, a relational perspective makes it possible to avoid thinking in 
terms of a separate, discrete “global” that determines the “local.” A common critique 
of world-systems approaches—which the idea of incorporated comparison builds on—
is that they presuppose the global. On the one hand, incorporated comparison aligns 
with what McMichael calls the Wallerstein/Tilly Path in that it challenges the ways in 
which formal comparison unproblematically uses analytical categories such as the 
nation-state as an ahistorical given. Both the Wallerstein/Tilly form of comparison and 
incorporated comparison seek to shed light on the larger whole that produces 
particular places. However, while the former methodology presupposes a whole—that 
is, the world system—incorporated comparison, because it is interested in historically 
specific social relationships, advances an understanding of the whole as a spatio-
temporal conjuncture or formative moment in world history. Put differently, the whole 
is the product of the relationships between the geographic locations or social entities. 
Therefore, it is never given. Instead, the whole is always emerging. 
By the same token, McMichael calls the part—be it the nation-state, the city, 
an institution or specific place—a “moment” or “outcome” to emphasize that the part 
is also a product of continually changing historically specific social relationships, 
which are themselves continually in flux (McMichael, 1990, p. 392). This is how I 
conceive of Berlin and the places to which it is connected through e-waste. The 
particular places of my study are constitutive of and constituted by the whole—a 
whole or system that is continually being constituted by its parts. 
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Such a perspective also acknowledges the heterogeneity within places. Places 
are internally different, complex and contested. Hence, each place is always changing, 
shifting, and, at times, paradoxical (Massey, 1994, p. 121). As such, Berlin is a site of 
multiplicity where power is unevenly distributed along gender, racial, ethnic and 
economic lines and where identities, meanings and subjectivities can simultaneously 
align, crosscut and conflict in each place, if not within the same individuals. Thinking 
of the various “places” in my study as heterogeneous sites full of unequal relationships 
and contested meanings adds a richness to my analysis that could not be attained 
through a traditional, macro world-systemic approach alone. Thus, by emphasizing the 
heterogeneity within places McMichael’s conceptualization of geography makes it 
possible for me to engage with how meaning, identity and so forth can help shape the 
process of unmaking of ICT starting in Berlin. 
The technological system that forms the object of my study clearly extends 
beyond Berlin or even Germany. Despite policymakers, industry representatives and 
municipal governments’ efforts to keep Berlin’s e-waste local, discarded technologies 
flow out of the city and across the globe through formal and informal channels of 
unmaking. Berlin is connected to the rest of the world through flows of materials, 
money and toxins as well as through its unique location in the global division of labor 
and environment. 
Given the globalized nature of the technological system I analyze, this study 
invites questions pertaining to how, when and why national borders and the borders of 
technological systems align or do not align as the case may be. It is not only critical to 
engage with how technological systems transcend national boundaries, but also how a 
globalized technological system maps onto an uneven political-economic topography. 
By applying the technological system to discarded technological artifacts my 
study extends the concept in yet another way. Generally studies of technological 
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systems tend to look at technologies in their commodity form and overlook the fact 
that technologies eventually become waste. Taking discarded technologies as my 
object of study makes it possible to investigate why studies of technological systems 
frequently leave waste out. Furthermore, because discarded ICT equipment goes back 
and forth between being a commodity and waste, we see that the line between a 
technological system based on an object in the commodity form and one based on an 
object in the waste form is far from solid. Another way to think about it is that the line 
between the commodity form of a technology and its waste form are seamless—
mutually articulating and inextricably bound. I suggest that this insight has 
implications that extend beyond the line between the commodity and waste phases. It 
opens up questions for historians and social scientists of technologies to explore the 
relationships and fluidity between production use and design. 
In Sum 
The STS concepts of technological system and seamless web are central to my study 
of the unmaking of ICT technologies placed on the curb in Berlin. Specifically, the 
technological system allows me to underscore that the technological artifacts that form 
the object of my study are not just given, singular, discrete entities. Instead they are 
part of a system that consists of many other technologies, as well as a host of social, 
political, cultural, physical and environmental relationships and processes. The notion 
of the seamless, in turn, helps me avoid reproducing binary representations of the 
categories listed above. Instead it allows me to emphasize the mutually articulating 
and co-productive characteristics of the components that make up the technological 
system I study. 
Instead of focusing on the design, making and use of technologies, however, I 
study the process of unmaking. Though, to my knowledge, the concept of 
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technological system has not been used to talk about unmaking, it easily lends itself to 
discussions of this process. 
The Specifics 
Below I will briefly elaborate on my research process and the methods I used. I 
conducted research Germany as well as in Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Ghana. 
I carried out the German portion of my research from July 2009 to January 2011. The 
archival portion of my research consisted of analyzing the legal and discursive 
framework in which the e-waste networks I study are embedded. My ethnographic 
research reconstructed and analyzed the formation and operation of the licit and illicit 
e-waste recycling networks in Berlin and beyond through over sixty semi-structured 
interviews with key actors and non-participatory observation at formal and informal e-
waste processing sites. Specifically, I reconstructed how various actors discursively 
and materially transformed discarded technologies after they had been placed on the 
curb in Berlin. I paid particular attention to the organization of export and how various 
actors along the formal and informal networks perceived of the e-waste problem and, 
in particular, the issue of e-waste export. My research in Belgium, Holland and 
Switzerland, which took place from February 2011 until June 2011, was devoted to 
situating Germany within its regional and global context. 
My decision to conduct ethnographic and archival research beyond Germany 
was inspired by my methodological commitments as described in detail above. That 
places such as Berlin cannot be understood in isolation rings particularly true with 
regards to e-waste given the globalized nature of e-waste recycling and reuse systems: 
legislation governing e-waste management and export in Germany is formulated in 
response to EU directives and international conventions. Furthermore, once 
disassembled, multinational firms in Belgium and Holland process a significant 
portion of the plastic, glass and metals in e-waste—even e-waste that is disassembled 
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in the developing world. Finally, German e-waste is not only exported through the 
Hamburg port but also finds its way to the Rotterdam and Antwerp ports. Hence to 
fully understand German laws and to reconstruct licit and illicit e-waste recycling 
networks in Germany, I had to conduct archival and ethnographic research in the 
countries mentioned above. The e-waste networks I studied are global and I did 
conduct primary ethnographic research at Agbogbloshie market in Ghana in the 
summer of 2008. However, given the constraints of time and resources, I choose to 
focus primarily on the European segments of the networks as they have been largely 
understudied in relation to the developing world; most emerging research on e-waste 
flows concentrates on importing developing countries or conceives of Europe as a 
closed system. 
Archival Research 
I conducted the archival component of my research at the Scientific Library for 
Environmental Protection of the Federal Environment Agency in Berlin.18 It primarily 
involved tracing the history and politics of German e-waste management. Specifically, 
I focused on the German laws that govern e-waste management and export—the 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act (ElektroG) and the Waste Shipment Act 
(AbfVerbrG).19 Because of Germany’s cooperation principle—which stipulates that 
environmental policies should be developed in close cooperation among all relevant 
parties (Hucke 1985)—stakeholder meetings were held prior to the implementation of 
both acts. The minutes of these meetings are publicly available as are the technical 
studies that were conducted in preparation for the acts. Moreover, opponents and 
                                                 
18 The Fachbibliothek Umwelt des Umweltbundesamtes is the largest environmental library in the 
German-speaking world. 
19 Abfallverbringungsgesetz (AbfVerbrG). 
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proponents of the acts produced a spate of publications, speeches and advertisements. 
Minutes of the debates in the Bundestag were also available. These minutes provided 
an important window on the reaction of various parties and regional representatives. In 
addition, I reviewed and analyzed journalistic and popular accounts of the disputes 
over the acts. 
In Belgium and Switzerland I studied the three policies that are crucial for 
understanding the international dimensions of Germany’s e-waste management: the 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive (WEEE Directive), the 
Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS Directive) and the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transnational Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal (Basel Convention). The former two directives set the standards for e-
waste management in Europe and for the use of certain hazardous substances in 
electrical and electronic equipment respectively, while the latter convention regulates 
the international flow of discarded electrical and electronic equipment. I visited the 
European Commission in Brussels and the Secretariat of the Basel Convention in 
Geneva, where the documents pertaining to the implementation of the Directive and 
Convention are respectively housed, to collect written material pertaining to e-waste 
management and interview key informants. 
My archival research was guided by the following questions: Under what 
circumstances do these actors and the public at large become interested in e-waste? 
How are discarded technologies defined? How are debates regarding the definition of 
waste characterized? What policy initiatives are favored and why? I used the archival 
sources outlined above to reconstruct the politics of e-waste management and export 
and to analyze how debates over e-waste enters into wider national and regional 
debates regarding the reconciliation of environmental sustainability, technological 
development and economic pursuits. 
	39 
Ethnographic Research 
The ethnographic portion of my research consisted of a qualitative material flow 
analysis.20 To date engineers have conducted the majority of research on e-waste flows 
in the form of lifecycle or material flow studies. I had the opportunity to interact with 
engineers at the forefront of e-waste studies at the 2009 StEP e-waste summer school 
organized by the United Nations University, the 2009 World Resource Forum in 
Davos as well as during various e-waste conferences and presentations at the 
Technical University in Berlin and through conversations with scholars at the 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy. These engineers repeatedly 
expressed the need for research that focuses on how politics and meanings shape the 
material flows they study. My qualitative material flow analysis—which 
simultaneously engages with e-waste flows as physical and social constructs—
addresses this need in e-waste studies and provides important insights for 
policymakers into the loopholes and limitations of existing national e-waste policies. 
This methodological approach bridges the divide between the social sciences and 
engineering. 
Specifically, the ethnographic portion of my research consists of semi-
structured interviews with officials at the German Federal Ministry of Environment, 
the Federal Environment Agency, the Berlin municipal recycling organization (BSR), 
Hamburg Authority for Urban Development and Environment (BSU), and the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. I met with Hewlett Packard, 
Dell, Sony, Ericsson, Elektrolux Gillette and Philips executives. I also interviewed 
representatives of industry lobby groups such as the WEEE Forum, the European 
Committee of Domestic Equipment Manufacturers, Digital Europe, The European 
                                                 
20 Perrine Chancerel, an environmental engineer at the Technical University in Berlin, introduced this 
term to me during an informal conversation in September 2009. 
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Electronics Recyclers Association and The European Engineering Industries 
Association. I had intended to interview representatives of plastic and CRT glass 
recycling firms, but they did not answer my numerous requests to meet. 
Representatives of the following NGOs: GermanWatch, Greenpeace Germany, 
Oekopol, the European Environmental Bureau, WASTE based in the Netherlands, and 
Greenpeace Netherlands were willing to speak with me. Furthermore, I established 
links with informal e-waste recyclers and exporters in Berlin and Hamburg. I 
conducted follow-up interviews with most of the respondents listed above. 
Importantly, the European WEEE and RoHS directives, which form the basis 
of the ElektroG, were recast at the European Parliament and Commission. Hence, 
2010 and 2011 was an ideal time for me to interview and observe key stakeholders, as 
they were in the process of explicitly voicing their concerns and critiques of the 
existing legislation to lawmakers. I found that industry, government and NGO 
stakeholders were particularly eager to discuss existing and proposed e-waste policies 
with me at this point in time. 
I extended my understanding of the formation and operation of the illicit 
networks through interviews with the European Union Network for the 
Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL), reports by the 
Hamburg, Antwerp and Rotterdam Harbor Patrols, and NGOs that actively monitor 
transnational movements of e-waste. The most active of these groups are the Swiss 
Federal Laboratories for Materials Testing and Research (EMPA) in St. Gallen, 
Switzerland, Greenpeace International in Amsterdam, The Netherlands and DanWatch 
in Copenhagen, Denmark. The Basel Action Network and the Silicon Valley Toxic 
Links Coalition—two US NGOs—are also important players. I monitored these 
organizations’ websites and publications and had, albeit limited, contact with their 
representatives. I had intended to interview customs officials and analyze customs 
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files and closed court cases that deal with illegal export of e-waste at the EU level, but 
I was not granted access to these individuals and files. Finally, I spent significant time 
interviewing and observing informal recyclers who gather outside Berlin’s fifteen 
recycling centers and used equipment exporters, the majority of whom have 
businesses on Billstrasse in Hamburg. I also interviewed and rode along with a 
number of informal scrap dealers in Berlin. 
My interview questions covered six broad issues aimed at understanding the 
characteristics of e-waste networks. These six areas were 1) organization or firm 
characteristics: number of employees, the history of firm or organization’s 
engagement with e-waste and organization of work; 2) the transformative processes: 
how organizations handle and transform e-waste; 3) flows of value or money: annual 
revenue, growth sectors, cost breakdown; 4) material streams: what materials are 
processed, origin and final destination of materials; 5) perceptions of emerging and 
existing legislation: specifically the ElektroG, WEEE and RoHS directives and their 
revisions as well as the Basel Convention and Amendment; 6) and finally, perceptions 
of strengths and weaknesses of current e-waste recycling and reuse practices. 
During my interviews I paid particular attention to how respondents defined 
the discarded technologies they handled and how they addressed e-waste export. I also 
focused on how respondents discussed issues pertaining to the reconciliation of 
technological development, economic growth and environmental sustainability. 
Through non-participant observation I was also able to gain insight into how my 
respondents’ narratives of e-waste transformations compared to the practices I 
witnessed. 
In August 2009 I obtained approval from the Cornell Institutional Review 
Board for this research. I continued to follow Human Subjects protocols and adhere to 
accepted standards of ethical research to secure the safety of my respondents, 
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particularly those who engage in illicit activities throughout the course of my research 
(Emerson, 2001). 
	43 
CHAPTER 3: THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY 
Overview 
In this chapter, I analyze the ElektroG, Germany’s most recent Extender Producer 
Responsibility-based policy [EPR], which went into force in 2005. I argue that, in 
theory, EPR policies represent an improvement over end-of-pipe waste solutions such 
as land filling, incineration and recycling in that they recognize a fundamental 
problem with the linearity of capitalism. By the linearity of capitalism, I refer to the 
propensity of capitalist social relations to sever the connection between making and 
unmaking, thereby creating unidirectional, rather than circular, commodity lifecycles 
through disposability, planned obsolescence and the devaluation of refuse. 
I explain why EPR applied to e-waste does not work in practice. Despite the 
praise Germany’s forward-thinking and extensive approach to solid waste 
management in general and e-waste in particular has received, the ElektroG does not 
meet its stated objectives because it fails to acknowledge the complex relational 
system in which the problem it attempts to fix is embedded. Specifically, EPR does 
not work because competitive pressures force firms to outsource the very externalities 
the ElektroG seeks to force companies to internalize. Specifically, two loopholes in 
the German e-waste law make it possible for companies to continue evading 
responsibility for their products once they become waste: methodological state-
centrism and methodological formalism. By methodological state-centrism I refer to 
the tendency—as outlined in Chapter 2—to reify the nation-state as the unit of 
analysis and thus obscure how Germany is connected to and constituted by its social, 
economic, technological and environmental relations to other places. By 
methodological formalism, in turn, I mean that the policy does not acknowledge the 
informal dimensions of the technological system in which Germany and the rest of the 
world are embedded. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. The first section traces the history of 
waste management in Germany in order to situate the problem of e-waste historically. 
I begin with a discussion of how the rise of modern capitalism in the late nineteenth 
century in Germany resulted in a shift from more circular systems of production to 
linear ones. Following this shift, Germany struggled to manage its growing and 
increasingly complex waste stream by implementing high-tech municipal waste 
management systems. The country’s efforts to manage its waste over the last hundred 
years has been punctuated by a number of waste crisis, which I describe and analyze. 
Having contextualized Germany’s e-waste problem historically, the main section of 
this chapter focuses on the ElektroG. I outline how the law came about, what it 
stipulates and finally, building on my archival and ethnographic research on e-waste in 
Berlin, explain how and why this law fails to meet its stated objectives. 
The Rupture 
The ElektroG represents an attempt to reverse the negative environmental and health 
implications associated with capitalism’s linearity. The problems with capitalism’s 
linearity became evident as early as the second half of the nineteenth century. This 
was a period of tremendous social, political and economic upheaval in Europe. The 
radical restructuring of relations and processes of production that accompanied the rise 
of modern-day capitalism was a key driver of these changes. Rapid industrialization in 
the cities and the mass exodus from the rural areas, often called the Landflucht in 
Germany, resulted in an increase in urban populations across the entire country. Urban 
population growth was particularly pronounced in Berlin, which had become the 
German empire’s capital upon its founding in 1871. The capital’s population rose from 
172,000 to more than 2.7 million between 1800 and 1900 (Curter, 1996, p. 19). This 
dramatic demographic shift resulted in a significant rise in waste production. 
Traditional waste handling systems were no longer able to cope. In other words, even 
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if reuse, frugality and other “circular” techniques were compatible with capitalism, 
they would have probably still not been able to accommodate the dramatic increase in 
waste production. 
Changes in consumer habits also contributed to the waste explosion. For 
instance, the industrialization of food production and the changes in working 
conditions meant that less time could be spent cooking food (Curter, 1996, p. 23). 
Instead, many factory workers began to eat preserved goods. As a result, disposable 
glass and tin containers flooded the municipal waste stream. At the same time, 
traditional uses for household and workplace “outputs” were rapidly becoming 
obsolete. Up until industrialization, women and scavengers actively sought out 
household and commercial leftovers such as rags, food scraps, ashes and scrap metal. 
They transformed these “wastes” into new products. However, new mass production 
techniques necessitated a consistent supply of homogenous materials; modern industry 
had very little use for the mixed scraps supplied by scavengers (Strasser, 1999). 
Moreover, women started working in factories and thus spent less time reusing waste 
products. Likewise farms could not make use of urban waste as a soil amendment. 
The turn of the nineteenth century witnessed a dramatic change not just in the 
quantity of waste being produced in Berlin, but also in its quality—or material 
composition. Until industrialization, waste was primarily comprised of ceramic shards, 
stone, rags or organic matter. The creation of Berlin’s sewage system in 1878 meant 
that fecal matter, the most valuable waste for famers, was whisked away. Additionally, 
as new materials such as plastic were introduced, the waste became correspondingly 
complex and difficult, if not hazardous, for traditional reusers and recyclers to handle, 
let alone reintegrate into production (Curter, 1996, p. 28). 
These changes, which are closely related to the rise of modern-day capitalism 
and industrialization, resulted in a radical restructuring in the relation between 
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production and consumption. Whereas systems of production had been relatively 
circular in the past—making and unmaking inextricable interconnected—production 
suddenly became linear during this historical period. Outputs of household and 
workplace activities were no longer raw materials for new production. Instead, they 
were now hazardous bads that threatened local environments and public safety. It was 
during this period that the idea of waste was born (Barles, 2005; Melosi, 1981; 
Strasser, 1999; Windmüller, 2004). 
The Responses 
Like many of its neighboring cities, Berlin responded to the waste crisis of the 
nineteenth century by creating various dumps in and around the city (Curter, 1996, p. 
19).21 Until then, residents had simply dumped their waste in nearby fields (Grant, 
2003). First the city required residents to collect their waste in pits located in their 
courtyards. These pits were to be emptied on a monthly basis. However, this system 
did not work for various reasons, and so the city established its first municipal waste 
collection points in 1887 (idem). These collection points were distributed throughout 
the city. The growing mountain of waste quickly overwhelmed the collection points. 
Thus, in 1894 the city built a larger landfill approximately 40 km outside the city. The 
creation of the dump followed one year after the passing of the Prussian 
                                                 
21 It is not quite accurate to say that Berlin had a municipal waste authority during this period. In 1887 
Kaiser Wilhelm I called for an independent branch of the government to handle street cleaning. The city 
then initially contracted out the task to 60 independent enterprises. Ten years later, a number of Berlin’s 
most prominent landowners banded together and formed the Berliner Grundbesitzer GmbH. This 
organization handled approximately 90% of city’s trash until WWI. The labor shortage of WWI drove 
the cost of waste handling up to the point that the Berliner Grundbesitzer GmbH went under. After 
WWI the Berliner Müllabfuhr-Akiengesellschaft (BEMAG) was founded. The city purchased 25% of 
company shares as a means to ensure that public interests were kept in mind. In addition, the major 
began to monitor the waste company’s activities during this period. Four years later, the city had taken 
over 85.8% of the company. Only after WWII, however, did the city host a truly municipal waste 
management authority. After the city was divided into two, each side had its own waste authority: the 
Berlin Stadtreinigung in West Germany and the Grossberliner Stadtreinigung und Muellabfuhr in East 
Germany.  
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Kommunalabgabengesetz (local tax law)—the first waste law that explicitly made the 
city responsible for street cleaning and waste disposal (Curter, 1996). 
Over time, Berlin’s waste authority became more efficient at whisking away 
the growing urban refuse, effectively keeping the consequences of the new relations of 
production “out of sight and out of mind.”22 Landfills were the preferred approach 
across the country. By the early 1970s, over 50,000 dumps dotted the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Schnurer, 2002). However Germany’s success in waste 
management proved to be relatively short-lived. Landfills were unable to 
accommodate the vast quantities of waste generated by German consumers and 
industry. 
The average West Berlin resident produced approximately 0.5 kg of waste 
daily around the end of the 1950s. In the ten years between 1960 and 1970 Berlin’s 
waste increased 126% (Grant, 2003). By the 1980s that number had increased fivefold 
to 2.5 kg (Curter, 1996, p. 36).23 Especially as the culture of disposability took over in 
the 1960s and packaging waste grew, it became apparent that the city’s landfills were 
                                                 
22 Though most of Berlin’s waste was landfilled until the 1970s, various groups and individuals 
experimented with alternative channels of disposal well before the second waste crisis of the 1970s and 
1980s. Obviously, resource scarcity during WWI and WWII incentivized higher rates of reuse and 
recycling (Curter, 1996; Grant, 2003). For instance, during WWI a program was set up in which 
residents exchanged organic wastes for firewood. In addition, during the 1920s many openly criticized 
landfills for taking up too much space and resulting in a loss of valuable raw materials. In light of these 
criticisms, the city of Charlottenburg, adjacent to Berlin, started a recycling program. In 1919 Berlin 
also experimented with incinerator technology (Grant, 2003). Another “alternative” waste channel 
consisted of private ovens in homes. Until the 1960s, many Germans burned a substantial quantity of 
their own waste in their home heating ovens. As centralized heating and oil burning furnaces replaced 
wood burning stoves in the 1960s, this form of waste disposal subsided.  
23 East Berlin also saw an increase in garbage production during this time. However, East Berliners 
created significantly less waste than their Western counterparts. Annual per capita production of waste 
in West Berlin was 450 kg whereas it was only 270kg in East Berlin. The majority of West German 
waste was landfilled or incinerated (after 1967). East Germany stressed reuse and recycling more. For 
more information on East German recycling see SERO-System (Curter, 1996, p. 36). 
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unable to accommodate its waste.24 The problem was particularly acute in West Berlin 
because of the wall surrounding the city meant limited space for landfills, yet it 
extended over the entire country. 
To complicate matters, Germans were voicing concern over the safety of 
landfills. By the 1970s, the country had about 50,000 small and mostly unregulated 
dumps. Most of these dumps were located close to residential areas. Residents 
complained that contaminants were leaking into the groundwater. Public concern over 
dwindling natural resources also grew. These factors resulted in a second waste crisis 
in Germany. 
The German government addressed the second waste crisis through a 
combination of institutional, legal and technological interventions. Waste incinerator 
technology experienced a revival (Curter, 1996; Grant, 2003). In 1961 Berlin 
constructed a high-tech incinerator in the Ruhleben district. The incinerator, however, 
put only a small dent in the growing mountain of Berlin waste. Less admirably, the 
practice of exporting garbage to less affluent areas took hold (for more on this see 
Chapters 4 and 5). In particular, the West Berlin government began to export its waste 
to the DDR. This option was costly, both because of the export fees and because the 
city had to purchase a compressor to handle waste before it was transported to the 
East. All around the country officials looked into measures to increase recycling. 
What made Germany stand out, however, was its policymakers’ willingness to 
openly acknowledge the limitations of end-of-pipe tactics such as landfills, 
incinerators and recycling programs during the 1970s and 1980s. While many other 
                                                 
24 Importantly, not just changes in consumption patterns, but also infrastructural changes resulted in the 
increase in waste production. For instances, as noted in the previous footnote, the shift from household 
ovens to central heating, gas and oil meant that Germans were no longer burning their waste. This 
infrastructural change resulted in a significant growth in the quantity of waste produced in the postwar 
period. 
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countries focused almost entirely on downstream solutions, many German 
policymakers and the general public were open to treating the waste problem (as well 
as the larger problem of pollution) as a market failure.25 According to the popular 
discourse, the waste problem made evident the existing system’s inability to connect 
making and unmaking and this resulted in significant inefficiencies. In order the 
remedy these shortcomings, German officials introduced a new general waste policy 
based on the idea of the Kreislaufprinzip or the principle of the circular economy. This 
principle promised to reintegrate making and unmaking and thus usher in a more 
efficient and environmentally sustainable form of capitalism. 
Industrial Ecology 
Though the idea of a circular economy has a long history, the field of industrial 
ecology formalized it. In their foundational article titled “Strategies for 
Manufacturing” (1989), industrial ecologists Robert Frosh and Nicholas E. 
Gallopoulos maintained that conventional linear production practices were 
unsustainable in the long run, given the finiteness of natural resources—including 
waste sinks. Instead, these two thinkers, along with other industrial ecologists from a 
host of disciplines—including economics, engineering and environmental sciences—
argued that economies needed to be modeled after natural systems in which waste is 
continually reused as raw material for new production. It was imperative that societies 
shifted from open-looped to closed-loop production systems, argued industrial 
ecologists, in order to promote a more efficient, sustainable and ultimately zero-waste 
and zero-emissions economies. 
                                                 
25 By market failure I refer to an instance in which the invisible hand of the economy, for whatever 
reason, does not work. The solution, in such cases, is for the government to step in, though as minimally 
as possible, to correct the glitch in the system. 
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Key for the success of a circular economy is Produktverantwortung, or product 
responsibility. Broadly speaking, the term Produktverantwortung stands for the idea 
that goods should be produced and used in such a way as to minimize waste 
generation. Concretely this term has come to stand as a shorthand for the principle of 
EPR.26 EPR, to recall, dictates that producers should be responsible for the 
environmental costs of the products they produce (Lindhqvist & Lifset, 2003, p. 144). 
It is basically an extension of the producer pays principle (PPP) (Neyland & 
Simakova, 2012).27 The polluter pays principle is a market-based mechanism to 
counteract the tendency among profit-seeking firms to externalize the environmental 
costs of their activities. The idea behind this approach is that the act of “internalizing 
externalities” (Lifset, 1993, p. 163) will incentivize sustainable development. This is 
accomplished by “changing the behavior of producers by tightening the link between 
product design and marketing decisions and waste management-related concerns” 
(idem). 
Ideally, not only does EPR lead to product redesign, but also to a total 
reconfiguration of how disposal is organized (Walls, 2003, p. 5). Most existing 
disposal systems consist of publically funded, end-of-pipe diversion programs. Once 
an object is discarded, local governments become owners of the waste and responsible 
for its disposal. This approach enables the privatization of profit and the socialization 
                                                 
26 EPR is also sometimes also referred to as manufacturer take-back or product stewardship (Khetriwal, 
Kraeuchi, & Widmer, 2009, p. 154). EPR is a variation of the polluter pays principle (PPP). While PPP 
has traditionally been applied to production/manufacturing, EPR extends the idea to waste. Many policy 
instruments actualize EPR such as product take-back mandates, advance disposal fees, deposit-refunds, 
recycled content standards, and so forth (Walls, 2003, p. 1). In Germany, EPR takes the form of product 
take-back. 
27 Lifset (1993) offers a useful and succinct explanation of EPR and market failures. He writes, 
“Economists have long argued that by incorporating the impact of pollution and other environmental 
insults into prices—internalizing externalities—we can resolve our environmental difficulties. A 
negative externality arises when an economic activity imposes costs on a third party and that cost is not 
reflected in the price paid in the relevant commercial transaction” (Lifset, 1993, p. 165).  
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of the environmental and social costs of production, consumption and disposal (Lifset, 
1993, pp. 170–171). Instead of public disposal and private production, EPR policies 
make private producers own and operate the entire production-disposal chain—which 
ultimately is transformed into what William McDonough and Michael Braungart 
(2002) call “cradle-to-cradle” systems in which making and unmaking are 
reintegrated. 
EPR in Germany 
In 1991, a year after the Swedish economist Thomas Lindhqvist introduced the 
concept of EPR, the German government passed the Ordinance on the Avoidance of 
Packaging Waste (VerpackV), the most recognizable result of which is the green dot 
system.28 The packaging ordinance makes producers responsible for the end-of-life of 
the packaging they use. Though the VerpackV has been criticized on many fronts, the 
ordinance was generally successful.29 After Germany introduced the ordinance, 
collection and recycling rates improved (Clean Production Action, 2003). The 
                                                 
28 Verpackungsverordnung; Der Grüne Punkt 
29 Some complain that the DSD suppressed market competitions and thus produced inefficiencies (Tojo, 
2001, pp. iii, 41). Still, according to a report by the Clean Production Action, “Between 1992 and 1993, 
the volume of packaging material in circulation was reduced by half a million metric tons. Since the 
passage of the Ordinance, total packaging has been reduced by 1 million metric tons, a per capita 
reduction of 15 kg. The reduction reflects the elimination of some types of unnecessary packaging, such 
as shrink or blister packaging and the increased use of concentrates and refillable packaging. Significant 
design changes were made to reduce the amount of material used in packaging. For comparison, 
between 1991 and1995, Green Dot packaging decreased 14% from, while total packaging in Germany 
decreased 7%; during the same period in USA, packaging grew by 13%. The proportion of beverages 
sold in refillable containers has increased. The transport packaging sector, which has seen the greatest 
drop in packaging, has developed reusable shipping containers. Furthermore, the Ordinance has raised 
awareness among packaging producers of the need to radically rethink material use in packaging. [. . .] 
This drop reflects avoidance and minimisation of plastic packaging, in favor of paper/carton and 
tinplate. Also seen within the plastic packaging sector were shifts away from PVC to PE and PP. [. . .] 
The Ordinance has spurred the development of new sorting and recycling technologies, especially for 
mixed plastics.” (Clean Production Action, 2003) 
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ordinance also successfully stimulated product redesign, which in turn resulted in a 
reduction in the amount of packaging waste produced each year (Tojo, 2001, p. 12). 
 
Figure 1. Germany’s official waste hierarchy clearly places waste avoidance at 
the top. Recycling, recovery and landfilling are all secondary and tertiary goals. 
Reprinted from Federal Environment Ministry, http://www.bmu.de/english/ 
waste_management/doc/3432.php. 
Subsequently, in 1996, the German government passed The Act for Promoting 
Closed Substance Cycle Waste Management and Ensuring Environmentally 
Compatible Waste Disposal (KrW-/AbfG).30 The Act represented a relatively radical 
rethinking and restructuring of German Abfallwirtschaft, or waste economy. For one, 
the law explicitly, and for the first time, distinguished between reclaimable waste and 
                                                 
30 Gesetz zur Förderung der Kreislaufwirtschaft und Sicherung der umweltverträglichen Beseitigung 
von Abfällen also referred to as Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallgesetz (KrW-/AbfG). 
	53 
waste for disposal.31 Further, it set up a clear hierarchy of waste management 
objectives: the first priority being waste avoidance, followed by waste recovery or 
recycling and finally environmentally responsible disposal (see Figure 1). Perhaps 
most significantly, the law cemented Germany’s commitment to the principles of the 
circular economy and extended producer responsibility. The Act remains the 
cornerstone of Germany’s waste law and forms the basis of the ElektroG. 
There are a number of reasons why the ideas of the circular economy and of 
EPR gained such a strong foothold among German environmentalists, industry 
representatives and policymakers. First, EPR policies echoed a larger trend in 
environmental policy during the 1990s in which end-of-pipe solutions were no longer 
satisfactory on their own (Khetriwal, Kraeuchi, & Widmer, 2009, p. 155, Castell, 
Clift, & Francae, 2004, p. 4). EPR policies promised to get at the root of the problem 
by broadening notions of responsibility. They made “upstream entities responsible for 
downstream impact” and thus corrected a glitch in capitalism’s feedback system 
(Lifset, 1993, p. 165). 
Secondly, EPR policies represented a way to reconcile two seemingly 
diverging goals: Germany’s long-time commitment to environmental sustainability 
and the country’s desire to remain one of the world’s economic powerhouses. Up until 
then German law had favored “green social welfare” policies, in which the 
government, rather than the market, was expected to promote environmental 
sustainability (Schreurs, 2002). However, as of the 1970s, industry, trade unions and 
the labor movement accused the country’s green policies of leading to job losses and 
impeding Germany’s economic competitiveness and technological innovation 
(Schreurs, 2002). They saw market-based environmental strategies, such as EPR, as 
                                                 
31 Abfälle zur Verwertung and Abfälle zur Beseitigung. 
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the ideal solution to this problem as these policies promised to use market feedback to 
“shift the world’s economies towards more circular patterns of resource use and 
recycling” without the burden of what was increasingly perceived as heavy-handed, 
“command-and-control” environmental regulations (Castell et al., 2004, p. 5; Lifset & 
Lindhqvist, 2008, p. 144; Mayers, 2005).32 These policies, resonating with the 
neoliberal political ethos, promised to correct market failure while remaining flexible 
and economically efficient because they gave “producers freedom to innovate and to 
choose the most inexpensive approach to regulatory compliance” (Lifset, 1993, p. 
166).33 
Importantly, social-welfare environmentalism remained strong in Germany 
until at least the 1980s when the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) reemerged as the 
ruling party. The CDU, under the leadership of Helmut Kohl, evoked the rhetoric of 
Thatcher and Reagan, did not however push neoliberal cuts in government to the same 
extent as the British and Americans. In fact, Kohl merely continued with moderate tax 
reduction policies instituted during the final years of his predecessor’s rule. 
Nonetheless, compared to the 1970s, the 1980s were a period of financial constraints 
                                                 
32 Key here is the word “less.” EPR policies differ from pure laissez-faire economic approaches in that 
they stresses the importance of government involvement (Tojo, 2001, pp. iii, 41). According to 
orthodox economic theory the market corrects itself at each stage of making and unmaking (Lifset, 
1993). For instance, orthodox liberal economists argue that customer demand for more sustainable 
products would ultimately lead to product redesign. However in practice, the market, left to its own 
devices, often fails to give the appropriate feedback to stimulate less resource intensive and 
environmentally friendly production. In the case of consumer pressure for environmental design, it is 
commonly accepted that the market signal is simply too weak to trigger any changes (Tojo, 2001, p. 
39). Voluntary programs, which would be more in line with orthodox economic theory, often also do 
not work in practice. Consumer awareness campaigns rarely impact economic behavior (OPEC 200, p. 
40). The same applies to voluntary recycling programs, which only tend to work for waste that has a net 
market value. In fact, such voluntary approaches often make matters worse as they often create a 
situation in which publically funded programs are left with the cost of recycling unprofitable wastes 
without the income they would otherwise glean from handling the valuable waste. It is for these reasons 
that promoters of EPR policies argue that the government needs to get involved to “level the playing 
field” and “get the prices right.” 
33 The underlying belief is that industry is a more creative and efficient problem solver than the 
government (Lifset & Lindhqvist, 2008, p. 144). 
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for municipalities in Germany (Prasad, 2006, pp. 168–171) and a shift away from top 
down environmentalism. 
Finally, and perhaps more mundanely, EPR policies represented a way to raise 
money for municipal waste programs. Berlin’s municipal waste authority was under 
pressure to cut costs as it had been accused of overcharging residents. Residents 
wanted a reduction in their tax bills (Walls, 2003, p. 1). Germany’s EPR policies were 
governed by the principle of shared responsibility: municipal governments continued 
to collect and sort discarded items and manufacturers paid for these services. 
Consequently, EPR policies meant more income for municipal waste authorities that 
were struggling to survive. 
EPR policies appeared to offer the perfect balance between market efficiency, 
technological innovation and government regulation for Germany in the late twentieth 
century. However, while the theory behind EPR underscores the importance of taking 
a more holistic, upstream approach to addressing the problem of waste, in practice, 
many EPR policies, including Germany’s ElektroG, are ultimately reduced to end-of-
pipe activities. In the following section, I explain how and why the ElektroG, 
Germany’s most recent EPR policy, fails to meet its stated objectives. 
The Drive to E-Waste Flows 
In March of 2005 the German government passed the Law on the Use, Return and 
Environmentally-Compatible Disposal of Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(ElektroG).34 This law governs the production, registration, management and disposal 
of discarded electrical and electronic equipment in Germany. The ElektroG is the 
national transposition of the European Union’s Waste Electrical and Electronic 
                                                 
34 Gesetz über das Inverkehrbringen, die Rücknahme und die umweltverträgliche Entsorgung von 
Elektro- und Elektronikgeräten. 
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Equipment Directive (WEEE directive) and the Restriction of Hazardous Substances 
Directive (RoHS directive), which went into force in January 2003.35 As noted earlier, 
the WEEE directive regulates collection and recycling of electrical and electronic 
equipment (EEE). Its objective is to minimize the quantity of EEE in the waste stream 
and to harmonize the disposal of waste from electrical and electronic equipment across 
European nations. The RoHS directive restricts the use of certain hazardous 
substances in EEE, specifically, lead, mercury, cadmium, chromium, VI 
Polybrominated biphenyl (PBB) and Polybrominated diphenylether (PBDE).36 
By the time the ElektroG passed in early 2005, Germany had been searching 
for ways to regulate its e-waste stream for nearly a decade. Already in the early 1990s, 
long before other European nations had given much serious thought to the afterlife of 
discarded electrical and electronic equipment, the Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU)37 and the Federal 
Environment Agency (UBA)38 had begun formulating a general e-waste ordinance.39 
Later, in 1998, a series of stakeholders drafted an information technology waste 
management ordinance40 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 7). However, unlike 
countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands, which implemented national e-waste 
                                                 
35 At the time of writing this dissertation, the European parliament and council were recasting the 
WEEE and RoHS directives. As a result, all involved parties, from industry representatives to member-
state environmental offices to NGOs are currently in the process of articulating their complaints and 
criticisms of the existing laws. As a result, this was a particularly exciting time to be looking into this 
issue. 
36 European directives are only enforceable once member states have transposed them into national law. 
Importantly, each member states has considerable leeway in terms of how they transpose directives. In 
other words, Germany’s transposition of the WEEE and RoHS directives varies quite a bit from Italy’s 
or France’s for example. 
37 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit. 
38 Umweltbundesamt. 
39 Elektronikschrott-Verordnung. 
40 The IT-Altgeräte-Verordnung (ITV). 
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policies prior to the finanalization of the WEEE directive, Germany became heavily 
involved in articulating a European-wide strategy. Consequently, the country 
postponed efforts to draft a national e-waste law until it could transpose the EU 
legislation into federal law. 
Though Germany only passed its e-waste law in 2005, it already had an e-
waste handling infrastructure. Over 400 German companies were involved in e-waste 
handling and treatment (Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2006). These included about 300 
disassembly plants ranging from small to medium enterprises, “social projects” that 
work with handicapped and otherwise socially marginalized individuals, non-
government and governmental charitable organizations as well as larger 
corporations.41 In addition, about 120 companies specialized in the manual and 
mechanical processing of discarded electrical and electronic equipment. These 120 
possessors—half of which were small to medium enterprises and half of which were 
larger, multinational firms—manually and mechanically processed the country’s e-
waste. Many of these firms were equipped to handle the removal of potentially 
hazardous CRT tubes and cooling elements. Together, these enterprises handled 
somewhere between 1,000 to 500,000 metric tons of e-waste per year (Deutsche 
Umwelthilfe, 2006). 
However, prior to the ElektroG, the quantity and quality of collection and 
processing varied significantly according to product type. For instance, the collection 
and handling of large household appliances by municipalities functioned quite well, 
whereas other forms of waste often ended up in the municipal waste bin. While 
                                                 
41 According to the report by the German federal government, there are currently about 50 such social 
projects in Germany today. These projects are not financially viable due to the high labor costs and thus 
their futures are precarious. For more see das Bericht der Bundesregierung zu den 
abfallwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der §§ 9 bis 13 des Elektro- und Elektronikgerätegesetzes 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 19). 
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measures were taken to handle toxic components in cooling devices, there were no 
unified collection targets or handling protocols. As a result, handling of these 
potentially hazardous components was inconsistent. Moreover, the quality and 
quantity of collection and handling varied considerably from state to state (Deutsche 
Umwelthilfe, 2006). Further, prior to the ElektroG, Germany’s e-waste sector was 
largely financed through municipal waste taxes and dumping fees (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2011, p. 7). This funding schema not only meant limited financial 
resources for collection and processing, but the depot fees also created a disincentive 
for residents to properly dispose of their unwanted technologies. Finally, monitoring 
and data collection was inconsistent at best and non-existent at worst. Given these 
limits, the country desperately needed an e-waste policy that would harmonize 
collection and handling across the country, increase recovery rates, standardize the 
treatment of toxic components, improve monitoring and data collection and raise 
funds for municipal collection and handling of the growing mountains of German e-
waste. 
Outline of the ElektroG 
After years of negotiations and debates, the German government adopted the ElektroG 
in 2005. The ElektroG has three main objectives: waste avoidance, improved recycling 
and recovery and the minimization of hazardous substances in electrical and electronic 
equipment (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011; Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2010). Waste avoidance is promoted through reuse 
and redesign.42 The ElektroG sets clear recycling and recovery targets for each 
                                                 
42 The EletroG states clearly in § 9 Abstatz 9 that reuse is a priority and that collection should take place 
in such a way that reuse and maximal recycling is possible. In order to optimize reuse and recycling, 
collection needs to be organized in such a way as to ensure minimal damage. Importantly, the law 
qualifies its prioritization of reuse by stating “as long as it is technically and economically feasible.” 
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category of e-waste. Clear restrictions on what chemicals can be used to manufacture 
products placed on the German market minimize the hazardous chemical content of 
electric and electronic equipment.43 According to the German government, the three 
goals listed above will reduce the overall environmental impact of electrical and 
electronic equipment by reducing extraction of virgin resources and minimizing the 
environmental impact of production and disposal. Furthermore, improved e-waste 
recycling and recovery will secure Germany’s access to critical raw materials (see 
Chapter 4) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 5).44 Importantly, in accordance with the 
country’s overall waste policy the Kreislaufwirtschaft und Abfallgesetz, the ElektroG 
places its two primary goals in a hierarchy: reuse and redesign supersede recovery and 
recycling (ElektroG, § 1, ¶ 1).45 
In addition to setting clear goals, Germany’s e-waste law defines e-waste, 
which is no small task46 It also identifies all stakeholders and outlines their roles and 
                                                                                                                                            
This qualification makes it easy to justify non-compliance with the reuse rule (see also ElektroG, § 11, ¶ 
1 ElektroG). 
43 Specifically, the ElektroG restricts levels higher than 0.1 percent weight of lead, mercury, hexavalent 
chromium, polybrominated biphenyls (PBBs) or polybrominated diphnyl ethers (PBDEs) for products 
placed on the market after July 1st 2006 (See ElektroG, § 5). 
44 The ElektroG also lists a series of secondary objectives: better monitoring and data collection as well 
as the harmonization of e-waste collection and handling across Germany.  
45 The German Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetzt—the country’s overall waste policy—depicts a five level 
waste management hierarchy (See KrW-/AbfG, § 6, ¶ 1). At the top of the pyramid stands Vermeidung, 
or avoidance. Next comes Vorbereitung zur Wiederverwendung, or preparation for reuse. Recycling is 
third. Fourth and fifth are Sonstige Verwertung z. B. energetische Verwertung, or other forms of 
recovery such as thermal processing and Beseitigung, or disposal respectively. For more information on 
Germany’s approach to waste management, see the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) webpage “General Information Waste Management in 
Germany” (“BMU - Waste Management,” n.d.).  
46 Annex I of the ElektroG provides an extensive list of items that fall under the purview of the 
ElektroG (Deutscher Bundestag, 2005). As I discuss in Chapter 5, classificatory systems vary from 
place to place. This is because e-waste is a broad category that includes objects ranging from toasters to 
washing machines to MP3 players. Furthermore, the category of e-waste is constantly expanding as new 
products are introduced and more and more objects become ‘digitized.’ Consequently, there is often 
considerable confusion and conflict over what should be labeled as e-waste. Section 9 of the ElektroG 
categorizes e-waste into five subsections: 1. Large household appliances and automatic dispensers 2. 
Refrigerators and freezers 3. IT and telecommunications equipment and consumer equipment 4. Gas 
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responsibilities (Curter, 1996). The ElektroG places the most demands on the 
producer.47 According to the ElektroG, producers must organize and pay for the 
responsible handling—be it reuse, recycling or disposal—of e-waste.48 The ElektroG 
sets explicit guidelines for responsible handling, and requires producers to provide 
documentation of compliance with these guidelines on a regular basis.49 Furthermore, 
the law makes producers responsible for meeting relatively high recovery and 
recycling quotas (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety, 2010, p. 2). All producers who place items on the German market 
must not only register with the federal government, but must regularly report on their 
activities as well as provide a substantial financial guarantee in the case of insolvency. 
Finally, the law compels manufacturers to disclose information on product 
composition to waste processors within one year of putting a product on the market as 
a means of rendering e-waste recycling safer and more efficient. Though in practice 
manufacturers circumvent this requirement by citing trade secret laws. 
                                                                                                                                            
discharge lamps 5. Small household appliances, lighting equipment, electric and electronic tools, toys, 
sports and leisure equipment, medical products, monitoring and control instruments. In contrast, the 
WEEE directive lists 10 categories of e-waste. The German law simplifies the classification scheme and 
uses 5 categories in order to make collection and handling more logistically possible. As municipal 
waste workers in Berlin explained to me, few collection points have enough space to accommodate ten 
separate collection containers. 
47 The category of producer includes manufacturers, importers as well as retailers that place their brand 
name on the products they sell. There has been some controversy over how the ElektroG should define 
the category of producer. For instance, it is unclear how big an enterprise has to be to be considered a 
producer. 
48 The task of organizing the end-of-life of discarded items in Germany includes mundane tasks such as 
supplying municipal waste management authorities across Germany with collection containers for each 
category of e-waste and picking these up in a timely fashion. It also involves running a national 
clearinghouse, the EAR. The EAR monitors and coordinates e-waste pickup from municipal collection 
depots across Germany. 
49 The guidelines set by the ElektroG are remarkably detailed and specific. See section 11 of the 
ElektroG for more. 
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The ElektroG applies the principles of shared responsibility.50 This means that 
whereas producers are responsible for e-waste recycling, recovery and disposal, the 
collection of household e-waste falls under the purview of the municipal waste 
management authorities.51 These public agencies are required to collect municipal e-
waste free of charge. They must then sort the collected items and make them available 
to producers (Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2006).52 It is also the responsibility of public 
waste management authorities to make residents aware of the resources available to 
them, educate residents about proper disposal protocols and sensitize them about the 
environmental and health implications of improper handling.53 Consumers, in turn, are 
obligated to dispose of their unwanted technologies in a responsible manner; the 
ElektroG makes it illegal for consumers to place items in the trash (ElektroG, § 9, ¶ 1). 
The symbol shown below—which must be placed on all electrical and electronic 
equipment placed on the German market after July 1 2006—reminds consumers of 
their civic waste duties (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
50 My translation. The original term is geteilte Produktverantwortung.  
51 A caveat, municipal waste management authorities may take over ownership of one or more 
categories of e-waste (see the ElektroG, § 9 ¶ 6). This option is called Optieren. If a municipal waste 
authority chooses to optieren a category of e-waste, they must notify the EAR of their intensions three 
months prior to taking over that particular waste stream. The waste authority must then take over 
responsibility for that waste stream for a minimum of one year. A waste management authority might 
select to optieren a category of waste if it is valuable and thus represents a source of income. Of course, 
if the waste management authority takes over the waste is must also provide documentation that the 
waste was handled according to the environmental provisions set out by the ElektroG (Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2010). In section 9 paragraph 7 & 8 it 
states that distributors and producers that wish to collect equipment and thus bypass the municipal 
collection scheme, may do so as long as they meet the requirements for environmentally sound handling 
of e-waste as described in the ElektroG. 
52 The only exception is if they provide a pick up service. In such cases the fee should cover 
transportation costs (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 10). 
53 Section 9, paragraph 2 of the ElektroG states “Public waste management authorities obligated under 
state law to dispose of WEEE must notify private households of their obligation [to separate e-waste 
from domestic waste].” 
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Figure 2. This symbol reminds German consumers that unwanted electrical and 
electronic devices do not belong in the trash. Still, a significant portion of 
discarded equipment, especially small devices such as cell phones, is thrown away 
annually. Reprinted from http://www.fuer-mensch-und-umwelt.de. 
The ElektroG also explicitly describes the duties and obligations of the Stiftung 
Elektro-Altgeräte Register (EAR—The National Register for Waste Electric 
Equipment).54 
The EAR is a non-governmental organization that operationalizes aspects of 
the ElektroG on behalf of the federal government. The EAR registers all producers in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. It also collects, processes and regularly reports data 
on e-waste to the Federal Environment Agency (UBA). In addition, the EAR must 
calculate, based on annual market share, the quantity of e-waste each producer is 
responsible for. The EAR coordinates pickups from municipal collection points across 
the country.55 As stipulated by the ElektroG, the Federal Environment Agency 
                                                 
54 For more on the EAR see http://www.stiftung-ear.de/. 
55 For a detailed list of the clearing house’s responsibilities see section 14 of the ElektroG. Chapter four 
of this dissertation also provides a description of the EAR. 
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(UBA)56 oversees the EAR and determines whether producers may be registered in 
Germany.57 
In addition to identifying all stakeholders and outlining their roles and 
responsibilities, the ElektroG sets specific collection, recycling and recovery quotas 
for each category of e-waste. Recovery quotes range between 70–80% and recycling 
quotas between 50–80%. As noted above, and in accordance with the principles of 
extended producer responsibility, the responsibility for meeting these quotas rests on 
producers (Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2006).58 The ElektroG also provides clear protocols 
for monitoring, data collection and reporting.59 Municipalities, waste processing firms 
and manufacturers are obligated to regularly report their activities to the national 
clearing house (EAR), which, in turn, reports to the Federal Environment Agency 
(UBA) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 22).60 
The ElektroG classifies e-waste as a waste that “necessitates careful 
monitoring” (Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2006, p. 4).61 Consequently, only specific waste 
handling firms are permitted to treat this waste stream. The ElektroG also gives very 
                                                 
56 For detailed explanation of the Federal Environment Agency’s roles and responsibilities, see section 
16 of the ElektroG. 
57 Importantly, this marked-based law gives the government a relatively conscribed role. Besides having 
municipal governments collect discarded items, the government’s role is restricted to “keeping 
competition alive.” The importance of keeping “competition alive” in the ElektroG is a direct response 
to problems with the 1990s packaging waste ordinance. The packaging EPR law made it easy for one 
company, the DSD, to monopolize the packaging waste management sector and drive the price of waste 
handling up considerably. (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 8). 
58 See section 12, paragraph 1 of the ElektroG. 
59 According to a recent report evaluating the ElektroG for the German parliament (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2011), Germany has exceeded the 4kg quota set by the ElektroG considerably. In fact, along 
with Sweden, Denmark and Norway, Germany exceeded 8KG collection in 2006. Germany has also 
met the recycling and recovery quotas set by the ElektroG. 
60 Specifically, producers have to report once per month to the national clearing house for private e-
waste and once a year for business-to-business waste. See § 13 of the ElektroG for more on reporting 
requirements. 
61 Besonders überwachungsbeduerftiger Abfall. 
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specific and elaborate guidelines for treatment and recovery procedures (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2011, p. 10).62 Moreover, the law calls for the annual auditing and 
recertification of processing firms (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 19).63 
Not only has the ElektroG successfully improved collection and recycling rates 
in Germany, but the market-based approach to e-waste has also made the ElektroG 
politically and economically palatable to a wide range of actors.64 Advocates of the 
ElektroG say that the law places Germany’s e-waste system in the hands of private 
firms thus maintaining competition. This is turn results in an “eco-efficient” system in 
which the costs of disposal are relatively low in relation to other European countries 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 23). 
Despite the praise for the ElektroG, many of its key provisions fall short in 
practice. I describe and analyze the shortcomings of the ElektroG below. 
Limitations of the ElektroG: Reuse 
To recall, the ElektroG states, like Germany’s overall waste policy, that reuse of 
electrical and electronic equipment represents the most effective way to minimize 
resource use and waste generation (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 18). Various 
initiatives have been put in place to promote reuse. For instance, the Federal 
Environment Ministry (UBA) and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) are collaborating with the environmental 
NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH) on a project called “Second Life.” This project 
                                                 
62 See sections 10 and 11 and Annex III of the ElektroG. 
63 See section 11, paragraph 3 of the ElektroG. 
64 The ElektroG appears to be successful. It is estimated that Germany is one of Europe’s, if not the 
world’s top e-waste collectors (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 11). Though there is still considerable 
room for improvement in terms of collection, recycling and precious metal recovery, German recycling 
and recovery rates are comparatively high. Furthermore, the law has reduced the level of toxic 
compounds in e-waste (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, pp. 21–23).  
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explores the feasibility of a quality label for second hand items as means to promote 
reuse.65 
In addition, the government supports “social projects” such as the Werkstatt 
Frankfurt e.V., which employs marginalized individuals to repair and sell discarded 
electrical and electronic equipment.66 More locally, Berlin’s BSR actively promotes 
reuse as well. Originally, the institution ran a store that sold functional discarded 
items. This store has since been replaced by an online market on the BSR website.67 
Despite these initiatives, however, only a small quantity of discarded electrical and 
electronic items have a second life as used equipment in Germany. In fact, an 
extensive report on reuse conducted by the Technical University of Braunschweig 
shows that reuse has declined from 10% to 3% since the ElektroG was introduced in 
2005 (TU Braunschweig, 2009). 
There are a number of reasons why reuse does not work in practice. Perhaps 
the most straightforward challenge is the fact that many items break during the 
collection phase and thereby become dysfunctional. Berliners are required to drop off 
their equipment at one of the city’s municipal waste depots. Each of the city’s depots 
has five separate containers, each designated for a separate category of e-waste. 
Residents often drop or toss their unwanted equipment into the containers without 
much care often damaging still-functional objects. Furthermore, many items are 
broken during the transportation process from the municipal waste depots to the initial 
waste processing facility (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 13). Waste processors 
complain that not only are many of the items they receive damaged, but valuable 
objects and components are often also removed between when they are collected and 
                                                 
65 For more information, see http://www.duh.de/wiederverwendung.html. 
66 For more information, see http://www.werkstatt-frankfurt.de. 
67 http://www.bsr.de/verschenkmarkt/list.asp. 
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when they are delivered to waste processors. The waste processers I spoke to 
suspected the collection depots or transport companies of removing and selling the 
valuable objects, parts or materials from the waste stream. 
The report on reuse by the Technical University of Braunschweig concluded 
that reuse rates could be improved considerably if more effort and care was put into 
improving e-waste collection and transportation practices (TU Braunschweig, 2009). 
Despite the report’s recommendations, however, collection and transportation 
practices remain unchanged. The problem lies in the wording of the ElektroG. The law 
states, “Where technically and financially feasible, a check must be made prior to 
treatment as to whether the waste equipment or individual components thereof can be 
sent for reuse” (ElektroG, Section 11, paragraph 1). The caveat “where technically and 
financially feasibly” makes it challenging to justify the extra cost of reuse friendly 
collection and transportation. 
Even if items were collected and transported in a reuse friendly way, there 
remains the problem that the domestic market for used goods is rather limited in 
Germany (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 18). There are a number of second-hand cell 
phone and appliance stores in Berlin. However, most of their clientele consists of 
recent immigrants. Mane of these customers prefer higher quality used equipment to 
what they perceived as less well-built cheap new technologies. Other clients purchased 
goods in bulk from these second-hand stores in order to export them to their home 
country. Traders in second-hand equipment explained that the market for these goods 
was flooded. One interviewee explained that business had gotten significantly worse 
in the past few years (personal communication, August 27, 2010). They explained to 
me that they struggled to make a living (personal communication, August 26, 2010). 
One man whose store specialized in the repair of electronic equipment explained that, 
in most instances, repair cost more than buying something new. This is because of the 
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relatively high cost of labor in Germany and because items were increasingly being 
manufactured in such a way to make repair difficult. He confided in me that the only 
reason he was still in business was because recent immigrants who, he explained, 
“don’t know that repair will cost them more than buying something new” (personal 
communication, August 27, 2010). 
While the possibilities for domestic reuse are quite limited, there exists a 
substantial market for reusable and refurbished German equipment in the developing 
world. However, export for reuse poses another set of problems. Perhaps most 
importantly, as I discuss in greater depth in Chapter 5, export for reuse is often a ruse 
for illegal export. In other words, the controversy surrounding export for reuse 
explains the considerable confusion among waste handlers in Berlin regarding the 
legality of reuse. While conducting ethnographic research at the official recycling 
centers in Berlin, I was repeatedly told by recycling center workers, as well as by a 
representative of BRAL, the semi-private company that handles e-waste recycling for 
the city, that reuse was prohibited (personal communications, November 27, 2009–
December 9, 2009). This, of course, is technically inaccurate, but the belief that reuse 
is undesirable if not illegal is firmly held among the people with whom I spoke. I was 
repeatedly told that once a product crosses the recycling center property line it 
becomes waste. Many of the workers found this policy highly disturbing, given their 
rough estimation that 80 percent of the electrical and electronic goods they collect are 
still perfectly functional when they are dropped off. One recycling center worker in a 
rather affluent part of Berlin told me that seeing what people threw away made him 
want to cry, especially since he knew so many people who were struggling to make 
ends meet (personal communication, December 9, 2009). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are number of powerful actors 
with an incentive to curtail repair and reuse. The primary goal of manufacturers such 
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as Dell, HP and Apple is to sell as many new products as possible. They embed this 
intention into the physical structure of their products by designing and manufacturing 
them to become obsolete as soon as possible (Slade, 2006).68 At the same they 
promote perceived obsolescence through advertising. Recycling and recovery firms 
also have a vested interest in minimizing reuse. Waste handling firms, from the BSR 
to processors to recovery firms need constant supply of waste to earn a profit. 
Extending a product’s life would lead to decreased consumption, which means 
decreased waste generation. Less waste translates into fewer profits for producers and 
recyclers respectively. I discuss in Chapter 4, these actors invest substantial capital in 
lobbying efforts and directly influence European and German policies regarding e-
waste handling. 
A representative of the Federal Environment Agency aptly summed up the 
problem of reuse. She explained, 
Reuse is the best way for us to achieve our goals of waste minimization and of 
lessening the environmental impact of electrical and electronic equipment, but 
there is very little reuse going on. It’s not that hard to figure out why this is the 
case. No one besides us has any interest in making reuse an attractive option. 
Producers want to sell new technologies, consumers, influenced by million-
dollar ad campaigns, want the latest models, and recyclers—ranging from 
collectors to processors to metals recovery firms—want to handle as much 
waste as possible. Reuse feels like a lost cause. In fact, since the ElektroG was 
implemented in 2005, our numbers indicate a steady decline in reuse. (personal 
communication, December 23, 2009) 
                                                 
68 Importantly, the ElektroG addresses the tendency for companies to sabotage reuse. The law states: 
“electrical and electronic equipment should, whenever possible, be designed to provide for and facilitate 
its disassembly, recycling and recovery, and particularly the reuse and recycling of WEEE and its 
components and substances. Producers should not prevent its reuse through specific design features or 
manufacturing processes, unless such specific design features or manufacturing processes present 
overriding advantages, for example with regard to the protection of human health and the environment 
or safety requirements” (ElektroG, § 4, §1). The caveat “whenever possible” makes it possible to 
bypass this requirement, however. Manufacturers easily argue that their design is necessary. 
Furthermore, they can refuse to share information on design by citing trade secret protection laws. 
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In sum extending the life of digital equipment through reuse is a priority of the 
ElektroG. However, in practice, powerful actors actively marginalize reuse. 
EcoDesign 
Since the idea of extended producer responsibility was first introduced, there has been 
considerable debate over what EPR stands for and its goals should be.69 Despite the 
lack of consensus, scholars in the field of industrial ecology generally agree that 
stimulating design for the environment was the original impetus for EPR (Clift & 
France, 2006; Lifset, 1993). As Lifset and Lindhqvist, two leading scholars in the field 
of industrial ecology, explain, “At the heart of the original version for extended 
producer responsibility was the desire for a policy strategy that could provide ongoing 
incentives for the incorporation of environmental concerns into the design of products. 
If producers were made responsible for end-of-life management (i.e. reuse, recycling, 
energy recovery, treatment and/or final disposal) of products, they would find it in 
their self-interest to anticipate end-of-life costs and obligations and design their 
products to minimize those costs” (Lifset & Lindhqvist, 2008). 
The ElektroG also stresses redesign. As the Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) explains in their summary of the 
ElektroG, “The obligation to take on responsibility for disposal management, in other 
words treatment, recovery or disposal of WEEE, aims to compel producers to 
                                                 
69 There is considerable debate over what EPR is and what its goals are or should be (Lifset & 
Lindhqvist, 2008, p. 3; Walls, 2003, p. 1). Some argue that EPR is only about waste, whereas others 
claim that it refers to the entire lifecycle of a product. Some governments see EPR primarily as a means 
to raise funds for recycling programs, whereas others see it as a means to stimulate redesign. What 
some call “downstream EPR” concentrates on minimizing how much waste is landfilled and 
incinerated. Others include design for diposal under the label of downstream EPR. Promoters of 
“upstream EPR,” in turn, “argue that EPR should be aimed at optimizing the environmental performace 
of a product throughout the life (Lindhqvist, 1998) Castell et al. (2004) argue that the lack of agreement 
over the meaning of EPR watered down the effectiveness of the WEEE directive and the ElektroG. See 
also (Khetriwal et al., 2009) for more on the various objectives of EPR. 
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incorporate the entire life cycle of their products into their calculations” (Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2010). In a 
section on the environmental goals of the ElektroG, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, a 
prominent environmental NGO, writes: “A significant aspect of the ElektroG is 
producer responsibility, that is, producers cover the cost of disposing and recycling 
equipment. The goal of this intervention is to encourage producers to take the entire 
lifecycle of their products into consideration, and not just until the point of purchase. 
This is intended to create incentives for producers to design high quality, easily 
manually disassembled and long-lasting productions. Recycling alone does not make 
products ‘green’”(“Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V.,” n.d.). 
However, much like reuse, the ElektroG does not meet this goal for a number 
of reasons. The literature analyzing existing EPR policies and programs underscores 
the challenges with actually incentivizing design for the environment through EPR 
policies. For instance, a report by the United Nations University on EPR states, “there 
is no evidence that the WEEE Directive has led to design for the environment” (J 
Huisman et al., 2008; Lifset & Lindhqvist, 2008). Analogously, in an essay evaluating 
the Swiss e-waste handling system, which is purportedly the most effective e-waste 
system in the world, the authors admit in the conclusion that the Swiss system excels 
in collection and recycling but has considerable room to improve in terms of redesign. 
The authors write, despite the fact that the Swiss e-waste system is based on the idea 
of EPR, in practice “it provides little incentive to producers to design more 
environmentally friendly products or to consumers to influence buying habits” 
(Khetriwal et al., 2009, p. 164). The problem is that in practice the disposal-design 
feedback chain contains a number of loopholes. These problems with EPR are perhaps 
most pronounced in the case of e-waste (Castell et al., 2004; Clift & France, 2006). 
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A number of the challenges to the success of Germany’s EPR-based e-waste 
law are directly linked to e-waste’s unique properties. Unlike packaging, which has a 
relatively short lifespan, electrical and electronic equipment are kept for comparatively 
longer period (Tojo, 2001, p. 36). At the same time, innovation and change is very 
rapid in the electronic and electrical equipment industry. Thus, by the time products 
become waste and give “feedback” to manufacturers, manufacturers have moved on to 
making entirely different products (Tojo, 2001, p. 22). An engineer working at a large 
manufacturing firm explained why design for the environment through EPR does not 
work in practice: “There’s not much benefit of working on an end-of-life benefit in a 
TV, which comes back after 15 years [. . .]. We stopped selling CRT TVs probably 
almost ten years ago now, but we’re only getting CRT TVs back as waste (personal 
communication, January 21, 2010).” Thus, by the time the CRT televisions were 
returned, the ‘feedback’ they gave was entirely irrelevant to the design and 
manufacture of new products. 
Moreover, the material composition of a product has a significant impact on 
the success of EPR policies (Tojo, 2001). The more complicated a product, the more 
challenging it becomes for EPR policies to incentivize design changes (Tojo, 2001, p. 
41). E-waste is one of the most complex waste streams in the world. For instance, a 
printer contains over 34 different types of plastic. A television is made up of over 
4,300 different chemicals. To complicate matters further, most products are loaded 
with various toxic compounds (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 5). For this reason, e-
waste is challenging and often very expensive to handle and attempts at redesign are 
correspondingly difficult (Walls, 2003, p. 17). In other words, e-waste’s unique 
materiality makes it challenging to reconnect processes of making and unmaking. 
To complicate matters, manufacturers are not really manufacturers anymore. 
This means that making them responsible for the end-of-life of their products has 
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virtually no impact on their design choices. The engineer I quoted above highlighted 
this problem repeatedly during our interview. He explained: 
For us, as [manufacturers] we don’t make the panels [for flat screen 
televisions]. For us, it’s –commodity is maybe not the right word, but it’s a 
module we buy in from another country. [. . .]. Things changed because of 
different business models. [. . .]. Where traditionally we were a company that 
would develop and make everything ourselves, now we’re also shifting more 
to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), buying other products is from 
other companies, buying complete modules and then putting them together. 
[. . .] But that stopped, because we didn’t have so much in-house development, 
and it’s not happening in [city where company is headquartered]—it’s 
happening in China and other countries. [. . .] We got approached by [a 
recycling firm] to sit in a discussion group on how to deal with [the LCD TVs 
we produce] and we said “OK, I’ll join.” But there’s one problem—we don’t 
make those modules, so yes, we can contribute, we can share facts and 
information with you [. . .]. We can’t come up with the solutions because we 
don’t make them ourselves anymore, (personal communication, January 21, 
2010) 
Another executive concurred, 
 . . . our challenge from a supply chain perspective, is much more control. We 
don’t make screws—I’ll just take an example—we buy screws from the 
market, from wholesalers, who buy them from different vendors around the 
world. It’s very, very difficult for us to go down and really check that a really 
small factory somewhere applies the environmental protections to make 
screws. So the challenge for manufacturers like [name of company] is very 
much controlling the supply chain of the environmental process. And here 
there is a big gap in local enforcement of environmental legislation. The EU 
legislation in many countries is too lax. (March 9, 2010) 
Indeed, more often than not, companies such as Philips or Dell outsource 
production to a number of firms connected across the globe via commodity chains, 
and only add their name brand to the goods that they buy. As such these firms have 
little knowledge, and thus impact, on the ways in which the products they sell are 
produced. Further, because of the ways in which production has been restructured in 
the past twenty years, there is no longer a single manufacturer that can be held 
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accountable for its products. As another high-ranking executive of a large computer 
manufacturing firm explained to me, production practices had changed considerably in 
the last two decades. Whereas in the early 1990s, when Germany’s packaging waste 
ordinance passed, many manufacturers were located in Germany, today there is nearly 
no production in the country. The executive claimed, 
Well, the producers of course already at [the time of the packaging waste 
ordinance] were not only in Germany, but there were still many producers in 
Germany, yes, there was more production available at that time in Germany, 
there was also in Germany more research and development departments of 
companies to develop appliances. So I remember that in that preamble, I 
involved our R&D department, and remember for instance, in [names four 
specific manufacturing firms], they all had their R&D and production people 
involved in this process. Nowadays there’s very little production left, and 
indeed very little research left in Germany, unfortunately, so you would not 
have today access to all these people. So I think that is a big difference 
between now and let’s say, 15 years ago. It is a significant change, and if you 
would have to do that today again in the same very early learning curve, we 
would need much more time. Because here we could talk across the street with 
production and R&D people, and nowadays I would have to talk to somebody 
in probably the US or in India or in China. So that is a big, big, big difference. 
(personal communication, March 09, 2010) 
In addition, manufacturers complained that they had very little control of their 
products once they were discarded. As one high-ranking executive explained during 
our discussion of the actors involved in unmaking, 
It’s not so informal. It’s really brokers, these companies at least who buy from 
Deutsche Bank are in the meantime bigger companies who are making several 
hundred—several million dollars a year. It’s not just the informal unemployed 
person who comes and collects waste. It’s really companies who do some 
refurbishment, mainly in completing the product. Because if they buy from 
Deutsche Bank a printer, this printer most likely doesn’t have a driver with it, 
maybe nor a manual, maybe not the right power cord. So those guys who are 
taking it, they may not repair a printer because it’s not broken, but they just 
complete it so they can resell it. But the point is the stuff is out of our hands 
completely. And we cannot tell the customer, the Deutsche Bank, what they 
have to do with it. So that’s what I see as a development—more and more, we 
as manufacturers don’t have control over the e-waste. (personal 
communication, March 9, 2010) 
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Important here is the fact that manufacturers are not simply competing with a 
wily informal sector, but also with large powerful and well organized brokers that 
trade in end-of-life products. These products carry the manufacturer’s name, and it is 
the manufacturer who suffers the consequences of bad publicity when images of their 
products in e-wastelands surface in the global media. 
In brief, they key issue is that we live in a time in which there is a radical 
separation between making and unmaking. The project of reintegrating making and 
unmaking is challenging because the legislative framework remains state-centric and 
focused on formal processes and actors. It cannot address the fact that Germany is a 
place that is constituted by economic, social, environmental relations—both formal 
and informal—that extended beyond its borders. 
Not only state-centrism, but also the ability to diffuse responsibility, 
undermines EPR policies. In order for EPR to work, manufacturers must “feel” the 
consequence of their design choices. However, because the ElektroG defines 
responsibility rather loosely, manufacturers can, and mostly do, contract out disposal 
to third parties, called end-of-life service providers (Lifset & Lindhqvist, 2008, p. 
144). As such, besides writing a check, companies end up taking on very little 
responsibility for the end of their products’ lives. The ability to outsource their 
responsibilities renders the feedback mechanism imbedded in the ElektroG virtually 
impotent. 
Furthermore, in current formulations of the ElektroG, responsibility for e-
waste can be shared among all producers and divided according to current market 
share. Because manufacturers share responsibility there is little incentive for 
individual companies to take on the costs of designing more eco-friendly products. To 
use the company Apple as an example: Apple has to share the costs of recycling all e-
waste in Germany. Since Apple is not merely accountable for the actual products it 
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produces, that is, it is not individually responsible, investing in designing green 
products at a higher cost places them at a market disadvantage over competitors who 
design difficult to recycle yet cheaper goods. An engineer at a large manufacturing 
firm explained, 
Whatever type of investment you make, and also looking at the recycling 
processes themselves, it’s much more or less focused on shredding. Sometimes 
you have to do some de-pollution, so you have to take out, for example a TV, 
the CR tube has to be treated separately. For years, that’s what’s been 
happening. So there’s some manual labor involved, people who dismantle the 
TV, take out the tube. The latest recycling treatment processes, you don’t even 
have to do that anymore. You just put it together in the shredder, and you still 
separate the waste streams afterwards, because of all the various improved 
filtering techniques and technology. 
So you can invest in a product today, but you have no idea how it’s 
going to be treated when it comes back. And what else is in that same stream 
when it comes back. So unless you do it all separately, individually, you’re 
unlikely to get any payback on that investment. And if there is a payback, the 
chances are unlikely that another party has already gotten hold of that product 
and taken it out for you. [Here is a] famous example: a few years ago, we had a 
nice presentation from [a computer manufacturer] at a conference in Berlin, 
and they were painting a nice picture about their products. They were investing 
in their products so that when they came back they could retail more value 
from those products [. . .] And a very simple question from the audience was, 
or remark from the audience was to say, “OK, that’s good to know, because in 
a few years, I’ll start collecting [your] products because I know there’s a value 
in there. And there is nothing you can do to stop me.” At which point the 
presenter got very upset, and he got upset because it was exactly the weak 
point. And that is what we are faced with, with the informal and non-registered 
systems, if a product retains representative value, it will never reach you. 
Whatever investment you make into a product, the chances that you will 
actually get a benefit from that investment is very small. (personal 
communication, January 21, 2010) 
A 2007 report by the German environmental consulting firm, Ökopol (Sander 
et al., 2007), explained that the WEEE directive (and consequently the ElektroG) as it 
is formulated now, “makes it nearly impossible for producers to benefit from 
investments in product design that minimize the cost or improve the environmental 
performance of their products at the end of life” (Lifset & Lindhqvist, 2008, p. 145). 
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The idea of the individual producer responsibility versus collective 
responsibility was introduced as a means to overcome the problems with collective 
schemes (Lifset & Lindhqvist, 2008, p. 3). Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) 
distinguishes itself from general extended producer responsibly in that it makes 
manufacturers directly responsible for the specific physical items they sell. The idea is 
that if manufacturers were forced to take back their own products they would have a 
greater incentive to redesign. In addition, they would be less likely to be outcompeted 
by their cost-cutting competitors. A number of manufacturers such as Electrolux, IBM 
and Sony are in favor of IPR and have joined forces with environmental groups and 
scholars to form an advocacy group called IPR Works.70 Advocates of IPR stress that 
without individual responsibility “the core objectives of EPR will be lost” (Lifset & 
Lindhqvist, 2008, p. 145). 
To clarify: technically, according to the WEEE directive and the ElektroG, all 
non-historical waste—that is waste that was produced after national laws went into 
effect—should in fact be handled according to an individual responsibility scheme. In 
other words, in the case of Germany, HP would only technically have to handle 
discarded HP products that were placed on the market after 2005. German 
policymakers foresaw that an individual responsibility scheme would be more likely to 
realize the original goal of the ElektroG, and this is why the WEEE directive and the 
ElektroG favored individual responsibility. 
However, few European member states actually transposed individual 
responsibility into national law and of those that did, none have been able to 
effectively run a system in which e-waste is separated and returned to individual 
producers. According to the 2007 Ökopol study on EPR (Sander et al., 2007), only 9 
                                                 
70 For more information, see http://www.iprworks.org/contact.asp. 
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out of the EU 27 member states formulated their national e-waste laws in such a way 
that clearly privileges individual responsibility. The other states either passed 
legislation with vague language or entirely excluded any mention of IPR (Sander et 
al., 2007). Though the ElektroG has adopted IPR, in practice collective responsibility 
takes precedence as industry representatives as well as government officials believe 
IPR is too costly and logistically impossible to implement. 
The challenge with implementing an individual responsibility program is that 
tracking and coordinating a system in which every company receives its own, and only 
its own, discarded technologies would be, as one official at the 
Bundesumweltministerium (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety, BMU) plainly stated, “a logistical nightmare” 
(personal communication, December 23, 2009). Other interviewees stressed that IPR 
was “unreasonably costly.” To complicate matters, individual physical responsibility 
creates a disincentive for collection, since the more is collected the more 
manufacturers have to pay (Tojo, 2001, p. 211). As such, IPR could further incentivize 
illegal export. 
Not only is it difficult to create and uphold a feedback mechanism that makes 
producers “feel” or internalize the costs of disposal, but, much as in the case of reuse, 
many of the actors involved in the process of unmaking have a vested interested in 
keeping things the way they are. In 2009, during the course of my field research, I 
heard an executive for one of the world’s largest e-waste processing firms, Sims 
Recycling Solutions, blatantly tell a group of engineers and social scientists interested 
in green ICT design: “To all of you interested in design for recycling, give it up right 
now. You’re wasting your time. We’re not interested. Design for recycling does not 
add value. We can recycle the e-waste with the machines we have. Focus on 
something else” (personal communication, September 9, 2009). 
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Ironically, the executive made this statement during a presentation at the 
“Solving the E-waste Problem Conference.” The conference, which was organized by 
the United Nations University, was intended to bring together PhD students in 
engineering and the social sciences who were conducting promising research on e-
waste, and who would, it was believed, eventually help find ways to solve the global 
e-waste problem. One of the problems with the conference, however, was that, 
according to Sims, a powerful, well-connected and politically active multi-national 
corporation, and incidentally also one of the primary hosts of the conference, there 
was no real e-waste problem to speak of. Or, to be more accurate, for this company 
that had invested significant amount of capital in high-tech recycling technologies, the 
problem of e-waste was a question of improved collection and recycling. The problem 
was not consumption or design. This way of framing the problem makes it possible to 
maintain capitalism’s linearity—where production, use and disposal are discrete, 
successive stages of a commodity’s lifecycle—intact. It leaves no room to question the 
premise that capitalism and unbridled consumption represent the inevitable pinnacle of 
social organization. 
Notably, not only high-powered firms but also informal waste handlers are 
dependent on growing waste production and thus have an interest in sabotaging waste 
avoidance initiatives, though the latter actors have little recourse to formally further 
their interests. The scavengers and exporters I interviewed in Berlin and Hamburg 
were clear that their livelihood relied in large part on German’s consumption patterns. 
Analogously, during the course of my fieldwork in Ghana in 2009, it quickly became 
apparent that the children that informally recycled e-waste in Agbogbloshie market 
needed rich Europeans to keep discarding their electronics and exporting them to 
Ghana. However disturbing the situation in Agbogloshie market is, in the end, the 
more waste was brought there, the more these children are able to sustain themselves. 
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Recovery and Recycling 
The ElektroG also seeks to improve domestic recycling and recovery rates. The law 
sets a collection target of 4 kg per resident per year. As noted earlier, Germany has not 
only successfully met its goals but it has also exceeded it in some years by more than 
100% (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011). A target of 4 kg per person per year is relatively 
low for a country like Germany, given how much waste is produced each year. The 
target was set this low to make it possible for other European member states with less 
sophisticated collection infrastructure or less production of e-waste to meet it. 
Still, Germany continues to export a significant portion of its waste. Part of 
why so much e-waste escapes is that ElektroG systematically ignores scavengers, 
informal recyclers and used EEE brokers, who play a central, yet largely unseen, role 
in Germany’s e-waste management system. This informal sector is a significant 
hindrance to Germany’s ability to improve its recycling and recovery rates (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2011, p. 6; Tojo, 2001, p. 23). 
German officials have a hard time accepting that such an informal sector exists 
in Germany. As a German government official working at the Hamburg port 
explained, “The problem in Germany is that we can’t imagine, let alone accept, that 
we have an informal sector. We can see informality in developing countries. We can 
even accept that there is informality in France, but not Germany” (personal 
communication, March 04, 2010). Regardless of German administrators’ wishful 
thinking, however, the country’s informal e-waste sector is not only alive but well. It 
is also remarkably complex and diverse (see Chapter 4 for more on Germany’s 
informal sector). 
In the draft proposal for the revised WEEE directive, the European government 
proposes to shift the recycling target from 4 kilograms of WEEE per capita, per year 
to 65% of the weight of EEE placed on the market in the two preceding years. Shifting 
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the target from a weight to a percentage, claims the EU government, will even out the 
playing field between member countries. Increasing the overall collection mandate is 
obviously intended to increase recycling and thus minimize waste generation. 
Producers, however, argue that increasing the target without taking the existence of 
informal recyclers and used EEE brokers into account, forces producers to either find 
a way to shut down the informal market in EEE, or gives them no choice but to 
purchase used goods from informal handlers in order to meet the high collection goals 
set by the government. In effect, producers claim that by increasing the collection 
target without cracking down on informal brokers who “hoard” up to 80 percent of 
Germany’s e-waste, the government makes producers responsible for stopping the 
informal market, something they adamantly assert goes well beyond their 
responsibilities as private companies. 
Not only does the ElektroG’s failure to recognize the informal sector place 
unrealistic expectations on industry, but because Germany’s e-waste law does not take 
the informal globalized e-waste economy into account—that is, because of its 
methodological formalism—it enables the displacement of the health and 
environmental costs of e-waste disposal onto the developing world. As informality is 
not acknowledged, export through informal channels continues. Not only informality 
but also the globalization of unmaking eludes the ElektroG. The past twenty years 
have seen a rapid reorganization of the global recycling industry. Formerly recycling 
firms were generally small and medium-sized, often family-run, local operations. 
Today, a handful of multi-national corporations dominate the global recycling sector.71 
                                                 
71 For a fascinating account of the recent reorganization and globalization of the American scrap metal 
industry see “American Scrap” in The New Yorker, January 18th, 2008. 
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Conclusion 
Since the rise of modern capitalism during the nineteenth century, Germany has 
struggled to handle its waste. The struggle has been punctuated by two major waste 
crises. In response to the first waste crisis the federal republic built landfills and later 
incinerators. However, these tactics of displacement were only temporary. Germany 
faced a second waste crisis during the 1970s and 1980s. This time, policymakers, 
NGOs and the general public recognized mass consumption as key to the waste 
problem. However, liberal economic theory dominated at the time. Thus, German 
lawmakers introduced market-based environmental policies based on the idea of 
extended producer responsibility. Germany’s EPR-based waste policies promised to 
reconcile social and environmental objectives with the goals of increasing profit and 
economic growth. Consequently, they became very popular and palatable among 
many actors in and outside of Germany. 
Though EPR policies certainly represent an improvement from end-of-pipe 
solutions in that they acknowledge capitalism’s role in creating the waste problem, 
such incentive-based policies often fail to meet their stated objectives. In this chapter I 
have argued, using the example of Germany’s most recent EPR policy—the ElektroG, 
that while the law tries to internalize that which the market usually externalizes, it 
obscures other things. Specifically, because of the fact that given the way the law is 
formulated responsibility remains at odds with market survival of firms. Profit seeking 
manufacturers, recycling and recovery firms and even the informal sector have a 
vested interest in stopping waste avoidance as their income is contingent on as much 
consumption as possible. Thus, their incentive to elevate profit stands in direct 
opposition to the ElektroG’s goals of waste avoidance through reuse and redesign. 
Furthermore, the ElektroG’s mechanism to stimulate redesign through holding 
manufacturers responsible is watered down because the market-based law allows 
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manufacturers to hire end of life services providers to work on their behalf. Individual 
responsibility policies, though more likely to successfully stimulate green design and 
though mandated by the WEEE directive, are rarely applied because they are deemed 
too costly and thus “unrealistic.” 
The pervasiveness of neoliberal economic thought heavily circumscribes what 
“solutions” to the problem of e-waste policymakers and even environmental NGO 
employees consider. Keeping costs down and increasing profit shapes the parameters 
of what is deemed a “realistic” or “possible” solution to the problem of e-waste. The 
profound importance of economic efficiency is clearly evident in the ElektroG’s 
caveat that efforts to improve reuse and redesign are only to be pursued if they are 
“economically realistic” (ElektroG, 11, 1). In fact, according to Castell et al. (2004, p. 
6), economic considerations superseded health and environmental protection 
objectives during negotiations over the WEEE directive, which in turn had direct 
impacts on the ElektroG. Policymakers were very concerned that environmental policy 
would not violate trade agreements and WTO rules. Such caveats make it easy to 
abandon interventions that would threaten profits. 
The extent to which the discourse of economic feasibly has permeated the 
discourse on e-waste is quite striking. Nearly all the stakeholders I spoke to 
throughout the course of my research refused to seriously consider solutions to the 
problem of values that supersede the market. A representative of a large European 
environmental group explained during an interview that NGOs were forced to speak in 
the language of economic feasibility if they wanted to be taken seriously: 
We’ve got to—not to speak in the language of profitability, but to integrate 
that into a constraint to make things practical. I don’t say I fully agree with 
this, I don’t say that we should always consider the environment with what 
kind of business we can make out of it. It’s rather unfortunate, I repeat, I think 
from an NGO point of view, that at the end of the day, if you want to make 
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things happen, you’ve got to be realistic about this issue. (personal 
communication, November 19, 2009) 
Other NGO workers were less critical of the pressures to speak economics. 
Many of my interviewees began to laugh when I asked why they did not focus on 
campaigns that would address mass consumption. One respondent openly stated, 
“Trying to get people to consume less? That’s simply ridiculous. Even if it were 
possible, we don’t want that. That would be mean going backwards in time” (personal 
communication, July 9, 2008). 
Of the many NGO representatives I spoke to only one was openly critical of 
the economistic logic that dominated the discourse on e-waste in Europe. In the quote 
below, the NGO employee is responding to a question on the Best of Two Worlds 
project. This project proposes to create a global division of labor in which electrical 
and electronic equipment is manually disassembled in the developing world and the 
valuable circuit boards containing precious and rare earth elements are shipped to 
Europe for high tech recovery (for more on the Best of Two Worlds Project see 
Chapter 5). 
He stated, 
Okay, but for me, I can understand that as an economical justification, but as 
long as we send our waste to other countries, even if it’s done properly so that 
they can in a way take charge of disassembling, recycling, treating them, and 
sending them back to us, I think it’s not a strong appeal for us to start changing 
our consumption patterns. So to be honest, for me it’s not a problem even if it’s 
more costly here. I can understand that it’s difficult, and that we’ve got to deal 
with social fairness and social acceptability, accessibility to consumption, but 
for me, if we had to treat our waste here at a bit more expense—well, then let’s 
have it treated here and be more expensive. Then maybe if the product is more 
expensive, people would pay more attention to it. The whole idea is how can 
we create patterns so that people can access the modern technology and things 
like this, so it’s all about how we can create another item of ideas—I’m not an 
expert on that, but how we can create the structure to give access to people, but 
paying the right price in terms of what it costs. So as long as you say, “Okay, 
it’s cheaper to have it dismantled there, then what’s the incentive for us to 
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behave differently? That’s my question. (personal communication, November 
19, 2009) 
In the course of my research I rarely came across discussion of other values 
that supersede the value of making more money; no one took seriously the idea of 
asking people to “pay more” as the man I cite above suggests. 
The challenges of implementing a policy that actually stimulates redesign led a 
number of stakeholders, including the United Nations University, to claim that efforts 
to create circular systems should be abandoned. However, advocates of EPR policies, 
stress that an “EPR justified solely in terms of landfill diversion is an impoverished 
policy strategy.” They explain that, “the special value of EPR is not realized unless 
there are incentives for (re)design of products, distribution and logistical networks, 
and a host of other environmentally related innovations” (Lindhqvist, 1998, p. 7). 
Nonetheless, in a 2008 review of the WEEE directive, the United Nations University 
argued for the abandonment of the original goals of WEEE directive—namely waste 
avoidance and the stimulation of a circular economy (Lindhqvist, 1998, p. 7). The 
authors argued that the WEEE directive’s goals should be to increase recycling and 
recovery and raise funds for waste collection schemes. Stimulating green design and a 
circular economy is simply not possible because it is not cost effective, they 
maintained. Thus, as the case of the ElektroG suggests, as long as policies aimed at 
creating a circular, more green economy allow for competitive pressure between firms 
to prevail and do not address the methodological state-centrism and formality, there is 
little hope for EPR policies to usher in a circular economy. In fact, as other scholars 
working on market-based environmental policies have shown, incentive-based 
“solutions” to environmental problems, though very palatable to a range of actors, 
often fail to meet their objects because of what they obscure and ignore (Lohmann, 
2006; Neyland & Simakova, 2012, p. 37). Consequently, in practice, they often make 
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matters worse by “recycling the problem as the solution” (McMichael, personal 
communication, August 23, 2013). 
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CHAPTER 4: DER KAMPF UM DEN ABFALLSTROM: THE STRUGGLE OVER 
THE WASTE STREAM 
Overview 
In the summer of 2009, as part of my year conducting dissertation field research, I 
visited, along with a number of other researchers, the impressive sprawling 
headquarters of a Belgian mining company at the forefront of global e-waste 
recycling. Before they allowed us to enter the premises, our guides asked us to sign 
comprehensive confidentiality forms and hand over our cameras and cell phones for 
the duration of the visit. In addition, each visitor obtained a personalized security 
badge. We needed the badge to enter and exit the main building, as well as to pass 
through security checkpoints during the tour. They warned us to keep close to our tour 
guides and avoid deviating from the path. The tour culminated in randomized searches 
of our persons and bags—apparently a daily occurrence for visitors and employees. 
Having made it through the final checkout, my colleague turned to me and whispered 
“All this trouble for trash?” 
Indeed what my trip to the e-waste recycling facility made plainly visible was 
that e-waste can be an extremely valuable resource—a resource worth investing in, 
protecting, and fighting over. Over the past decade, the Belgian mining company, 
which has been in the mining business for well over two hundred years, has invested 
upwards of 250 million Euros in developing the world’s most state-of-the-art metals 
recycling facility. While the facility has the capacity to handle multiple metal-rich 
waste streams, e-waste holds a particularly high rank among the detritus handled at the 
plant. The representatives I interviewed routinely referred to e-waste as “urban ore” 
and stressed that the handling of discarded electrical and electronic goods represented 
the new frontier in precious metals mining. “As global consumption of high-tech 
goods increases and the combination of political instability and dwindling natural 
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reserves restricts access to metals needed for the production of high-tech goods, e-
waste will grow into a strategic and immensely profitable material stream” predicted 
the company engineers (personal communication, Sep. 11 2009).72 Indeed, according 
to the company’s website, their Belgian facility should be thought of as “our very own 
Fort Knox” (accessed 28 May 2012). 
E-waste is a hot commodity. Various actors, such as the Belgian mining 
company I visited, struggle to control this strategic material stream. I use the term 
struggle consciously, since, far from straightforward and unproblematic, the disposal 
process is characterized by conflict and contestation. In this chapter, I outline and 
analyze what one German government official dubbed as “der Kampf um den 
Abfallstrom,” or the struggle over the waste stream. I begin by taking a closer look at 
how Germany’s e-waste policies translate into practice. I describe e-waste’s path once 
it has been discarded, introduce the various actors involved in Germany’s e-waste 
networks and describe how they handle and, where applicable, transform discarded 
electrical and electronic technologies. Following waste engineers, I separate the e-
waste chain into three phases: 1) collection; 2) pre-processing; and 3) recovery 
(Chancerel et al., 2009; Deubzer, 2011). Importantly, though I separate the formal and 
informal networks here for the sake of clarity, I wish to stress that in practice the 
boundary between these two chains is porous. Actors and objects move fluidly 
between these two networks. Further, the phases of processing sometimes overlap, 
particularly in the informal processing chain. 
Specifically, I argue that disposal is a complex social process worthy of social 
scientific analysis (Gregson et al., 2005; Gregson et al., 2007). In other words, an 
object’s story does not end when an object is labeled as trash. Rather, another equally 
                                                 
72 In fact, rising prices have motivated some companies to re-mine previously abandoned mine-tailings. 
See for example, “Remining in 10 historic tailings dames probed” (Kolver, 2007). 
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compelling social, political, economic and cultural tale of unmaking begins once 
something is discarded. Moreover, e-waste’s physical characteristics influence the 
recycling process and play a role in determining who can legitimately—in terms of 
meeting environmental and efficiency standards—extract value out of e-waste. In 
other words, the struggle over e-waste cannot be reduced to politics and power alone. 
As we will see again, materiality—in the sense of values and relationships crystallized 
into material properties—matters. 
Collection Phase 
According to the ElektroG, the responsibility for collecting e-waste lies with 
municipal waste management authorities, which in Berlin is the Berlin Stadt 
Reinigung (BSR). Producers, also referred to as original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs), in turn, are responsible for the environmentally sound recycling of discarded 
equipment. This division of labor and responsibility between public and private 
entities is referred to as geteilte Produktverantwortung or shared product 
responsibility.73 As noted in Chapter 3, an independent clearinghouse, the Elektro-
Altgerätregister (EAR), supervises and coordinates Germany’s dual e-waste system.74 
Technically, the legal responsibility for collection and disposal lies with the municipal 
waste authorities and OEMs respectively.75 However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, both 
parties can contract out their obligations to private third parties. In Germany, nearly all 
                                                 
73 For a detailed discussion of “geteilte Produktverantwortung” and an extensive explanation of why 
collection remains in the hands of the municipal government in Germany, see: Das Bericht der 
Bundesregierung zu den abfallwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der §§ 9 bis 13 des Elektro- und 
ElektronikgerätegesetzesBericht (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, pp. 6–10).  
74 Das Bericht der Bundesregierung zu den abfallwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der §§ 9 bis 13 des 
Elektro- und ElektronikgerätegesetzesBericht (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 5), provides a clear 
description of EAR’s function and the institution’s relationship to the UBA. Importantly, the report 
explains that there has been quite bit of conflict over the EAR algorhythm. This conflict even resulted 
in a court case (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, pp. 9, 17). 
75 According to the ElektroG retailers are also permitted to collect electrical and electronic equipment.  
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producers take advantage of this option and hire end-of-life full-service providers 
(ESP). ESPs are private firms that handle anything from registering and reporting 
duties, to pick-up, storage, recycling, recovery and disposal of e-waste. Importantly, it 
is technically illegal for private third parties to collect municipal e-waste unless they 
have been contracted to do so by the BSR. As we will see below, however, this law is 
challenging to enforce. 
According to formal collection schemes, unwanted electrical and electronic 
equipment should be dropped off at one of Berlin’s 15 Recyclinghöfe, the city’s 
recycling stations scattered around the city.76 In addition, as of 2011, Berlin has 
introduced the “Orange Box,” which according to the city’s advertisement, campaign 
represents “den Recyclinghof vor Ihre Haustür” or the recycling center at your 
doorstep. Orange boxes collect all “Wertstoffe” or valuable materials, including metal-
rich items ranging from pots to plastic toys to untreated wood to textiles as well as e-
waste. These boxes are located in the courtyards of apartment buildings or anywhere 
else the city’s assortment of recycling containers can be found. The boxes are meant to 
address the problem that many Berliners did not, or could not, transport their items—
particularly small gadgets—to official collections depots. Though, as noted above, 
private actors are technically forbidden from collecting waste in Germany, for various 
historical reasons, the recycling firm ALBA also collects a portion of the city’s e-
waste in its Gelbe Tonne Plus or Yellow Bin Plus collection bins. Finally, the BSR 
also provides a pick-up service for items that are too big to fit into the orange box. 
Few residents take advantage of this option, however, as it is costly and inconvenient. 
                                                 
76 Other cities have regular collection days during which residents place their unwanted items on the 
curb. However, this practice makes it easier for what the German government refers to as “thieves” to 
collect discarded materials. These informal collectors note official pick up days and do collection 
rounds before he municipal waste management authority (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 12). 
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The city’s recycling stations collect a wide range of recyclables including 
paper, plastics, textiles and unwanted electrical and electronic goods. Upon arrival at 
the recycling stations, Berliners are asked to sort their e-waste into separate containers 
provided by the manufacturers. In theory, once a container is full, the BSR notifies the 
clearing house (EAR). The EAR then contacts the next manufacturers in line to pick 
up the e-waste. The ElektroG stipulates that the turnaround time between notification 
and pickup should take no longer than a few days. In reality, however, the process can 
take four to six days, and sometimes even longer. Because of limited space, Berlin’s 
waste authority collaborates with a third-party BRAL Reststoff-Bearbeitungs GmbH. 
BRAL collects e-waste from the recycling depots and transports it to a larger facility 
outside the city center. BRAL notifies the EAR and submits relevant data pertaining to 
types and quantities of e-waste collected on behalf of the city. 
Though the BSR mainly handles municipal e-waste, the city will also accept up 
to five items from small firms as well as up to twenty items from small companies. 
Private firms, businesses, larger institutions such as hospitals, schools and retailers do 
not go through the BSR. These firms and institutions are required to pay for 
environmentally sound and socially responsible collection and disposal through 
private channels. In contrast to the public disposal process, private networks of 
unmaking is not easily monitored or regulated.77 
                                                 
77 The responsibility to for the waste stream is not shared with municipal waste authorities as is the case 
for municipal waste. The language used in the ElektroG on business-to-business (B2B) e-waste remains 
rather vague. The law stipulates that producers must give businesses reasonable opportunities to return 
their devices (zumutbare Möglichkeiten zur Rückgabe) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, p. 5). The law also 
allows for businesses and producers to come to alternative arrangements. (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, 
p. 10). The vagueness of this statement helps explain why there is relatively little data on B2B e-waste.  
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Pre-processing 
The municipal waste authority hands over collected items to pre-processors. First, pre-
processors break equipment into their constitutive parts: plastic casings, glass and 
metal-containing components. At this point, the firms extract hazardous components 
and substances such as the mercury-containing backlights of LCD monitors or 
batteries. They also take out valuable components such a printed circuit boards, 
processors or components that can be used as spare parts.78 This breaking apart can be 
done manually or, if the cost of labor is too high, mechanically. Some facilities 
specialized in e-waste pre-processing claim to have the technological capacities to 
break equipment apart while keeping components intact. 
Technically, the municipal waste management authority’s role in the recycling 
chain is restricted to collecting and sorting unwanted electrical and electronic 
equipment. Private so-called end-of-life service providers take over pre-processing 
and recovery for the manufacturers. However, according to the ElektroG, all 
municipal waste authorities have das Recht zu Eigenvermarktung, or the right to 
assume ownership of any category of e-waste for at least one year.79 Selling e-waste 
components and fractions represents an important source of revenue for the 
municipality, and thus the waste authority frequently takes advantage of this option. In 
Berlin, the waste authority extends the right to a private firm called BRAL. BRAL 
                                                 
78 Obviously, the terms toxic, hazardous and valuable are anything but static. As I argue throughout this 
dissertation, these definitions fluctuate over time and space. For instance, presently there is a heated 
debate among stakeholders over whether one should use the term “toxic” or “hazardous” in relation to 
e-waste. 
79 As mentioned earlier, the term “optieren” is also used to describe when municipalities take over a 
waste category. E-waste categories 1 and 5 are most often optiert as are the most valuable sections of 
the e-waste stream. For more information on municipal waste management authorities or “öffentlich-
rechtlichen Entsorgungsträger(örE)” as they are called in German, see Bericht der Bundesregierung zu 
den abfallwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der §§ 9 bis 13 des Elektro- und Elektronikgerätegesetzes 
(2011, pp. 10–12).  
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thus not only stores and sorts Berlin’s e-waste, but also handles valuable subcategories 
of this waste stream. 
At BRAL facilities sixteen workers manually and mechanically disassemble e-
waste into parts or materials. While manual manipulation is a more effective method 
for recovery of precious metals—whole components, as opposed to mechanically 
shredded fractions can often be more easily harvested for valuable metals later—
mechanical pre-processing dominates in Germany due to high labor costs. However, 
because BRAL also employs socially marginalized populations such as the long-term 
unemployed and handicapped—a common practice among e-waste handling firms—it 
can also afford manual disassembly in certain instances. 
After the processor manually or mechanically breaks the equipment apart into 
glass, plastic and metal segments, he extracts the larger hazardous and valuable 
components. He comminitizes the rest. Comminution is the process whereby solid 
objects are transformed into smaller parts. For e-waste this usually means shredding. 
Large machines break the equipment into small pieces. Mechanical separation follows 
comminution, which is comprised of multiple steps. Mechanical separation sorts the 
shredded materials into multiple fractions: aluminum, copper, iron, plastics and glass. 
BRAL, or another end of life service provider, then sells these fractions to traders or 
directly to firms specialized in recovery and recycling. 
Recovery 
The next step in the e-waste recycling chain is recovery, whereby valuable materials 
are extracted and processed into raw materials for production. Pre-processing firms 
either sell the fractions or components to traders or they directly send them over to 
companies specialized in recovery and re-processing. If the pre-processing firm is 
small, for instance as with BRAL, the company then sells to traders who collect larger 
quantities, as recovery firms prefer to deal in large volumes. Traders collect e-scrap, 
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components or fractions from all over the world before shipping them to recovery and 
re-processing firms. 
Glass from CRT monitors can be rich in lead or other contaminants. Some 
firms such as the UK-based NuLifeGlass specialize in e-glass recycling.80 They 
transform e-glass into pellets, which can be used to manufacture new products. 
However, since glass recycling is minimally lucrative, Germany incinerates most of its 
glass. 
Plastic fractions are heterogeneous. This makes them difficult to recycle. 
Consequently, in Germany, the plastic fractions from e-waste are, like glass, mostly 
incinerated. Cement kilns frequently use plastic fractions as an alternative source of 
fuel. E-plastic, especially the plastic produced before the RoHS directive was passed, 
contains brominated flame-retardants. The process of incinerating plastics often 
releases furans and dioxins, which are toxic. Flue gas cleaning technology captures 
these compounds and prevents them from being released into the air. Some plastic 
fragments are sold to traders who then export this plastic to processing firms 
specialized in the manual and mechanical separation and recovery of plastics. Most 
plastic pre-processing occurs in China. A recent market study by BCC Research 
predicts that e-plastics will be valued at $1.6 billion by 2014 (BCC Research, 2010). 
However, it is generally accepted that metal, and in particular the copper fractions, are 
the most valuable segment of e-waste. 
Only a handful of smelters are specialized e-scrap recycling: Arubis in 
Germany, Boliden in Sweden, Umicore in Belgium, Xstrate in Canada, Dowa in Japan 
and Singapore-based TES-AMN. Of these recovery firms, some are specialized in iron 
and aluminum fractions. These fractions are treated to remove contaminants such as 
                                                 
80 See http://www.nulifeglass.com. 
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lead, tin and copper. However, because of the physical and chemical properties of iron 
and aluminum, the elimination of contaminants out of this waste stream is challenging. 
Further, it is nearly impossible to extract traces of precious metals out of aluminum 
and iron mixtures. Given these constrains, aluminum and iron fractions generally have 
lower returns. 
The copper fraction is rich in rare earth elements. Copper’s physical and 
chemical properties makes extracting contaminants and valuable metals much easier. 
Of the recovery firms that can handle e-scrap, only a few specialize in precious metals 
and rare earth elements recovery. These companies have invested heavily in their e-
waste processing infrastructure. To use one unnamed company as an example, though 
the facility has the capacity to handle multiple metal-rich waste streams, e-waste holds 
a high rank among the detritus handled at the plant despite only representing ten 
percent of the feed (personal communication, November 18, 2009). Similarly, 
Boliden’s board recently approved an investment of SEK 1.3 billion growth in its e-
scrap recycling capabilities (Boliden Group, accessed on 12 April 2011 at 
http://www.boliden.com/Sustainability/Presidents-statement/). 
A Note on Disposal 
The recycling process is never 100% efficient, even in state-of-the-art recycling 
facilities in the global North. Every phase in the e-waste processing chain produces 
effluent. For instance, during pre-processing hazardous components such as batteries 
and mercury-containing backlights of LCD monitors are removed. Some of these toxic 
components or materials are sent to facilities specialized in the recycling of mercury 
and batteries. These specialized firms also produce hazardous leftovers, which they 
deposit in specialized landfills. Further, pre-processing and recovery produce dust. 
This dust is often noxious, but can also contain valuable metals. Depending on the 
	95 
quality of the captured dust as well as the market price of metals at any given time, 
these filters are sent to facilities to be recycled or they are landfilled. 
In addition, the recovery process and incineration produce slag. Some of this 
slag is used in road construction and for backfilling mines. The slag that is too toxic is 
deposited in a classified landfill. Other leftovers from the recovery stage are captured 
in a concentrated cake, which as one interviewee explained, is then deposited in waste 
“safety deposit boxes.” While private firms dominate pre-processing and recovery, 
public facilities often handle the hazardous leftovers. 
The Formal Recycling Chain 
Three observations about the formal recycling chain need to be made before 
continuing with the informal network. E-waste handlers repeatedly denied me entrance 
to their processing sites. When I finally managed to gain access I always had to hand 
over my phone and sign waivers that I was not carrying any audio and visual recording 
devices. After many negotiations and much paperwork I gained permission to take a 
limited number of pictures at the Berlin recycling stations. Likewise, my contact at 
BRAL—the private end-of-life service provider for the city of Berlin—rushed me 
through the processing facility and forbid me from speaking with the workers or 
taking any pictures. I had similar experiences at most of the other sites of unmaking 
that I visited—be they formal or informal. 
What struck me in particular was how otherwise my engaged and friendly 
industry contacts became suddenly vague and reluctant to speak when I asked about 
the leftovers from the recovery process. For instance, no one would tell me where the 
safe-deposit boxes or classified landfills that captured the toxic slag or cakes were 
located. One respondent vaguely mentioned something about a mine in Germany 
where these materials were deposited. My questions about the less valuable plastic and 
glass fractions were largely met with blank stares. The secrecy surrounding waste in 
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general and particularly the waste left over from the “green” recycling process, though 
worthy of analysis in and of itself, renders any step-by-step description of the formal 
recycling chain limited. 
The second structure of the formal network of unmaking changes as the 
availability of technology, the materiality of the waste or fragment, labor costs and the 
market demand for e-waste fluctuate. For instance, according to manager at BRAL, 
disassembly is tailored towards market demand. If interest in circuit boards is high, 
BRAL disassembles the goods in such a way to make whole circuit boards available. 
However, if there is a market for processors, then BRAL provides processors. Further, 
some metals are more easily extracted from whole components versus shredded 
fragments. If the cost of labor is low in relation to the value of the boards, then 
processors will try to remove entire components manually. For these reasons, my 
description of the recycling chain should be thought of as a snapshot in time, as the 
whole chain or steps within the process of unmaking are constantly in flux. 
Third, the e-waste recycling chain is global and highly mobile. E-waste 
exporters and dealers in e-scrap operate in the shadows and are difficult to find. 
Nonetheless, I spoke to an executive who frequently interacts with e-waste traders. He 
attested to the international and mobile character of the e-waste market. As we walked 
around his facility, the man pointed to a pile of shredded circuit boards and explained, 
This e-waste here has an incredible story—a story that is not too uncommon 
these days. I do not know where the equipment came from, but I know the 
circuit boards originated somewhere on the East Coast of North America. A 
Taiwanese trader bought them and shipped them to Hong-Kong. Someone in 
Mainland China then bought them and had the components manually removed. 
The circuit boards minus the components were then sold to another trader in 
California who sold the goods to yet another trader. This guy trucked the 
boards to the Midwest and had them shredded there. The man in the Midwest 
then sold it to our customer, who then shipped the shredded material to us in 
Belgium, so we could recover the precious metals. (personal communication, 
September 11, 2009) 
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As my contact stressed, this arrangement is common. What exactly happens to 
the used and end-of-life electronic equipment once it leaves countries such as 
Germany is difficult to quantify with any certainty. Still, it is clear that e-waste does 
not follow a simple North-South trajectory (Lepawsky & McNabb, 2010). In fact, the 
flows of e-waste out of Germany are anything but linear. Used and end-of-life 
electronic equipment rarely stays in one country or region. Instead, e-waste traders and 
recyclers move the once-obsolete items from place to place. Along the way, informal 
and formal recyclers and re-users repeatedly transform these items, with varying 
economic, health, environmental and social repercussions. 
In contrast to certain forms of mechanical disassembly, such as the manual 
extraction of copper wires in Bangladesh, other types of informal e-waste recycling 
can be catastrophic for human health and the environment. For instance, in Ghana, 
children break apart equipment imported from Europe and North America and set the 
wires on fire to get at the copper. They then bury, burn or sell the rest to brokers. At 
each stop along the formal and informal circuits traveled by used and end-of-life 
electronics, handlers focus on particular parts and use different techniques. In some 
places, e-waste processing causes significant environmental and health damage; in 
other locations, it causes nearly none at all. Some make a significant profit from 
handling e-waste, while others, such as the children at Agbogbloshie Market in Ghana 
make barely enough to survive. 
Finally, as noted in Chapter 3, the waste processing and recovery sector has 
become increasingly consolidated in the past decade. Whereas pre-processing firms 
were small and medium-sized, often family-run, operations, today, a handful of large 
multinational companies, mostly based in the global North, including SIMS, 
Remondis, Elektrocycling, Alba and Veolia dominate the global recycling sector. 
Small firms such as BRAL thus face increasing competition. The e-waste recovery 
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sector is particularly consolidated; recovery firms specialize in a particular fraction or 
process. For instance, Arubis focuses on copper, Boliden on lead, and Umicore on 
precious metals. Such specialization lessens competition or even eliminates it in 
certain instances. In fact, one industry representative revealed that collaboration is not 
uncommon in this specialized sector, “The metallurgy world works like that—you 
have for certain materials competition and then again you contract your competitor for 
other metals” (personal communication, November 19, 2009). Thus, just like networks 
of production, trade liberalization has led to the consolidation of small firms into 
larger, powerful multinationals that dominate networks of unmaking. 
Informal Network: Collection 
Despite Germany’s sophisticated e-waste management infrastructure, up to half the 
country’s e-waste remains unaccounted for every year. Some of the missing e-waste 
ends up in the trash or in storage. Gifting represents another channel of divestment. 
Many hand down their used equipment to friends and relatives or to strangers via 
forums such as the BSRs “Tausch- und Verschenkmarkt,” or exchange and gifting 
market, and Craigslist’s “Kostenlos zu Abgeben,” or to give away for free section. So-
called digital-divide development organizations such as ReCellular, World Computer 
Exchange and ComputerAid are also popular ways to get rid of unwanted items. These 
development agencies collect used and end-of-life equipment and ship them to 
countries in the global South in an effort to bridge the digital divide. 
Export through development agencies represents only a fraction of used and 
end-of-life electronics that leaves Germany. A much larger amount of e-waste exists 
the country through individuals who are either settled immigrants or persons who have 
come to Germany for the intended purpose of collecting and exporting discarded 
technologies. The group that I refer to as informal waste collectors or scavengers 
consists of an amalgamation of multiple players. These actors have different 
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backgrounds and overlapping, yet distinct interests. First there are individuals from 
Albania, Romania and Russia who collect second-hand goods for resale or as spare 
parts in their home countries. These actors access the waste stream through flyers, 
newspaper advertisements, on the street, as well as by standing outside the BSR 
recycling stations and asking for donations of goods intended for the depot. More 
recently, these actors have taken to raiding the city’s Orange Boxes. Many Berliners 
choose to give their unwanted technologies to informal collectors as a means to 
assuage their guilt over getting rid of functional equipment. Informal collectors also 
scour listservs and online forums such as those listed above. They also periodically 
purchase e-waste at second-hand stores—many of which are located in the 
neighborhood of Neukölln in Berlin (the borough with the largest immigrant 
population). 
Of primary interest for these collectors are televisions, refrigerators, washing 
machines, cell phones, laptops and desktop computers. Circuit boards and metal parts 
are of little value to these waste handlers. These scavengers were hesitant to speak to 
outsiders for fear of retribution. The men who agreed to be interviewed explained that 
they make very little money selling second-hand goods. Most claimed that they had 
once had well-paying factory jobs in Germany or in their home countries. However, 
because of deindustrialization and the ensuing layoffs, they now had little or no other 
means of eking out a living. The Eastern European e-waste collection system appeared 
to be highly organized. Individual collectors had a defined territory and reported to a 
boss. Any attempt to trespass on another’s turf such as standing outside a BSR depot 
resulted in conflict and potentially violence. One BSR worker told me that I should be 
careful as he had heard that a collector outside his station had stabbed another man 
who wanted to collect on his turf in the eye (personal communication, November 17, 
2009). 
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Afghanis, Palestinians, Nigerians, Senegalese and Ghanaians, among others, 
make up the second group of informal e-waste collectors. This group specializes in 
large-scale export of goods to developing countries, in particular African states. They 
access equipment through advertisements, pick-up services, websites, and second-
hand stores as well as through larger institutions such as businesses, government 
offices and schools that upgrade their equipment. An additional source is merchants 
that deal in returned and slightly damaged equipment—known in Germany as A, B 
and C Ware (A, B and C goods). A goods are the least damaged, whereas C goods 
require considerable repair, and are thus sold at a much lower price. Before export, the 
goods are stored in depots along Billstrasse in Hamburg or similar streets in harbor 
cities. Afghanis run most of the depots on Billstrasse. Like their Eastern European 
counterparts, e-waste exporters focus on items for resale or as spare parts. However, 
they also export equipment that is damaged beyond repair. This suggests that another 
source of revenue for these waste handlers consists of exporting goods for end-of-life 
service providers (ESPs) as a means to defray the cost of domestic recycling. Those 
who export broken equipment as a means to defray domestic disposal costs often 
declare their exports as used goods re-use. Some also pack their containers so that a 
row of functional equipment conceals the waste cargo. Others paste money on the 
inside of container doors as a way to bribe customs inspectors to let their shipments 
through. Moreover, this group of exporters, in contrast to their Eastern European 
counterparts, often has substantial capital at its disposal and thus often purchases 
rather than collects equipment. 
International brokers purchase discarded equipment from individuals, 
businesses and e-waste collection sites. Larger brokerage firms generally purchase 
EEE from companies that wish to upgrade their IT equipment. In the absence of 
official reports or relevant academic research, international brokers and their activities 
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remain poorly understood. I had a hard time identifying and contacting brokers. 
Furthermore, while some brokerage firms are large and well established, the line 
between “individuals” and smaller or unregistered “businesses” can be gray, making it 
challenging to discern the difference between these latter two categories. 
The third and final cluster consists of a diverse group of Turks, Bulgarians, 
Poles, Roma as well as individuals from various Arab and African countries who 
specialize in scrap metal. As one scrap dealer explained, the scrap-collecting sector in 
Berlin consists of “small fish, medium fish and big fish” (personal communication, 
May 7, 2010). The “small fish” are mostly foreigners who work alone collecting 
scraps with an old vehicle. Some smaller fish focus on manually extracting scrap 
metal, specifically copper, from equipment such as television sets placed on the 
streets. They sell the accumulated metals to the numerous local scrap metal firms in 
Berlin such as TSR and ALBA. These small scrap dealers make anywhere from thirty 
to two hundred Euros a day depending on the market price for metals and what they 
could find. The “big fish,” some of whom have been in the business for upwards of 30 
years, have multiple vans and employees (though mostly family members). These 
actors have established close ties to scrap producing companies and industry and, as 
one scrap dealer described, “have huge homes and drive Mercedes” (personal 
communication, May 14, 2010). Medium fish have been in the business for some time 
and make enough to live comfortably. Scrap dealers collect pieces of iron, steel, 
copper, and brass: anything that can be dismantled manually. They especially covet 
washing machines, gas stoves, metal bed frames, bicycles, electronics, DVDs, heating 
elements, some auto parts, wires and pipes, as they are largely comprised of metals. 
The collectors stay away from televisions and refrigerators because, as one person 
explained, “they have poison gas” (personal communication, May 14, 2010). Again 
here, the line between a scavenger and a legitimate businessperson is blurry as many 
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scrap dealers have tax numbers and report their earnings—a requirement from the 
scrap purchasing firms. However, many scrap collectors admitted that they had found 
ways to go around the requirements and only pay taxes for a fraction of what they 
earned. 
Pre-processing 
Like the formal network, some scavengers manually disassemble items and extract 
valuable components such as copper wires, copper yolks or spare parts. One often sees 
the effects of this process on Berlin streets as unwanted TVs left on the curbside are 
slowly cannibalized over the course of a few days. As with the formal recycling chain, 
that which waste handlers deem value-less is handed over to the public facilities for 
final disposal. For the informal waste handlers this means either bringing the 
unwanted items to the BSR recycling stations or leaving unwanted items on the 
streets. While the “dumping” of leftover waste in the formal e-waste recycling chain is 
rarely, if ever mentioned, the informal “dumping” is a frequent topic in German news 
reports (Schmolinga & Bottin, 2010). As with the formal e-waste processing chain, 
informal pre-processing extends beyond the city. Informal collectors frequently send 
collected items to be processed abroad. 
Recovery 
Most informal recovery occurs in the developing world. Informal recyclers focus on 
copper and some precious metals. For instance, at Agbogbloshie market, the largest e-
waste processing site in Accra, Ghana where I conducted field research during the 
summer of 2008, children—mostly from the impoverished northern part of Ghana—
break apart and then burn discarded electrical and electronic equipment to extract 
copper wires. The children sell the copper to scrap dealers who then export the metals 
to India, China and sometimes even the United States and Europe. In other areas, such 
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as Guiyu, China, recyclers use acid baths to extract gold, platinum and other precious 
metals from circuit boards. In turn in Bangladesh women strip copper wires by hand. 
Plastics are manually and sometimes mechanically broken apart and then sold to 
international traders or local manufacturers, depending on available technology, need 
and infrastructure. Other times handlers burn the plastic casings or just leave them in 
piles. They manually break the glass apart and sell it for re-processing, landfill it or 
leave it out in the open. Such informal recycling occurs all over the globe. However, 
different countries receive different equipment, use different techniques to recycle 
goods, and focus on different materials or components. 
Der Kampf 
As the price of metals and the cost of domestic recycling have risen in recent years, 
and the market for digital technologies in the developing world has grown, the e-waste 
management sector has developed substantially (Cobbing, 2008; Hicks, 2005). 
The higher potential profits, the more pronounced the conflict over parts of e-
waste. Global companies and governments have begun to target scavengers. In Berlin 
two sets of actors challenge scavengers for control over the waste stream: 
municipalities and a conglomeration of manufacturers, scrap dealers and multinational 
mining companies. 
The BSR has a vested interest in controlling the e-waste stream. As noted 
above, e-waste is an important source of revenue for the city’s municipal waste 
authority. Many of the BSR workers I interviewed ranged from being mildly annoyed 
by, to outright hostile towards informal e-waste collectors, especially those that milled 
outside the collection depots. The workers I interviewed repeatedly described the 
Eastern European e-waste collectors standing outside the BSR recycling stations as 
“unerwünscht“ (unwanted) (personal communication, December 2, 2009). Scavengers 
were often referred to as “Ausländer” (foreigner) in a tone that hinted at racial and 
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ethnic tensions (personal communication, December 8, 2009). One respondent 
confided, “we don’t want them here, but there is nothing we can do” (personal 
communication, December 8, 2009). Some workers referred to e-waste collectors as 
“environmental criminals” (personal communication, August 2009 - April 2010), 
citing local news reports to substantiate their claim that the exporters had no regard for 
Germany’s environment. “If they don’t dump the stuff in our forests then they take it 
to their home countries where it eventually lands in a pit or in the woods. These people 
don’t care for the environment” (idem). Others characterized the scavengers as 
dangerous and unpredictable. Some BSR workers admitted that they sometimes called 
the police or used other tactics to dissuade scavengers. However, they complained that 
their efforts were often futile, since as long as the collectors remained off BSR 
property they could do as they pleased. 
While many BSR employees resented the informal recyclers, a select few 
tolerated them. One man explained, “it’s best if we just live and let live” (personal 
communication, December 9, 2009). Another worker spoke warmly about the man 
standing outside his station. “He’s been here for about 3–4 years. He doesn’t cause 
any problems and never leaves a mess. He’s tidy and doesn’t make any trouble” 
(personal communication, November 11, 2009). I once even witnessed a BSR worker 
waving at a scavenger in a friendly manner as he pulled into the station. 
The scavenger is also a threat to the municipal waste authority. The 
administrators I spoke to described scavengers as petty criminals who steal the city’s 
property and thereby deprive the municipality of a much-needed source of income. 
As one interviewee explained, 
Now, again, to give you a personal experience, my dishwasher broke down last 
year, and the guy who replaced it said, “Can I keep the old one?” I said, “OK, 
yes, but tell me what you’re doing with it?” And he said, “We the employees 
of this dealership, we collect them, and as soon as we have a truckload, we 
bring it to the nearest shredder, and they pay 100, 150 Euro and out of that 
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we’ll have a beer fest.” Some dealers like Media Markt do this on a much more 
professional basis—it’s not the employees, it’s the company itself. They’re 
collecting it and selling it. And the municipalities lose out. My municipality 
here, they have the workers on this collection place, they have a lot of—a lot to 
pull on the salary, because everybody is bringing their waste and stuff there. 
But throughout the week, you know I sometimes saw them dismantling 
washing machines, throwing the iron and the steel into their steel container 
which they get paid for. So if you see the study you will see the details- I think 
it’s 2 kilos which are sold—it’s all average per day there—are sold from the 
municipality directly to the recyclers. Another 3 kilos are going to retail, and 
then they have the scrap dealers and all those guys. (personal communication, 
March 9, 2010) 
Scrap processing firms such as BRAL, SIMS, and Remondis, mining 
companies and manufacturers, such as Umicore and Boliden have been the most active 
and adamant critics of the informal sector. These multinational firms see scavengers as 
serious competitors. In fact, in a PowerPoint presentation on expanding their e-waste 
processing facilities, Sweden’s Boliden listed its major competitors as Umicore, 
Arubis, Xstrata, Dowa and “e-waste exporters” (Boliden, accessed on 12 January 2011 
at http://www.boliden.com/Documents/Press/Presentations/100503_e-
skrot_ronnskar_eng.pdf). The burden of meeting the collection targets stipulated by 
European and German e-waste laws falls on manufacturers. Manufacturers predict that 
they will have to buy e-waste from informal waste handlers to meet increasing 
collection quotas. In addition, the bad publicity associated with illegal export is a key 
motivating factor for OEMs. As a representative of a major ICT manufacturing firm 
told me, “no manufacturer wants pictures of their name on a product being burned in 
Ghana being plastered all over the place. That’s a public image disaster” (personal 
communication, February 3, 2010). 
Like the BSR administration, the convergence of pre-processors, mining 
companies and OEMs represent scavengers and backyard recyclers as environmental 
criminals who seek to make a quick buck at the expense of the environment and 
human health. Engineers who study e-waste flows, many with industry ties, use the 
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pejorative “Beraubung” (plundering) to describe informal recycling (Ebert, 2011; R. 
Lucas & Wilts, 2011; Michalski, 2013; Thome-Kozmiensky, Versteyl, & Beckmann, 
2007). 
In other words, these companies attempt to delegitimize informal recycling by 
emphasizing the environmental, health and efficiency problems with backyard 
approaches and by, in turn, representing their recovery techniques as clean and green 
alternatives. In a recent study, Christian Hagelücken and Christina Meskers, engineers 
as well as employees of a large mining company, argue that backyard recycling is 
inefficient (Hagelücken and Meskers 2009). They cite a study conducted in Bangalore 
that found “that only 25% of the gold contained in circuit boards is recovered, 
compared to over 95% at integrated smelters (Rochat, Keller, & Widmer, 2007).” 
They choose to selectively represent e-waste and types of unmaking to promote their 
interests and ideology, at times co-opting images from Greenpeace and the Basel 
Action Network that draw attention to the environmental harm caused by e-waste to 
secure control over the potentially lucrative waste stream and delegitimize competing 
networks of unmaking. That in 2007 alone Umicore earned $2,600 million through 
precious metals recovery and $400 million through other recycling is rarely revealed 
in presentations and reports decrying the inefficiency and dangers of the informal e-
waste sector. 
Though both parties stress the importance of stopping scavengers, the BSR and 
the recycling-manufacturing industry are also in conflict with each other. The tension 
between these two groups hinges on three issues: 1) collection; 2) the extraction of 
value; and 3) environmental responsibility. According to the current ElektroG, 
German municipalities cover the costs of collection. Because the public sector has a 
monopoly on collection, the collection is more costly and less efficient than it could 
be, argues the lobby for the privatization of collection. They add that market 
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competition in collection will eventually lead to more environmentally sound e-waste 
recycling. 
The same executive predicted that municipal waste management authorities 
would soon become a thing of the past, 
Again, today, everybody here at least in our part of the world—US, Europe—
are relying on waste removal services, of the municipalities. In ten years from 
now, we will not depend on it. I can imagine that by then, you know, you will 
have waste collection companies offering you a minimum of free service if not 
paying you so that they can pick up your waste. And then the question is what 
role will the municipalities have? Now in that scenario, we will always have 
ups and downs of raw material prices. So what if we have another financial 
crisis like in 2008 in the year 2021, where raw materials within three months 
drop from 100 to 20 or even less? So this is what we need to discuss is, what 
safety net are we putting below a structure, an infrastructure, which is not 
based on municipalities. (personal communication, March 9, 2010) 
The sentiment, that public waste management authorities were a thing of the 
past was widespread among the industry representatives I interviewed. My respondent 
stressed that in the next decade, public waste handling would be a thing of the past. He 
continued, 
This is what I usually call the Waste 2020 scenario—I think almost all waste 
will by then carry enough value that people are going after it, which will then 
lead into a complete paradigm change. So until today, and maybe even 
tomorrow—means next year, next two years—the main intention when people 
talk about waste is, “Get rid of it in a cheap and safe way.” In 2020, we will be 
in a situation that people say, “Can I get your waste?” And again, I think the 
expression you used earlier in our conversation about, how this is now 
considered an ore, is exactly hitting the point. Now why do I expect raw 
material prices to go up? It’s a very, very simple equation. In the early 1950’s, 
there were about 2.5 billion people on this planet. By then, maybe 200 million 
of those 2.5 billion, so less than ten percent, had enough wealth to buy 
electronic products: TV’s and radios, and disc players at that time. Today, 
there are 6.7 billion on this planet. People say there are about 2.5 to 3 billion 
people who have enough money to buy electronic products. And again, it’s 
more than a TV, and a radio and a disc player. Today it’s PC’s, it’s videos, cell 
phones, whatever. Now in the year 2040, people expect the world population to 
be around 9 billion. And people also expect that by then more than 4.5 to 5.5 
billion people will have the purchasing power to buy electronics. That means 
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doubling of the demand. Now again, even if we design our products to be 
lighter, to use less materials, we will see a much stronger demand for raw 
materials. So that’s one side. On the other side, all the rich mines and a rich 
mine is one that has a high metal content in the ore, are empty. When you go 
back to the turn of the 19th into the 20th century, so around 1900, a mine in 
average required—or profitable mining required a metal content of between 7 
and 10 percent in the ore. When I finished my studies in the 80’s, mid 80’s, it 
was about 2 percent. And today it’s going down to 0.6. So what does that 
mean? It means that you have to process up to 15 times more ore to gain the 
same metal. So for one kilo of copper, you need to process 10–15 times more 
ore. The processing ore requires energy. So the energy costs for many of the 
ore, many of the mining activities, are already very important. So with 
increased fuel prices, we will see also the manufacturing costs of metals going 
up. So I think all indications show that there will be higher metal prices, 
therefore people are going much more aggressively after scrap. Then again, 
people means private enterprises, people sometimes call them the informal 
sector, and then we need to understand what is the role of the municipalities in 
the future, and we also need to understand what type of environmental 
legislation or waste legislation do we need. (personal communication, March 9, 
2010) 
According to this high-ranking executive, and many others I spoke to, the 
future of municipalities was basically nonexistent. Privatization of waste handling is 
inevitable given the resource crunch. 
The BSR counters that e-waste brings in a much-needed source of income for 
the city of Berlin, a city struggling under ever-increasing budget-cuts. The profits 
gleaned from e-waste recycling keeps the city’s waste taxes low and subsidizes the 
costs of treating unprofitable waste streams. In addition, one BSR representative I 
interviewed questioned the ultimate result of privatization. “Private firms are out to 
increase their profits,” he explained. He continued, 
They have an incentive to “recycle” as quickly and cheaply as possible. This 
will probably lead to less environmentally and socially responsible e-waste 
handling in the end. If we privatize e-waste recycling, we’ll end up with a 
system in which valuable parts are extracted and the toxic parts are dumped 
here or abroad. These private companies assume that because e-waste has 
valuable components we don’t need to pay for recycling but this logic is 
wrong, because our goal is 100% recycling, not just the recycling of the 
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valuable parts, and for this you need long-term investment in infrastructure. 
(personal communication, December 9, 2009) 
Another official who lamented the privatization and globalization of the waste 
industry stressed that, “Abfall ist keine Handelsware!” (garbage is not a commodity), a 
notion that in many ways runs counter to Germany’s notion of Abfallwirtschaft or 
Waste Economy. He argued that e-waste needed to be handled and treated locally 
(personal communication, December 16, 2009). Another respondent remarked 
pessimistically that, “ultimately, the BSR will have to clean up the mess anyway” 
(personal communication, April 7, 2010). He used the example of paper recycling in 
Germany to illustrate his point. A few years back, the paper recycling industry had 
boomed. In response private companies had set up collection bins everywhere. Once 
the price of paper fell, however, the firms abandoned their bins. Municipalities were 
left to deal with the mess. The BSR official predicted that the same thing would 
happen with e-waste as ultimately municipal governments remained the ultimate 
safety net. 
The Response 
Scavengers, ranging from exporters to scrap metal collectors to informal recyclers, in 
turn, rarely have the means or venue to respond to their attackers. The Eastern 
European collectors who stood outside the BSR stations were aware of their negative 
public image. In fact, many were hesitant to speak with me, as the police and local 
residents regularly harassed them. One man I interviewed said that the police had 
harassed him three times in the past week (personal communication, December 16, 
2009). He and others stated that harassment was severe on days after news reports on 
e-waste had aired on television or published in newspapers (personal communication, 
December 9, 2009). Interestingly, several interviewees said that they did not merely 
dump what they collected in the forest—a sign that they were all too aware of popular 
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lore. “They think we take the stuff and bring it to the forest, but we don’t. We take it 
to Poland and from there is goes to Russia,” said one man (personal communication, 
December 16, 2009). Some even pointed out that they were doing important 
environmental work by repairing and reusing functional equipment discarded by 
affluent Germans. “Isn’t reuse the most environmentally friendly thing to do?” asked 
one scavenger rhetorically (personal communication, November 20, 2009). 
Whereas waste collectors were frequently confronted with their bad 
reputations, exporters and scrap collectors seemed to be largely unaware or 
unconcerned with the campaign to stop them. In fact, exporters often insisted that what 
they did was not illegal. It is difficult, of course, to determine if they were saying this 
because they were not aware of Germany’s laws or if they were just trying to hide the 
illegality of their work from me. Nonetheless, when I asked them about their work, 
nearly all scrap dealers stressed that recycling represented their sole means of making 
a living. Of course, they understood that what they did could potentially be detrimental 
to their health, but they had no choice. 
Conclusion: Matter Matters 
In Berlin, three sets of actors—the municipal waste authority (BSR), the recycling and 
manufacturing industry, and scavengers—vie for control over the city’s e-waste 
stream. These actors mobilize the language of responsibility, environmentalism, and 
technological sophistication to selectively socially construct e-waste and unmaking to 
gain control over digital detritus. As a representative of the Berlin municipal waste 
management authority explained, we must see the conflict over e-waste as “ein Kampf 
um den Abfallstrom,” or a struggle over the waste stream (personal communication, 
February 19, 2010). 
Der Kampf um den Abfallstrom—where waste should be treated, who is 
responsible for it and who can benefit from it—is a theme that runs through social 
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scientific and historical engagements with waste (Pellow, 2004). E-waste’s materiality 
plays an important role in the struggle. In fact, e-waste’s materiality could be 
considered a fourth actor in the story of e-waste’s afterlives. 
As noted in the introduction, e-waste contains both toxic and valuable 
components. These elements are almost inextricably mixed in electrical and electronic 
goods. Furthermore, as manufacturing becomes more resource efficient, fewer 
precious metals in smaller quantities are present in new equipment. This renders 
extraction of valuable parts such as precious metals in any meaningful quantities 
challenging. In addition, the physical characteristics of electrical and electronic 
equipment make it such that recycling can and often does cause significant 
environmental and human health damage. Thus, increasingly expensive and 
sophisticated technology is required to extract value out of e-waste if one is to avoid 
toxic exposure. 
Waste engineers with close ties to industry, recycling and recovery firms, are 
quick to stress e-waste materiality to the exclusion of all other factors. They construct 
a certain notion of e-waste and cite these seemingly immutable physical properties of 
electrical and electronic equipment as proof that only the most modern and efficient 
waste recycling companies in the North are capable of and thus should be the only 
ones permitted to handle e-waste. Such technologically determinist claims render 
imperceptible a host of factors such as the underlying causes of uneven labor and 
environmental relations or the politics of technological design. For instance, given the 
way circuit boards are manufactured, extraction of precious and rare earth elements is 
challenging. These valuable metals can only be recovered through capital-intensive 
integrated smelters or environmentally destructive and poisonous techniques such as 
acid baths and wire burning. This leads many informal recyclers to focus on less 
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valuable, yet easily extractable metals such as copper and aluminum. Alternately, they 
engage in recycling methods that pose a grave threat to their health and environment. 
Mining companies with integrated smelter technology do, in fact, provide what 
appears at first glance to be the best and only environmentally friendly option for e-
waste recycling. However, an examination of what is left out in their green narrative 
of modern high-tech recycling helps us see why it is worth probing these assertions. 
The mining company representatives I interviewed stressed that the way in which 
electrical and electronic goods are designed and built makes it such that the ideal 
approach to recycling discarded equipment would be a system in which technologies 
are manually disassembled, preferably in the developing world where labor costs are 
low, and then processed at their facilities, where state of the art integrated smelter 
technologies result in clean and green recovery (see Chapter 5 for more on this). These 
unmakers strategically socially construct e-waste—bringing some characteristics to 
the fore while concealing others—as a means to particular ends. 
Importantly, the materiality of e-waste is “real” in that it has physical 
properties that cannot be reduced to the social. Yet this materiality is not separate from 
the social. Electrical and electronic equipment does not necessarily have to be made of 
flame-retardant plastic, lead glass, and cadmium. Furthermore, that computers, cell 
phones and other ICT equipment are constructed in such a way as to make repair 
nearly impossible and environmentally friendly recycling challenging is not solely 
determined by physical limitations. As green designers point out, electrical and 
electronic equipment could be manufactured using different materials and in decidedly 
different ways. Thus the materiality of these technologies is, at least in part, an 
outcome of social and economic forces. Lobby and special interest groups, ideological 
commitments, fashion trends and cultural norms influence how technologies are 
designed, which are taken up and how they are used (Bijker et al., 1987). For instance, 
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Europe’s e-waste policies are indented to alter the materiality of e-waste to make 
disposal more environmentally responsible, efficient and less of a health risk. 
However, as noted above, interest groups, such as waste processing firms, fight these 
changes. A political battle ensues, one that is certainly shaped by technical limitations 
but not reducible to them. 
As Gille’s (2007) work makes evident, measures of efficiency and 
wastefulness are subjective. It is difficult to know for sure whether CO2 emissions 
from formal recycling practices, for instance, are less environmentally damaging than 
the toxins released through informal recycling practices. Comparing the impacts of 
formal and informal recycling is complicated by the fact that most of the research on 
this issue is primarily conducted by mining company employees or scholars with close 
ties to industry. In brief, the question of what is the “best” way to handle e-waste and 
who should be authorized to handle it is a complex one, one that is strife with conflict 
and struggle. What remains clear, however, is that matter matters in this Kampf um 
den Abfallstrom. 
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CHAPTER 5: TRANSNATIONAL FLOWS 
Overview 
In a July 2007 press release, Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH), a non-profit environmental 
organization, accused Germany of being the “waste export world champion” (DUH, 
2007). The press release referred to Germany’s status as Europe’s biggest e-waste 
producer and exporter.81 DUH openly questions Germany’s status as a global leader in 
environmentally sustainable solid waste management. In fact, the environmental 
organization argued that Germany’s progressive e-waste policy has caused more harm 
than good. Rather than reduce e-waste production, the ElektroG has merely created an 
incentive to export e-waste to developing countries because, while the law raises the 
                                                 
81 The past decade has seen a rapid growth in the overall generation and export of waste in Europe—be 
it non-hazardous, hazardous or illegal waste shipments (Wang et al., 2012, p. 47). European trade in 
waste in general is far from negligible. According to an extensive study on the transnational shipments 
of waste conducted by the European Topic Center on Resource and Waste Management in 2008, the 
export of waste out of the EU-25 represents a major segment of the European trade in secondary 
materials, in particular paper, plastic and metal (Fischer et al., 2008, p. 9). The majority of this waste is 
exported to China and the Far East (Fischer et al., 2008, p. 49). In terms of hazardous waste, Estonia, 
the United Kingdom and Germany represent the top three European producers and exporters (Fischer et 
al., 2008, pp. 23–25). Here, Germany, Europe’s largest economy and most populated country, stands 
out. It is estimated that the country is responsible for half of the total hazardous waste generated in 
Europe each year. It is important to note that these high numbers are at least partially explained by 
Germany’s stringent waste classification system; according to German law, the burden of proof lies 
with the producer. In other words, the manufacturer must explicitly prove that his or her waste is non-
hazardous, otherwise the refuse is automatically classified as hazardous garbage. Nonetheless, even 
when one takes Germany’s stringent waste classificatory system into account, the country still stands 
out as Europe’s largest producer and exporter of toxic waste. 
E-waste represents a critical fraction of European waste. It is estimated that Europe generates anywhere 
between 4–7 million tons of e-waste each year. Given that e-waste is the world’s fastest growing waste 
stream, this number is expected to grow exponentially in the coming years (Fischer et al., 2008, p. 10; 
Juan, 2009, p. 69). Not only production, but also export is on the rise. According to the European 
Topics Center, approximately 250,000 metric tons of e-waste are ‘officially’ exported within and out of 
Europe annually (Fischer et al. 2008, p. 10). In addition, a large portion of e-waste exists Europe 
through unofficial and illegal channels. These shipments are difficult to quantify and trace, yet it is clear 
that the official number of 250,000 tons of legally exported e-waste is merely a fraction of total 
European exports (Fischer et al., 2008, P. 82 for detailed estimates). Again, Germany leads the way in 
terms of legal and illegal export of e-waste. According to a recent report by the German environmental 
research institute Ökopol, illegal e-waste shipments go to Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Vietnam, India 
and the Philippines (Sander & Schilling, 2010, p. 19) 
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cost of domestic recycling, the government inadequately enforces measures to prohibit 
export of toxic waste (Leonhardt 2007). The report concludes that Germany’s 
environmental e-waste law is actually compounding and intensifying the negative 
social and environmental consequences of toxic waste disposal. Drawing parallels to 
the toxic waste export crises of the 1980s, the report points out that in both instances 
the environmental and social consequences of Germans’ high-tech and affluent 
lifestyles are not felt domestically.82 Instead, hazardous waste flows to countries in the 
global South that lack the technical, political, and economic capacity to safely handle 
and dispose of hazardous materials. 
The narrative of toxic waste colonialism promulgated by the DUH is 
widespread, particularly among environmental NGOs and, until recently, the media. 
However, two competing understandings of transnational e-waste flows have started to 
gain acceptance in recent years. One perspective sees export as a leakage of valuable 
strategic metals. Another interpretation posits that export represents a natural 
manifestation of comparative advantage—a manifestation that must merely be 
tweaked to correct glitches in the system pertaining to social and environmental 
justice. All three representations of e-waste export—the “dumping,” “leakage” and 
“comparative advantage” narrative—are selective representations of transnational e-
waste flows; they bring some things to light, while obscuring others. In all three cases, 
                                                 
82 Analogously, during the 1990s, Greenpeace Germany criticized the Avoidance and Recovery of 
Packaging Waste Ordinance, Germany’s packaging waste policy. Greenpeace claimed that the 
ordinance, which was intended to minimize packaging waste in Germany, merely increased Germany’s 
export of packaging waste to countries like Indonesia (Bokerman, 1993). A recent article in the New 
York Times offers yet another example of the paradoxical effects of Germany’s green environmental 
policies. The article explains that Germany’s remarkable recent cut in carbon emissions is in part 
explained by the fact that the country’s steel industry has moved to China. This move has resulted in an 
rise in net global carbon emissions, because steel production in China emits more carbon into the 
atmosphere than production of steel in Germany would have. See New York Times Report “China 
Grabs West’s Smoke-Spewing Factories,” December 21, 2007. 
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actors represent e-waste and the problem of export in such a way as to support their 
interests and uphold their paradigms. 
The Toxic Precursor 
The international toxic waste scandals of the 1980s have played a significant role in 
shaping conceptions of transnational movements of e-waste. Policymakers, NGOs and 
the media frequently reference the 1980s in discussions of e-waste export. 
Furthermore, the laws that regulate the transnational movements of e-waste today 
were formulated in response to these events. Thus, to understand the narrative of 
dumping more fully, we must briefly revisit the toxic waste scandals of the previous 
decades. 
On December 12th, 1991, Lawrence Summers, then the chief economist and 
vice president of the World Bank, sent out what would become an infamous memo. 
The memo took the theory of trade liberalization to its logical end. It argued that the 
export of toxic waste from the developing world to least developed countries (LDC) 
made perfect economic sense. Summers reasoned that because the cost of labor was 
lower in developing countries and because “under-populated countries in Africa are 
vastly UNDER-polluted,” the morbidity and mortality associated with toxic waste 
handling and the associated economic losses would be comparatively lower in the 
developing world (Summers, 1991). Summers concluded, “I think the economic logic 
behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and 
we should face up to that’’ (Summers, 1991). Indeed, for Summers, the export of toxic 
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waste represented a win-win solution, a perfect example of comparative advantage in a 
globalized economy.83 
That the export of toxic waste became an issue precisely when countries 
around the world were implementing domestic environmental policies is no 
coincidence. One outcome of the environmental movement of the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s was that many countries in the global North began implementing stringent 
waste disposal regulations. These policies, in turn, significantly raised the cost of 
domestic waste handling. In contrast, low labor costs, minimal environmental 
regulations, and limited enforcement capabilities kept the cost of waste handling in the 
developing world relatively low. In the 1980s, the cost of disposing waste in 
industrialized countries was as high as US$3000/ton. In contrast, exporters could pay 
as little as US$5/per ton for disposal in certain impoverished African countries. Today 
the costs are roughly US$2000/ton in Europe versus US$40 in Africa (Kone, 2010). 
The abundance of waste, the prevalence of free-trade policies and the uneven 
social, economic and environmental global topography not only facilitated toxic waste 
export, but also rendered it highly lucrative. Entrepreneurs who would later be dubbed 
“toxic commodity traders” took advantage of these circumstances and made fortunes 
exporting wastes. 
A series of waste export scandals during this period catapulted the issue of 
toxic waste trade onto the international stage. Three incidents between 1986 and 1988 
were particularly important for sensitizing the world to the issue. These incidents were 
the Khian Sea in Haiti, Koko beach in Nigeria, and the Rhadhost in Lebanon. In each 
                                                 
83 Once the memo was leaked, Summers clarified that his aid, Lant Pritchett had actually written the 
text. Summers insisted that he had signed the memo without having read it carefully. He also claimed 
that the memo was a joke. 
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case, toxic waste was exported from affluent, industrialized countries to impoverished 
ones.84 
The international media obsessed over these cases and the general toxic waste 
trade (Brooke, 1988; Cody, 1989; Financial Times, 1988; Henwood, 1992). Ultimately 
indignation translated into new policies. Groups such as Greenpeace International, the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environment Liaison Centre International, 
among others, formed an alliance called International Toxic Waste Action Network 
(ITWAN). This group worked closely with 77 developing countries (subsequently 
referred to as the G-77) to raise awareness of toxic waste export. ITWAN argued that 
toxic waste was not a commodity and was thus not subject to free trade laws. The 
alliance pushed for domestic and international laws that would ban the export of 
hazardous waste (Clapp, 1994; Russell, 1989). These efforts ultimately resulted in the 
implementation of a number of international, regional and national policies that 
restricted the transnational movements of toxic waste, most notably the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transnational Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal (The Basel Convention).85 
                                                 
84 The Khian Sea, a cargo barge loaded with toxic ash from Philadelphia, set sail for the Bahamas in 
August 1986. The cargo was refused by the Bahamian government, however, due concerns about 
human and environmental health. Rejected at every port it subsequently attempted to doc at, the ship 
sailed the seas for months searching for a place to unload. The itinerant vessel became the object of 
widespread public attention, if not obsession. Newspapers, magazines and television programs closely 
followed the plight of the Khian Sea. The ship eventually secretly dumped the unwanted freight in Haiti 
and in the Indian Ocean. A year later, NGOs and the media picked up on yet another toxic waste 
scandal. In this case, highly caustic industrial waste from Italy was discovered on Koko Beach in 
Nigeria. It was revealed that Italian businessmen had brokered a deal with a local Nigerian man to store 
18000 barrels of chemical waste on his land for $100 a month. The waste leaked out of the barrels and 
poisoned local residents, which led to the eventual discovery of the deal. One month after the Koko 
Beach scandal, another toxic waste scandal hit the headlines in September 1987. This time a ship named 
the Radhost was caught exporting 15, 000 barrels of toxic chemical waste to Lebanon.  
85 Significantly, though attention to toxic waste export peaked in the 1980s, the practice of exporting 
hazardous toxic waste to the developing world dates back to the post World War II period. The post-
war economic boom led to changes in production practices and patterns of consumption that ultimately 
resulted in the production of vast quantities of waste, as discussed in Chapter 3. The annual global 
generation of waste rose from 5 million metric tons in 1947 to 300 million tons in 1988 (Bomani, 
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One possible explanation for why toxic waste export received so much 
attention is that the practice of sending hazardous waste to poor nations raised 
important questions about globalization and the environment. The scandals captured a 
key dilemma faced by the environmental movement during the 1980s: the tightening 
of environmental regulations in affluent countries such as the United States, Italy or 
Germany frequently resulted in the displacement of the problem to a poorer region of 
the globe. In other words, the so-called accomplishments of the environmental 
movement in the developed world appeared to be making matters worse by facilitating 
the export of pollutants to developing countries that lacked the resources to resist the 
export of these toxic materials let alone to handle them effectively (Pellow, 2007, p. 
8). These scandals unearthed the obstacles to formulating effective domestic 
environmental policies in an increasingly interconnected and globalized capitalist 
economy. 
Moreover, the issue of dumping hazardous waste raised important questions 
about the definition of a commodity and the ethical limits to trade liberalization. Even 
though export made perfect economic sense according to the logic of neo-liberal 
economics, the practice transgressed an ethical boundary for many activists, 
lawmakers and members of the general public. It hit a nerve. Something about the 
poor of the world literally being dumped on by rich countries was simply too 
outrageous—a sign that free trade had gone too far. 
                                                                                                                                            
1996). This “modern” waste was not only abundant, but it was also qualitatively different than earlier 
forms of refuse. It contained complex materials and toxic compounds, which made it challenging and 
costly to handle. Complex connections, means of communication and social structures compound the 
problem (Gille, 2007, p. 27; Melosi, 1981; Tarr, 1996) 
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The Dumping Narrative 
Today, more than two decades since the toxic waste crises of the 1980s, the issue of 
waste export has resurfaced.86 This time the focus is on e-waste rather than industrial 
waste. NGOs and environmental consulting groups—including Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 
Germanwatch and Ökopol, as well as their international counterparts such Greenpeace 
International, the Basel Action Network (BAN) and The Silicon Valley Toxics 
Coalition (SVTC)—have released reports on e-waste in the past ten years (Cobbing, 
2008; Leonhardt, 2007; Puckett et al., 2002; Sander & Schilling, 2010). The German-
speaking media has also enthusiastically taken up the issue of e-waste during this time 
(Bitala 2008; Denkler 2006; Engelhardt 2008; Höges 2009; NZZ 2010; Reinbold 
2008) as has the English-speaking media (Black, 2004; Granatstein, 2008, 2009; 
Mayfield, 2003; Mooallem, 2008; Pelley, 2008; Walsh, 2008, 2009; Wray, 2008).87 
In addition to concerns over e-waste’s sheer volume and potential danger to 
human health and the environment, a popular theme, if not the most frequently 
mentioned one, has been the export of the health and environmental costs associated 
with e-waste disposal. Media and NGO reports repeatedly characterize the 
international movements of e-waste as toxic waste dumping. Provocative images of 
smoldering e-wastelands in China, India and West Africa, and titles such as 
“Exporting Harm” (Puckett et al., 2002), suggest that once again the poor and 
marginalized and their environments are paying the price for the affluent, high-tech 
                                                 
86 Critics of the German Landfill Ordinance (which is the national transposition of the European landfill 
directive, Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 2000), make a similar argument. They maintain 
that tightening of domestic waste regulations incentivises export. 
87 Media and NGO attention to e-waste export has pressured manufacturers to take a stand on the issue. 
Manufacturers such as HP, Dell, Philips, Sony, Samsung, Panasonic and distributers such as Best Buy 
all have openly addressed the e-waste issue on their websites and through diverse publications 
(Electronics TakeBack Coalition 2011). In 2009, for instance, Dell publically condemned e-waste 
export. Steve Jobs released an extensive statement pertaining to Apple’s stance towards e-waste (Jobs 
2007). HP, a company that has been directly dealing with e-waste for some time, continually releases 
public statements on e-waste (HP 2010, 2005, 2007). 
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lifestyles in the North (Bitala 2008; Denkler 2006; Högens 2009; Mayfield 2003; 
Reinbold 2008). 
While some reports implicitly reference the 1980s by reviving phrases such as 
“toxic traders” and “toxic waste colonialism,” others explicitly refer back to the toxic 
waste crises of the 1980s in discussions of e-waste export. This construction of 
continuity between the 1980s and today is emphasized again and again in popular and 
scholarly discussions of e-waste trade (Ekine, 2009; Pellow, 2007).88 For instance, the 
Basel Action Network (BAN), an environmental and human rights organization 
specializing in toxic waste trade, represents e-waste export as the latest manifestation 
in a long line of toxic waste export scandals dating back to the 1980s. According to 
BAN’s website, the key events in the history of toxic waste trade are the Khian Sea, 
Koko Beach, and Rhadhost scandals of the 1980s and, most recently, the e-waste 
export scandal (“Basel Action Network (BAN),” n.d.). As in the 1980s, these texts call 
attention to the link between environmentalism in the North and pollution in the South 
(Bitala, 2008; Leonhardt, 2007; Reinbold, 2008). 
Narrative of Leakage 
Though it is far from dominant, a second interpretation of export has been gaining 
traction among policymakers, industry representatives and the media in the last five 
years. This perspective narrows in on e-waste as an “urban ore.” Of particular 
significance is e-waste’s relatively rich concentration precious metals and rare earth 
elements. The platinum, tantalum, indium and rare earth elements found in e-waste are 
critical for economic growth, technological innovation and national security. They are 
                                                 
88 In this article, Ekine equates e-waste export with the recent dumping of toxic waste by Dutch Abidjan 
in 2006 and placed both events in a long line of toxic waste scandals dating back to the 1980s. Pellow 
(2007), in turn, includes a chapter on e-waste in his book on toxic waste trade, often slipping into 
equating toxic waste and e-waste streams.  
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essential for the production of touch screens, wind turbines, electric cars, catalytic 
converters, printed circuit boards, and superconductors (European Commission, 2011). 
Stores of these minerals are rapidly dwindling while demand is increasing. 
According to a report by European commissioner for industry and entrepreneurship, 
Antonio Tajani, the market for certain precious metals and rare earth elements will 
grow twenty times by 2030 (2011-03-08 Securing Europe’s supply of rare earth 
elements, 2011a, “The Scramble for rare earth metals in frontier Africa, including 
Somalia,” n.d.; Dempsey, 2011). To further complicate matters, extraction of these 
materials is concentrated in a handful of countries.89 Political instability in source 
countries coupled with geo-political tensions between importing and exporting nations 
further restricts access.90 In light of these threats to future access, countries such as 
                                                 
89 For instance, most of the world’s supply of antimony, fluorspar, gallium, germanium, graphite, 
indium, magnesium, rare earths and tungsten is located in China. Russia hosts a significant quantity of 
platinum and group metal (ruthenium, rhodium, palladium, osmium, iridium, and platinum) ores. 
Tantalum and cobalt are found in The Democratic Republic of Congo, whereas Brazil has a significant 
portion of the world’s niobium and tantalum stock. For more on the geographic distribution of these 
resources and the uses of individual materials, see (“Rare Earth Element Mines, Deposits, and 
Occurrences,” n.d., “Rare Earth Elements - Pictures, More From National Geographic Magazine,” n.d.). 
For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo houses 80% of the world’s stock of coltan, the ore 
from which tantalum is extracted. Tantalum, a rare metal, is essential for the production of cell phones, 
DVD players, computers and other electronics. The price of coltan has skyrocketed in the past decade 
due to the digital boom. At the same time that demand for this rare metal has increased exponentially, 
coltan mining has become the subject of controversy. This is because coltan mining directly finances 
the civil war in the Congo. In addition, Coltan mining, which occurs primarily in the Kahuzi Biega 
National Park, is causing significant environmental destruction. In particular mining is endangering the 
Mountain Gorilla. The political instability of the Congo, coupled with international outcry over the 
social and environmental impacts of coltan mining, have made industry and government representatives 
in the rest of the world nervous about their future access to this important mineral (Coltan, 2012; 
Mantz, 2008).  
90 Rare earth elements represent one of the biggest concerns. They are particularly vital for high-tech 
and clean energy industries. According to a report released by the United States Congressional Research 
Service, demand for rare earth elements rests at approximately 136,000 short tons annually and is rising 
rapidly. However, only about 133,600 tons are currently being produced each year. While production 
will certainly grow as new mining projects are developed, the research institution predicts that it will 
take 10 years for new projects to produce enough to meet demand (Humphries, 2012; Messenger, 2013, 
p. 2). China dominates the global market in rare earth elements. In the same report, it is estimated that 
97% of the world’s supply of rare earths in 2009 came from China (2012, p. 12). China has a monopoly 
on these essential materials, and as a European report stated, “Europe is completely dependent” on 
China (Perkowski, 2012). Yet in the past three to four years, China has dramatically cut its export of 
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Germany, the United States and Japan have recently begun developing multi-faceted 
“critical raw materials” strategies.91 
These strategies encompass efforts to improve diplomatic relations with 
exporting countries, challenge export bans through the World Trade Organization and 
identify alternative foreign sources of critical materials. In addition, they mandate 
identification and securing of domestic sources of these materials as well as 
appropriate alternatives (2011-03-08 Securing Europe’s supply of rare earth elements, 
2011b; European Commission, 2011). Increasing domestic sources involves 
improving, when possible, national or regional mining capacity. Given the growing 
concern over the social and environmental impacts of mining, the positive 
connotations of recycling, and the relatively high concentration of critical raw 
materials in e-waste, recycling of digital detritus has taken on a new meaning as part 
                                                                                                                                            
rare earth elements. In 2010 alone, China cut its export of rare earths by 40% and further cuts are 
anticipated (Burgess, 2010). China claims that it has reduced exports on the grounds that the mining of 
rare earths causes significant environmental damage. Another explanation for the cuts is the recognition 
that domestic demand for these materials is likely to grow rapidly. In fact, recent reports predict that 
China will soon become a net importer of rare earths. This has prompted the country to begin 
stockpiling these elements and cutting exports.  
Not only future scarcity, but also potential diplomatic tensions represent a threat to consistent 
supplies of rare earth elements. China banned the export of rare earth elements to Japan in 2010 because 
of a diplomatic quarrel over fishing rights. The ban on export to Japan, a country whose high-tech 
industry is entirely dependent on Chinese rare earth exports, caused panic among industry and 
governments not only in Japan, but around of the world. 
91 Growing awareness of dwindling stocks of rare earth elements coupled with the export ban of rare 
earth elements to Japan have underscored the world’s vulnerability in terms of access to these important 
materials. As a result, there has been a rush among policymakers to develop domestic rare earth 
strategies. In September of 2010, the Japanese government declared that it would invest upwards of 1.2 
Billion to improve its recycling capacities as part of its larger critical raw materials strategy (Burgess, 
2010). See also “Strategy for Ensuring Stable Supplies of Rare Metals” (Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, 2009) In the same year, the United States government proposed three 
separate bills focused on securing domestic sources of minerals including rare earth metals. See also 
(“Commentary—Recycling a key part of mineral policy,” 2012) for more on US policy to secure rare 
earth metals. Similarly, the European Union held hearings on rare earth metals in 2010 (Dempsey, 
2011). In addition, the European Commission revised and updated its strategy for securing access to 
what it calls critical raw materials. The Commission has also spent 17 million Euros ($23 million) on 
research that it hopes will improve the European Union’s access to rare earths through multiple 
channels including new mining projects, substitutions and recycling (Dempsey, 2011). The report 
identifies discarded electrical and electronic goods as a significant potential source of rare earths 
(Dempsey, 2011). 
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of Germany’s critical raw materials strategy.92 Germany has been particularly active in 
drawing attention to the topic of critical raw materials. The state has initiated various 
stakeholder meetings on the topic and has pressed the issue in the European 
Parliament and at G20 meetings (Dempsey, 2010). 
While the economic and technological viability of recycling for these strategic 
materials is still hotly debated, numerous experts with whom I spoke predicted that 
recycling of e-waste would become an important source of critical “raw materials” in 
the coming decades. One mining company representative stated that “[electronic 
devices] represent a considerable metal stock in society. Effective recycling will 
become more and more important for supply security” (personal communication, 
November 18, 2009). 
The recognition of e-waste’s potential value as an urban ore has had serious 
implications for understandings of and attitudes towards its export. In this case, 
powerful stakeholders such as governments and the mining industry construct an 
                                                 
92 However, it is important to note that not everyone sees domestic recycling as a realistic solution to 
the rare materials crisis. The European report clearly states that “no recycling or substitution processes 
for rare earths are currently commercially viable” (Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the regions tackling the challenges in commodity markets and on raw materials, 2.22011, p. 12). The 
report explains, “recycling of rare earths has been thrown around as a partial solution. Japanese tech 
firms have discussed ‘urban mining’ as a way to get rare earths from discarded e-waste. However, in the 
recent UK hearing over strategic minerals the British Metals Recycling Association (BMRA) spoke 
about the complexities of recycling.” (Montgomery, 2011). Similarly, the UK government warns that 
too much faith in e-waste recycling as a source of critical raw materials is dangerous. During a hearing 
in the UK on strategic metals, Ian Hetherington, the director general of the British Metals Recycling 
Association (BMRA), discussed the dangers of assuming that e-waste recycling represents a 
comprehensive solution to the imminent access problems. Hetherington explained, “Some are claiming 
the U.K. should protect its position strategically, recycling them within Europe and not exporting 
them . . . The widespread use of these metals is a relatively recent phenomenon, and so there is not a 
significant amount recovered through [Waste EEE] recycling. Currently, recovering these materials can 
be costly and only produces very small quantities, making it uneconomical,” (Montgomery, 2011). 
Nonetheless, I predict that domestic recycling will become increasingly strategic in the years to come. 
As many have pointed out, once the “true” cost of mining is taken into consideration—that is, the 
environmental and social costs of extraction are internalized—e-waste recycling will become more 
economically viable (Dempsey, 2011). Rare earth element prices have been kept deceptively low as a 
result of China’s relatively lax environmental policies. However, these prices are rising rapidly as China 
attempts to stymie the environmental damage caused by mining (Montgomery, 2011).  
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entirely different meaning for e-waste. This strategic social re-construction has 
revitalized efforts to restrict its export. Indeed, the past few years have seen a surge in 
government and industry reaffirmation for a ban on e-waste export. However, rather 
than a ban on the unethical dumping of toxic waste, this push to restrict transnational 
movements of e-waste can be understood as an attempt to secure continued access to 
strategic resources (“Commentary—Recycling a key part of mineral policy,” 2012).93 
For instance, European Energy Resource Alliance claims that 3–4 million tons of 
European e-waste is “lost” each year. In an interview, Mr. Zonneveld of the Alliance, 
refers to exported e-waste as a loss of Euro 700–1,000 million (cited in Juan, 2009: 
12). 
The Narrative of Comparative Advantage 
While there is growing movement in the North to plug export channels—whether 
because e-waste represents a toxic bad or a strategic good—a group of government 
                                                 
93 It should be noted that the potential value of discarded equipment has also had the opposite effect. It 
has made it possible to openly promote export without running the risk of being dubbed a “socially 
ruthless and arrogant . . . conventional economist,” as Lutzenburger called Summers back in the 1980s 
(Jensen, 2004). For instance, non-governmental development organizations specializing in technology 
transfer—commonly referred to as “digital divide NGOs”– encourage export of used ICT equipment as 
an important component of economic development. They contend that in today’s digitized world, access 
to ICT equipment is imperative for development. In an advertisement published in Computer Woche, a 
German IT magazine, an NGO called Close the Gap Deutschland solicited used computer donations for 
African schools and universities. The advertisement claimed that “[a]ccess to ICT equipment is a 
significant factor for supporting education, growth and the fight against poverty in developing 
countries. Work in this area fulfills the UN ‘Millennium Goals’ for the economic development of poor 
countries” (Knoll, 2005). Export of used technologies is represented in this narrative as a win-win 
solution. This is because, “in the industrialized world, computers are replaced every three to four years, 
meaning that companies are increasingly looking for sustainable ways to replace their used devices. At 
the same time, millions of computers are needed in developing countries,” (See 
http://www.closethegap.be/about/ for more on this organization). Similarly, World Computer Exchange, 
another digital divide organization, reasons that by exporting used ICT equipment to developing 
countries, it makes significant contributions to the improvement of children’s education. This in turn, 
helps children to “be more equipped to fight poverty, disease, injustice and instability” (“What We Do | 
World Computer Exchange,” n.d.). A third organization, Computer Aid, maintains that export of used 
ICT helps “reduce poverty through practical ICT solutions” (“Computer Aid International » Home,” 
n.d.). See also the One Laptop Per Child Campaign (http://one.laptop.org) and Carmara Education 
(http://camara.ie/web/).  
	126 
officials and industry representatives centered in Europe and closely aligned with the 
United Nations University’s “Solving the E-waste Problem” (StEP) contend that a 
total ban on e-waste export is both impractical, disadvantageous and potentially 
environmentally disastrous (“3 Reasons Why a Ban on E-waste Exports is Wrong,” 
n.d.). This group challenges the Basel Convention’s insistence on localized toxic 
waste management, and thus the minimization of export of hazardous waste, on three 
grounds. First, they point out that most countries lack the technological sophistication 
to safely and efficiently handle materially complex waste streams. They also insist that 
developing state-of-the-art domestic recycling and recovery capacity is unrealistic in 
many countries given the high cost of the requisite technologies, such as integrated 
smelters used to handle discarded electrical and electronic goods. Second, the unique 
physical make-up of used and end-of-life electronics necessitates both manual and 
high-tech disassembly. Third, labor is significantly cheaper in the developing world 
than in the industrialized world, and established informal collection systems in the 
developing world are highly efficient. 
Advocates of the comparative advantage perspective dismiss the prevalent 
narrative of e-waste dumping as a sensationalized exaggeration. They maintain that 
almost all German exports consist of re-usable equipment. In particular, the executives 
I interviewed were keen to stress this point. For instance, one respondent explained, 
And again, this is very important to distinguish—that this is not e-waste 
export. It’s second hand products. Again, as in any second hand market, you 
have different qualities. You have a superior quality which usually, in IT, it’s 
very much related to the age of a product—maybe 2–3 years from these returns 
from retired products of commercial customers, which—where almost 
everything you are getting here can be reused, and will be reused. It is my view 
that most of those products will either end up in Eastern Europe or in Northern 
Africa—Morocco, Tunisia. Then you have another category or quality 
category of used products which may end up—which are of lower quality, 
much lower quality, which also could lead into e-waste, right? It’s no clear 
boundary of what is e-waste and what is a product for reuse or secondhand 
product. And they are sold to Africa. Basically, people are coming from Africa 
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as tourists, they hire a couple of containers, and then they go to flea markets, 
they go to E-bay, and buy low-end secondhand products, fill the container, ship 
them down, and what the study found out is that about 30 percent of the 
products in these containers are not sold. And this doesn’t mean that those 
products are not functioning anymore. No, who wants a Pentium III PC? I’m 
not sure if you know what a Pentium III is, this is 16 years old. Even if you get 
it for free, you will not take it. (Personal communication, 3 February 2010) 
Interestingly, this interviewee distinguished between various types or qualities 
of used products and tied their trajectory to different geographic locations. Still, what 
he and other respondents wanted me to understand was that the majority of products 
leaving Germany were valuable goods, not waste. 
The Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Testing and Research (EMPA), 
which is closely aligned with the StEP initiative of the United Nations University, 
insists that the majority of exports from Europe to West Africa consists of items 
intended for re-use (Ayodeji, 2011). EMPA reasons that only a small percentage of 
goods arrive in a non-working state and half of that is repaired locally and resold for 
re-use (Ayodeji, 2011, p. 78; Lubick, 2012; Secretariat of the Basel Convention, 
2011).94 
While I was in Ghana, I saw both types of containers. Some were filled to the 
brim with what one can only describe as junk, whereas others mostly contained re-
usable equipment. Often, containers had both types of discarded technologies. In my 
experience the line between export for reuse and export as dumping was often blurry. 
Ghanaian exporters I spoke to described that they were brought to warehouses in 
Germany where they were told that they could buy equipment. However, the seller 
would not allow them to test the equipment for functionality. The Ghanaians exported 
                                                 
94 For more studies on this, see: http://www.ewasteguide.info/Where-are-WEEE-in-Africa. 
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the bulk of their purchases to their home countries—some of which was functional and 
could be resold. They sold the rest to scrap dealers at Agbogbloshie market. 
Critics of the dumping narrative also point out that there is a large market for 
second-hand technologies in the developing world. A recent paper on business re-use 
asserts that many companies complain that they cannot access enough used EEE. In 
fact, they rare access to adequate second-hand technologies as their primary barrier to 
business expansion (Kissling et al., 2012). From this perspective the transnational 
movement of end of life technologies is central to establishing a reliable and consistent 
supply of suitable equipment. 
Given the potential value in end-of-life equipment, advocates of the 
comparative advantage perspective promote controlled export of e-waste, instead of a 
total ban. Architects of such a global division of labor argue that the export of e-waste 
to the developing world will continue, given that e-waste holds value. Thus, 
formalized, regulated channels of export that adhere to strict environmental and health 
regulations are vastly superior to unregulated informal recycling networks that rely on 
“primitive” recycling techniques. From this vantage point informal processes of 
unmaking are harmful to both human health and the environment. They are also 
grossly inefficient (Juan, 2009, pp. 11–12). In a controlled global system of unmaking 
the South gains employment while high-tech firms in the North can more easily 
recover critical raw materials. In addition, such an arrangement protects the 
environment by circumventing both informal, backyard recycling and the expansion of 
mining.95 
                                                 
95 Such an arrangement, however, may perpetuate an unequal global division of recycling (Grossman, 
2006). Others dispute this, proposing that as mechanized recovery technology grows more sophisticated 
in Europe and if producers are more mindful of designing for the environment, constructing products 
with mineral recovery in mind, the entire process of disassembly may shift to Europe. Whether the 
latter claim proves to be accurate is yet to be seen. Nonetheless, it remains the case that, given the 
global distribution of technology, uneven wages and the various potential values embedded in discarded 
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The Solving the E-Waste Problem (StEP) initiative of the United Nations 
University (UNU) is at the forefront of exploring the feasibility of green international 
e-waste export channels. Together with a host of academic and industry partners 
located in China and Europe, StEP launched a pilot project called “The Best of Two 
Worlds” (Bo2W) in 2004 which seeks to integrate recycling best practices from the 
developing and developed countries (Wang et al., 2012).96 The project sets up an 
arrangement in which Chinese equipment is dismantled in regulated Chinese 
workshops that adhere to relatively high health and environmental standards, yet have 
low labor costs.97 Such an arrangement makes “complete dismantling” economically 
viable. Complete dismantling is a term waste engineers use to refer to a combination 
of manual disassembly and high-tech recovery that enables maximum materials.98 The 
Bo2W system promises to pave the way for a globalized recycling system that is both 
“economically profitable and environmentally sound,” or, to use a more prevalent 
term, “eco-efficient” (Jaco Huisman et al., 2007).99, 100 
                                                                                                                                            
EEE, a global system of processing seems inevitable to many policymakers and industry 
representatives. 
96 The following organizations are involved in this project: the United Nations University, Delft 
University of Technology in the Netherlands, the Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Testing and 
Research (EMPA), the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Taizhou Chiho Tiande Metal Co. Ltd., China’s 
largest mixed-scrap recycling firm, Philips, AER Worldwide an electronics “de-manufacturing” firm 
based in the United States and the WEEE Forum, a European-based association for firms specialized in 
the collection and handling of electronic waste. 
97 For instance, Deubzer writes in reference to Bo2W project: “Lower labor cost in developing countries 
and countries with market economies in transition may enable better treatment” (Deubzer, 2011, p. 85). 
98 For more on why a combination of manual and mechanical processing is ideal for e-waste, see 
Chapter 4. 
99 The StEP initiative, together with the Swiss EMPA, is researching the viability of applying this model 
to a number of other countries including South Africa, Ghana, Morocco (Personal communication, 
November 30 2012). 
100 Though I do not have the space to address this issue in this dissertation, I would like to note that the 
term “eco-efficient” was quite popular among engineers and policymakers I spoke to. This warrants 
careful analysis. 
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In order to avoid dumping, advocates of a formalized global system of 
unmaking outline explicit provisions that characterize controlled green shipment. For 
one, formalized export channels must go hand-in-hand with sophisticated “monitoring 
frameworks” that trace discarded equipment throughout the globalized recycling and 
recovery process, and ensure that manual disassembly in the developing world must 
comply at all times with strict environmental standards (Wang et al., 2012).101 Another 
stipulation is that exporters are held accountable for the waste they ship. 
The Bo2W project as it is formulated now focuses on domestic Chinese e-
waste. Supporters of Bo2W distance themselves—at least publicly—from the idea of 
exporting European and North-American e-waste to China for manual disassembly. In 
fact, they stress that the shipment of e-waste from developed to developing countries 
is technically illegal. Swiss material flows analyst Martin Streicher-Porte, explains, 
“The Bo2W project focuses explicitly on recycling of Chinese domestic e-waste, no 
illegal transboundary waste will be involved” (Streicher-Porte, 2009). Indeed, during 
official interviews with mining company representatives and individuals working at 
the Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Science and Technology (EMPA), two of 
the major stakeholders in the Bo2W project, I was repeatedly told that there was 
“absolutely no intention to ship waste to the developing world for manual 
disassembly” (personal communication, August 24, 2010). 
However, “off the record” conversations with industry and government 
officials exposed a somewhat different attitude. For instance, a leading figure in the e-
waste world remarked that were it not for the widespread “ideological” or “political” 
resistance to export—and these terms were clearly used as synonyms for irrational— 
he and many other more “scientifically inclined”—read rational—individuals would 
                                                 
101 Of course, as I will discuss later in this chapter, it is nearly impossible to ensure that these provisions 
are actually followed in practice.  
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be openly promoting the shipment of discarded equipment to countries with low labor 
costs for manual disassembly (personal communications, December 17, 2009; January 
25, 2012). Similarly, an industry representative admitted to me, 
I don’t understand why we don’t send our stuff to India or China, and have 
them dismantle it manually and then send certain components back—the 
important parts to us to process. We’d increase our profitability and they would 
have jobs. Why can’t we take advantage of cheap labor, when this is a 
common practice in other sectors? (personal communication, September 11, 
2009) 
A manufacturing industry representative who was involved with the Bo2W 
project since its inception explained, 
Originally, the Best of Two Worlds was looking into both handling domestic 
Chinese waste as well as imported European waste. But politically, the option 
of treating European waste in China was very badly received in China. Here 
[in Europe] I don’t think people made a big issue about it, as long as it’s done 
responsibly and according to proper standards, but it was very badly received 
in China. (personal communication, January 21, 2010) 
In fact, over the four years I have researched e-waste export, I have observed 
an increasing willingness to openly discuss export of e-waste from the North to the 
South for manual disassembly. When I began my field research in 2008, any mention 
of North-South export was—at least officially—vehemently rejected. Today, however, 
I encounter more and more actors who are willing to openly discuss the possibility 
with me. For instance, in his master’s thesis conducted at the Technical University at 
Delft, the Netherlands—a key center for those working on e-waste issues in Europe 
and with close ties to the StEP initiative—Wang Juan writes, “thus, transnational 
shipment of e-waste does not necessarily mean a disaster to developing countries, if 
they are controlled under certain conditions, such as a monitoring system.” For Juan, 
whose thesis focuses on transnational shipments of e-waste from Europe to China, an 
ideal future is one in which the Bo2W model in China and Europe is extended “to an 
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international agreement where the transnational shipment could be performed in a 
global legal environment” (Juan, 2009, p. iv). Countless interviews and discussions 
confirm that Juan’s thesis captures the sentiments of a majority of the StEP 
community. Thus, while it would not always be publicly admitted, one of the purposes 
of the Best of Two Worlds pilot project (as well as other projects) is to explore the 
viability of a global recycling system in which the world’s e-waste is manually 
disassembled in less affluent countries with low labor costs and then sent to countries 
in the North in which high-tech recovery of valuable precious metals and rare earth 
elements can take place. 
Conclusion: Selective and Strategic Representations 
In sum, three narratives dominate debates over the transnational movements of e-
waste: the dumping narrative, the leakage narrative, and the narrative of comparative 
advantage. According to the dumping narrative, e-waste export is yet another instance 
in which the “effluent of the world’s affluent” is dumped on the poor (Grossman, 
2006). However, e-waste’s duality as toxic bad and valuable good ultimately weakens 
any attempts to make a direct comparison with historical cases of toxic waste 
dumping. Discarded digital equipment certainly contains toxic compounds, as the 
dumping narrative points out. However, it is also is a source of valuable materials.102 
                                                 
102 E-waste does not just exit Germany as a liability, but also as a valuable good. A lot of the literature 
that engages with the phenomenon of global environmental trends of pollution and waste flows tends to 
focus on how and why toxic bads—be it the environmental and social costs of manufacturing a 
computer or the cost of carbon sequestering are “dumped” on the poor. In other words, the narrative is 
often about how trade liberalization enables the displacement of the liabilities and costs that arise out of 
the production and destruction of commodities in a globalised capitalist system.  
However, the export of e-waste from North to South is not simply a story of the affluent 
dumping on the poor. E-waste is also a source of value at multiple stages of its unmaking—in the sense 
that there is money to be made from it. E-waste value also drives its transnational movements from 
North to South. For waste management firms, e-waste is a source of revenue, not because it contains 
valuable materials, but because it is something that needs to be handled. And because waste treatment 
costs less in developing countries—due to lower labor costs and often less stringent or less enforced 
environmental regulations –than it does in exporting countries such as Germany, the profit margin is 
	
	133 
Therefore the transnational movements of discarded electronics cannot be reduced to a 
tactic to defray the costs of recycling in countries with stringent environmental and 
human health regulations, as had been initially assumed (Espejo, 2010; Josh Lepawsky 
& McNabb, 2010). 
In contrast, the leakage narrative acknowledges e-waste’s value. According to 
this alternative construction, which consciously contrasts itself with the dominant 
narrative of dumping, “the enormous resource impact of EEE . . . is widely 
overlooked” (Schluep, 2009: 2). This effort to reframe e-waste underscores that e-
waste is not a burden but a potential benefit for various actors. Alone, however, this 
perspective remains problematic as it ignores e-waste’s toxicity and thus fails to deal 
with questions of ethics and responsibility that arise due to e-waste’s potential 
hazardousness. 
Finally, the narrative of comparative advantage acknowledges both e-waste’s 
value as well as its toxicity. This framing of the issue, however, reifies the uneven 
                                                                                                                                            
larger in developing countries, thus incentivizing the export of e-waste. Furthermore, as discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4, e-waste also has value as a source of secondary materials, spare parts and reusable 
goods. 
Interestingly, discarded items and scrap are more valuable in the global South not simply 
because the people who live there have less income. As Odeyingbo (2011) points out, a cell phone that 
is worth one Euro in Germany is worth five Euros in Nigeria. The difference in value of a Cathode Ray 
Tube (CRT) television monitor in Germany and Nigeria is even more striking. In Germany, there exists 
virtually no market for used CRT televisions. In addition, the environmentally responsible disposal of a 
television costs more than the revenue gleaned from recovering the materials through the recycling 
process. However, in Nigeria, the intact television is worth somewhere between 17–35 Euros as a 
second-hand technology or a source of spare parts. Thus, exporters of reusable technologies stand to 
make a lot of money. Odeyingbo calculates that an exporter can make upwards of several thousand 
Euros per container shipped to Nigeria (Deubzer 2011, p. 69). 
The same trend applies to e-waste as scrap. Because EU and German regulations mandate 
higher recycling rates, the European market has been flooded with secondary materials. “For example, 
the amount of recycled packaging waste increased from 27 million tones in 1997 to 36 million tones in 
2003” (Fischer 2008, p. 10). However, the value of these secondary materials is higher on the 
international market. In the case of e-scrap, trade out of Germany is directed toward Asia, rather than 
Africa. E-scarp flows to Asian countries because the demand for raw materials is high in this region due 
to the fact that the ICT manufacturing sector is centered there. In addition, transportation costs 
(specifically shipping) to Asian countries are low. This is because cargo ships that bring commodities 
from East Asia to Europe end up sailing back to Asia with empty containers (Fischer, 2008, p. 10).  
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labor costs and differences in environmental regulations on which a proposed global 
division of labor would rest. As noted above, once e-waste arrives in importing 
countries it becomes exceedingly challenging to monitor this waste stream, let alone 
ensure its sound environmental disposal. Given this, it seems unlikely that controlled 
networks of export would actually be able to meet their criteria of ensuring the 
responsible handling of imported e-waste—a stipulation fundamental to the case for 
controlled export. Thus, what would likely come out of a global division of labor is a 
system of unmaking that not only capitalizes on global inequality in terms of labor and 
the environment, but one that would entrench this inequality. By creating a system of 
unmaking in which the added value aspects of e-waste recycling take place in the 
North and the low-value and more potentially environmentally and socially costly 
forms of recycling and disposal are relegated to the global South, inequality is likely to 
be perpetuated. 
In brief, how much and what kind of value e-waste holds is highly contingent 
on where the e-waste is located and by whom it is handled. In countries like Ghana, e-
waste is valuable as second-hand equipment, whereas in Germany and other 
industrialized wealthy countries e-waste is deemed valuable as a source of precious 
and rare earth elements. Thus, e-waste’s combination of toxicity and value helps 
explains how, when, to where and by whom e-waste is exported out of Germany 
through legal and illegal channels. Furthermore, the relations and geographies of 
global networks of unmaking are in flux; market fluctuations in the price of raw 
materials and the geographic and temporal location of discarded equipment 
continually shape and reshape its physical makeup and meanings. To complicate 
matters, channels of export in which discarded EEE traverses national boundaries as 
valuable goods co-exist and often overlap with channels through which e-waste is 
exported as a toxic bad. It follows then that the strategic construction of the social and 
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physical characteristic of e-waste by various actors is central to the nuances of how, 
why, when, where and by whom it flows across national boundaries, what types of 
regulatory efforts are made to channel the flow and how various actors interpret the 
transnational movements of discarded technologies. 
Furthermore, following the transnational network of unmaking makes evident 
that the North and South are more heterogeneous and the relationships between the 
two hemispheres more intricate than “rich” countries dumping on “poor” (Lepawsky 
& McNabb, 2009). Thus, the conceptual model underlying the dominant narrative of 
dumping—a model in which the world is cleanly divided into the wealthy, developed, 
high-tech global North that exports waste and the impoverished, technologically-
primitive global South—is not only oversimplified, but may actually hinder a more 
productive understanding of the issue. Such a model overlooks too many important 
subtleties to capture the second-life of used and end-of-life electronics as well as the 
array of social, economic, political and material relationships they engender. 
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CHAPTER 6: TRANSNATIONAL REGULATIONS AND LOOPHOLES 
Overview 
In response to the exponential growth in global e-waste production and the 
international controversy over export, the last ten years have seen a burgeoning of 
regulations at the local, national, regional and international levels.103 The policies and 
guidelines that apply to e-waste export out of Germany specifically are the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transnational Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal of 1992 (Basel Convention), the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development Council Decision C (2001) 107/Final (OECD Council 
Decision), the European Waste Shipment Regulation (WSR), and the German Waste 
Shipment Law (AbfVerbrG).104 
Though impressive in scope and number, these regulations are limited in their 
ability to stem the unwanted flow of e-waste out of Germany. E-waste exits Germany 
because of a series of loopholes in the existing legal infrastructure. These loopholes 
include: the difficulty in defining e-waste, the lack of harmonization in classification 
                                                 
103 E-waste has become a priority issue for policymakers across the globe (Yu, Williams, Ju, & Yang, 
2010). Since the early 1990s, countries around the world have struggled to manage their e-waste. For 
information on US e-waste policies see, http://www.epa.gov/osw/conserve/materials/ecycling/pubs.htm. 
See also the US Congress Bill HR 2284, otherwise known as the Responsible Electronics Recycling Act 
and the Gov Accountability Office Report, especially appendix 3. For more on Chinese e-waste 
regulations see the State Council issued the Waste Electronic and Electric Equipment Disposal 
Administrative Measures (China WEEE) and the Waste Electronic and Electric Equipment Disposal 
Catalogue and the Catalogue Drafting and Editing Rules. See also, http://www.usito.org/dev/policy-
work/environmental-protection/china-weee. In addition, the Asia e-waste Project is an initiative funded 
by the Ministry of the Environment of Japan and the Secretariat of the Basel Convention. The goal of 
the partnership is to establish a public-private partnership for dealing with e-waste in seven countries in 
the Asia and Pacific region (Cambodia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Thailand, Philippines China), 
see http://www.env.go.jp/en/recycle/asian_net/Project_N_Research/Asia_E-waste_Project.html. See 
also the following report by the Global Information Society Watch for more on e-waste policies and 
provisions in other laws that can apply to e-waste in African countries, 
http://www.giswatch.org/sites/default/files/gisw2010regionaleastafrica_en.pdf. Finally, Widmer et al. 
(2006) provide a good, though somewhat dated, overview of national e-waste regulations. 
104 Gesetz über die Überwachung und Kontrolle der grenzüberschreitenden Verbringung von Abfällen 
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systems, the logistical challenges of monitoring transnational movements of e-waste 
and the lack of resources to enforce export bans. The majority of stakeholders working 
on the problem of transnational e-waste flows favor a “technofix” interpretation of the 
problem; they see the issues listed above as individual glitches that can be repaired 
through technological and managerial interventions. 
I argue that underlying these problems of regulation and enforcement, 
however, lies a more complex challenge. While regulations are enforceable at the 
nation-state level, networks of unmaking are global. The tensions between national 
formulations of environmental waste policies and an uneven global political-economic 
topography make it challenging to effectively regulate global networks of unmaking. 
Though the case of e-waste illustrates this point vividly, the tensions I analyze in this 
chapter are applicable to other environmental issues. This chapter is structured as 
follows: I begin by describing the national, regional and international regulations that 
govern unmaking. Next I analyze the loopholes that facilitate unwanted export. 
Finally, I explore the ways in which e-waste export draws attention to some of the 
fundamental contemporar challenges to effective environmental policies today. 
The Basel Convention 
The Basel Convention, which arose in direct response to the toxic waste scandals of 
the 1980s, is the international policy that has the most potential to effectively regulate 
transnational flows of unmaking. In 1989, 179 countries signed the Convention and it 
went into force in May, 1992. The subsequent Nairobi Declaration in 2006 and the 
Cartagena Decisions in 2011 revised the Convention.105 Based on the principle of 
environmentally sound management (ESM), the Basel Convention has three stated 
                                                 
105 Note also that in 2012 the Basel Convention, in conjunction with a host of relevant partners, 
launched the Call for Action, a global survey on e-waste. For more on this, see (Hortoneda, 2012). 
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objectives: to minimize the production of hazardous waste, to encourage local 
hazardous waste handling, and to reduce hazardous waste export from developed to 
developing countries.106 
It is important to note that the Basel Convention does not ban the export of 
hazardous waste altogether.107 Instead, the Convention’s objective is to reduce the 
social and environmental harm caused by the international trade in wastes. The 
Convention has put a number of provisions in place to meet this objective. First, it 
attempts to clearly define hazardous and non-hazardous waste. In establishing codified 
classifications of waste, the Convention seeks to counteract export justified by the 
notion of cultural, geographic or historical contingency of hazardousness.108 In the 
case of the Basel Convention, hazardousness is defined by the chemical properties of 
the waste. In other words, waste that contains mercury above the official threshold is 
considered hazardous. The Convention does not have a specific rule for every category 
of waste. For instance, all televisions are not considered hazardous. Whether the 
                                                 
106 Importantly, the Basel Convention stipulates that in certain limited instances, when a country clearly 
lacks the technology to handle hazardous waste locally in an environmentally-sound manner, hazardous 
waste may exported to a country with the necessary technology/infrastructure for the purposes of 
disposal. For more about the history of the Basel Convention, see the UN Audiovisual Library of 
International Law at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/bcctmhwd/bcctmhwd.html. 
107 The Basel Ban Amendment was introduced in 1994 as a means to address some of the problems with 
the Basel Convention. According to some developing countries and environmental groups, the Basel 
Convention was not strict enough. Critics of the Convention point out that the Secretariat has nearly no 
power to enforce the Convention. Furthermore, with notification and consent, nearly anything could, at 
least theoretically, still be exported. Unlike the Basel Convention, the Basel Ban places a total ban on 
any export of hazardous waste for any purpose, including re-use, from Annex VII countries to non-
Annex VII countries. The Basel Ban has yet to be ratified, however. This is because some developing 
countries that specialize in waste handling see a total ban as a loss of revenue. Other critics of the Basel 
Ban, including industry representatives, argue that stopping all flows of hazardous waste would 
unnecessarily restrict access to recyclables and raw material. For more on the Basel Ban, see: (Kellow, 
1999; Josh Lepawsky & McNabb, 2010). 
108 See Annex I for a list of wastes that are considered hazardous. Annex III exempts certain wastes 
listed in Annex I. Annex II of the Convention gives the definition of “other wastes” covered by the 
Convention. Annex VIII and IX of the Convention, which were added later, expressly list what the 
Convention considers hazardous and non-hazardous. 
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export of televisions is restricted by the Basel Convention or not is contingent on the 
materials contained in that particular shipment. 
Second, the international agreement created protocols for waste export that all 
signatory countries must adhere to when exporting waste. Exporters must obtain prior 
informed consent from the Basel Convention authorities of import and transit 
countries prior to any activities. Moreover, waste shipments must be closely monitored 
at all times. Any waste shipment from developed to developing country that does not 
meet this provision is classified as illegal, according to the Basel Convention (see 
Annex VII). Finally, according to the convention, export of waste for disposal (as 
opposed to export for the purposes of recycling and recovery) are restricted; only in 
instances in which it can be guaranteed that the exported waste will be handled in an 
environmentally-sound manner, can this type of waste transfer occur. 
Currently, a number of public-private initiatives are attempting to address the 
unique challenges posed by the transnational networks of e-waste. The public-private 
Partnership for Action on Computing Equipment (PACE) and the Mobile Phone 
Partnership Initiative (MPPI) have created guidelines for the re-use, recycling, and 
transnational movement of used and end-of-life mobile phones and computing 
equipment.109 PACE is also implementing pilot projects on used and end-of-life 
computing equipment and the informal sector in developing countries. Another group, 
the Basel Convention Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), is creating technical 
guidelines to address the movement of used and end-of-life electronics. This initiative 
is largely based on the work done by PACE.110 Finally, the Legal Clarity Workgroup 
                                                 
109 For more on MPPI, see: http://archive.basel.int/industry/mppi.html; For more on PACE, see: 
http://archive.basel.int/industry/compartnership/index.html 
110 For more on OEWG, see: 
http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/OpenendedWorkingGroup%28OEWG%29/Mandate/tabid/2295/D
efault.aspx 
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launched by the recent “Country-Led Initiative” (CLI) on the Ban Amendment is 
working on improving definitions of wastes in general and of reuse in particular.111 
The OECD Council Decision 
In 1992, the OECD passed the Council Decision C(2001)107/FINAL, with the aim of 
controlling waste shipments and facilitating the trade in recyclables and recoverable 
materials between OECD countries. The Council Decision does not conflict with the 
Basel Convention. The Basel Convention permits the development of other 
international agreements and treaties as long as they comply with the Convention’s 
goal of environmentally sound and socially responsible waste management (see 
Article 11 of the Convention).112 Like the Basel Convention, the OECD Council 
Decision defines hazardous and non-hazardous wastes. Furthermore, like the 
Convention, the OECD agreement classifies hazardous and nonhazardous wastes 
according to established thresholds of toxic chemicals. Finally, if wastes are exported 
for the purposes of disposal (not recovery and recycling) then export countries must 
obtain prior informed consent from importing countries before shipments can be 
legally made. 
The OECD Council decision differs from the Basel Convention in a number of 
important ways, however. First, the Council Decision applies to a slightly different 
geographic area—countries such as Haiti and the USA, which did not sign the Basel 
                                                 
111 For more on CLI, see: 
http://www.basel.int/Implementation/LegalMatters/CountryLedInitiative/tabid/1339/Default.aspx 
112 Most of the basic terms and definitions used in the OECD Waste Agreement, such as the terms 
“waste” and “hazardous waste,” were harmonized with those of the Basel Convention in the 2001 
revised OECD Council Decision. However, for the sake of clarity, the terms “disposal” and “recovery” 
are distinct terms in the OECD Waste Agreement, whereas the term “disposal” covers both disposal and 
recovery operations in the Basel Convention. Furthermore, the OECD Waste Agreement retains certain 
procedural elements of the original OECD Decision C (92)39/FINAL that do not exist within the Basel 
Convention, such as time limits for approval process, tacit consent and pre-consent procedures. 
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Convention—can trade with other OECD countries. Furthermore, at the heart of the 
Basel Convention is the desire to minimize waste export regardless of the purpose of 
export. The Council decision, on the other hand, is much more tolerant of waste trade. 
The goal for the latter international agreement is to control the trade of potential 
resources secured from waste. Because of its slightly different focus, the OECD’s 
regulation has more specific guidelines than the Basel Convention regarding waste 
destined for recovery. 
Another important difference is how the OECD defines waste. After the 
passing of the Council Decision of November 2003, the OECD waste agreement 
recognizes two types of wastes: green wastes, which can be shipped like any other 
commodity, and amber wastes, which require informed consent because they pose a 
potential threat to human and environmental health (see Appendix III and IV for the 
lists of wastes). 113 Though the OECD Waste Agreement in 2001 (C(2001)107/Final) 
made improvements to harmonize with the Basel annexes (the green and amber waste 
lists were made to align with the lists in the Basel Convention Annexes) there remain 
significant differences in how these two agreements classify wastes and how they see 
the transboundary movements of wastes. 
The European Waste Shipment Regulation 
In 2006 the European Union transposed the Basel Convention and the OECD Council 
Decision into European regulation with the European Waste Shipment Regulation 
(WSR).114 The WSR implements the international obligations of the two regulations 
                                                 
113 Appendix IV of the Council Decision contains a list of these wastes. Again, the OECD classification 
consists of two categories. The first category includes the wastes listed in Annexes II and VIII of the 
Basel Convention. The second category consists of additional wastes that OECD Member Countries 
have agreed to classify as Amber wastes. 
114 The current regulation is the revised version of the Council Regulation (EEC) No 259/93 of 1 
February 1993 on the supervision and control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the 
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and includes the stipulation that wastes should be disposed of in an environmentally-
sound manner. How and what types of waste can be exported under the WSR is 
contingent on a number of factors: the intended destination, the purpose of export (re-
use, recovery or disposal) and the type of waste being exported. Much like the two 
multilateral agreements it builds on, the WSR divides wastes into three primary 
categories: “Prohibited Waste,” “Notification Control” and “Green Listed Controls.” 
Unlike the Basel Convention, however, it classifies waste by components, meaning 
that used and end-of-life electronics fall into one of the three categories mentioned 
above depending on what components they contain. The Regulation forbids the 
shipment of hazardous wastes in particular from EU to non-OECD countries.115 It 
does, however, allow the shipment of non-hazardous waste to other countries, so long 
as that waste is exported for the purpose of recovery. Moreover, if items are taken 
apart in the country of origin, what remains is often categorized as green list waste. 
This classification exempts an exporter from having to notify the authorities (Fischer 
et al., 2008, p. 33). The export of functioning second-hand items is also permitted 
under this regulation, though the recent revision of the WEEE Directive lays more 
restrictions on the export of used equipment.116 Like the Basel Convention and the 
OECD Council Decision, the WSR does not list many of the key components in used 
and end-of-life electronics. Importantly, Basel Convention, the OECD Council 
                                                                                                                                            
European Community. The European Waste Shipment Regulation was revised in 2007. As Juan 
explains, “The revised law aims to develop a simplified but stronger regime for waste movement, ban 
certain types of waste exports, establish greater enforcement actions and streamline existing procedures. 
It also seeks to incorporate into Community legislation the amendments to the lists of waste annexed to 
the Basel Convention as well as the revision adopted by the OECD in 2001” (Juan, 2009). While the 
new law is clearer, the export process remains complicated and confusing.  
115 See Annex V of the Regulation.  
116 For more details, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/shipments/pdf/correspondents_guidelines_en.pdf. 
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Decision and the European Waste Shipment Regulation are not enforceable in and of 
themselves. They must be transposed into national regulation to be effective. 
Germany’s Waste Shipment Regulation (AbfVerbrG) 
In the case of Germany, the ElektroG and the federal Waste Shipment Act 
(AbfVerbrG)117 set the guidelines for the production, collection and processing of e-
waste in Germany. Whereas the ElektroG concentrates on domestic matters, the Waste 
Shipment Act regulates the export of waste, including e-waste, out of Germany. 
The federal law goes beyond the multilateral and regional policies by clearly 
delegating responsibility for controlling waste shipments to specific government 
institutions. Importantly, according to the Waste Shipment Act, the main 
responsibility, including the right to conduct inspections, falls on the state in which the 
waste shipment begins its journey (Schilling & Sanders: 14). 
The waste shipment act also gives clear protocols in case an illegal shipment is 
discovered. It gives port authorities the right to impound illegal shipments. It also 
outlines a clear chain of command and responsibility. In the case of Hamburg, for 
example, the city through which much of German end of life equipment leaves the 
country, the Regional Authority for the Environment (BSU),118 the Hamburg Water 
Police119 and the Customs Office are the agencies that inspect and deal with WEEE 
shipments. 
Together, the Basel Convention, the OECD Council Decision, the European 
Waste Shipment Act and the German AbfVerbrG, create an impressive regulatory 
                                                 
117 Gesetz über die Überwachung und Kontrolle der grenzüberschreitenden Verbringung von Abfällen, 
also commonly referred to as the Abfallverbringungsgesetz or AbfVerbrG. . 
118 Behörde für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt 
119 Wasserschutzpolizei  
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landscape, especially when compared to the United States, which has not signed the 
Basel Convention and does not have an e-waste regulation to speak of. As outlined 
above, these regulations strive to adapt to the complexities of contemporary networks 
of e-waste unmaking. They take measures to acknowledge e-waste’s duality as both a 
commodity and waste, its constantly changing material makeup, as well as its spatial 
and temporal contingency. Moreover, rather than promote a total ban, these policies 
focus on regulating transnational flows by providing up-to-date and detailed 
definitions of goods for reuse, hazardous and non-hazardous waste, harmonizing their 
classifications, outlining proper protocols for each type of waste, requiring proper 
classification of waste streams, and by stipulating the need for consent and the proper 
dismantling of exported waste to developing countries. Yet despite these elaborate 
efforts, transnational networks of unmaking continue to evade regulators. 
Slippery Status 
The fluidity of the category of waste—indeed of waste itself—poses a serious 
challenge for lawmakers, as regulations require a stable definition of something in 
order to control it. One way legislators have attempted to deal with e-waste’s 
ambiguity is to categorize e-waste by its various uses: re-use, recovery or disposal. To 
recall, all the regulations listed above permit the export of discarded EEE for the 
purpose of re-use (Espejo, 2010).120 In addition, existing regulations permit the export 
of equipment for material recovery under particular conditions (Josh Lepawsky & 
McNabb, 2010). By distinguishing between end-of-life technologies that retain value 
                                                 
120 Annex 6 of the WEEE Recast states that it is incumbent on the exporter to prove that the items for 
export are functional. In the old formulation of the law it was the responsibility of the competent 
authority to test functionality. Placing the burden of proof on the exporter should improve the situation 
somewhat, though it is unclear how this will work in practice. Some products are easier to test for 
functionality than others. For more information, see (European Commission, 2007). 
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and those that are waste, the laws seek to acknowledge and adapt to e-waste’s inherent 
hybridity. 
Key for the success of these provisions, however, is the ability of authorities to 
differentiate between shipments that genuinely contain valuable goods and those that 
are waste. This is challenging for various reasons. For one, exporters adapt to new 
legislation by merely relabeling their activities instead of genuinely changing their 
practices. For instance, when the Basel Convention was first introduced, it banned the 
export of hazardous waste for disposal. However, the convention permitted export for 
recovery and re-use. As a result the export of waste intended for disposal from OECD 
countries to non-OECD countries decreased by 31 per cent between 1990 and 1995, 
whereas exports for the purposes of refurbishment and re-use increased by 32 per cent 
over the same time period (Espejo, 2010). In other words, export of wastes for 
disposal continued; only the exporters adapted to the new regulations by relabeling 
their shipments as reusable goods.121 
As noted in the previous chapter, whether the containers are filled with items 
that could be reused or with junk cannot be objectively assessed. It is contingent on 
subjective understandings of what is reusable and what is not, market conditions and 
existing technological capacity and know-how. A container full of discarded “broken” 
equipment, it could be argued, is not waste because it may have value in the import 
country. Many Nigerians and Ghanaians, for example, have the know-how and the 
cheap labor to repair broken equipment. Thus, a Nigerian or Ghanaian immigrant to 
Germany can legitimately argue that his shipments do not constitute waste (Espejo, 
                                                 
121 The Partnership for Action on Computing Equipment (PACE)—an initiative launched at the ninth 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention—introduced a recommended test for 
functionality to counter this problem. However, because the recommended test has not been adopted by 
the Conference of Parties (COP) it is not legally binding. Consequently, there is little guarantee that the 
test is routinely enforced by member states. For more information on the test for functionality, see 
http://archive.basel.int/industry/compartnership/index.html. 
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2010, p. 18). Harbor police and customs officials have a hard time disproving claims 
that equipment has value in import countries given the multiple factors that play a role 
in determining whether claims to value are accurate at any given time and for any 
given place. 
Perhaps more than most other forms of discard, e-waste makes evident that 
there exists a continuum between waste and commodity. As Christian Fischer explains 
in a report for the European Topic Centre on Sustainable Consumption and 
Production, “The conditions under which a used electronic or electrical product is, or 
is not, regarded as ‘waste’ for regulatory purposes are a matter that appears repeatedly 
in any discussion about the trade in these products. In the case of electronic and 
electrical items, the potential for direct reuse of a discarded but functional product 
complicates matters rather more than is the case for, say, waste paper.” (Fischer et al., 
2008, p. 54). Items can be non-functional, but given the right circumstances—be it the 
availability of knowledge on how to repair electronic items, relatively low labor costs, 
a market for used goods and so forth—individuals can repair, break apart, reconstitute 
or even just rename what had been waste and thus create a new commodity. As soon 
as there is any legitimate claim of reuse, the cargo immediate falls “outside of the 
waste regime” and thus can be freely traded as any other commodity (Willke, 2012). 
Moreover, all exporters have to declare the goods—if, as is often the case, they 
are being shipped outside of the EU—using the Customs Office’s IT system ATLAS 
(Sander & Schilling, 2010, p. 19). However, as Sander & Schilling have pointed out in 
their report commissioned by the German Ministry of Environment (BMU) on e-waste 
export out of Germany, “in the case of EEE, the codes do not distinguish between used 
and new equipment “ (Sander & Schilling, 2010, p. 20). The lack of a shipment 
category for waste renders it invisible and thus very difficult to monitor and regulate. 
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Classificatory Disharmony 
Definitions of e-waste vary not only from person to person but also from place to 
place (Huisman et al., 2012). Different countries emphasize the material composition 
of the product or try to define its status as functional or waste. For instance, whereas in 
Europe e-waste is classified according to its hazardousness, waste in China is 
classified according to the raw materials it contains. Thus, a form of e-waste that 
contains significant quantities of hazardous materials will be banned from being 
exported out of Europe, but if the waste is rich in raw materials the Chinese 
government will likely permit its import (Juan, 2009, p. 48). This means that it is very 
possible to have the same goods be legally imported to China but be illegally exported 
out of the EU. 
Not only do definitions of waste differ between countries such as Germany and 
China, but they also vary significantly among European countries. Theoretically, the 
European Waste Shipment Regulation provides the template for how member states 
should define e-waste. However, in practice, member states interpret the EU waste 
codes quite differently. As a result, countries across Europe operate with different 
classifications (Grossman, 2007; Josh Lepawsky & McNabb, 2010; Pellow, 2007). 
Discrepancies in national annual reports illuminate this. For instance, in 2003, the 
Netherlands reported that they had exported 1.3 million tonnes of household waste 
(the exact category was Y46) to Germany. Germany, however, reported only receiving 
21,000 tonnes of household waste from the Netherlands (Fischer et al., 2008, pp. 22–
23). While the example of household waste is used to illustrate the point here, this 
phenomenon extends to shipments of used and end-of-life electronic equipment as 
well (Juan, 2009, p. iii).122 
                                                 
122 A similar issue exists between the United States and the EU with regards to end-of-life automobiles. 
The U.S. exempts them from hazardous waste regulation as they are considered scrap metal. The Basel 
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There are also inconsistencies and incompatibilities between multilateral 
agreements and national regulations, as well as between multilateral agreements, in 
regards to definitions of e-waste. For instance, the Basel Convention’s classifications 
of e-waste contradict the classifications of many signatory countries (Josh Lepawsky 
& McNabb, 2010).123 Moreover, multilateral agreements operate with different 
definitions of e-waste. Contrary to the stated desire to harmonize the Basel, Rotterdam 
and RoHS Conventions, these three continue to use distinct and sometimes 
contradictory codes. 124 In addition, despite efforts to harmonize definitions in the 
OECD Council Decision and the Basel Convention, they still conflict with each other 
in terms of their definitions of hazardous types of e-waste.125 
What is perhaps most problematic is that there are inconsistencies and 
contradictions even within individuals policies. This is most clearly seen in the Basel 
Convention, which has mirror listings for certain wastes in both Annex VIII and 
Annex IX, depending on whether and to what extent they contain Annex I material 
and if this amount is sufficient to cause them to exhibit an Annex III characteristic. 
More specifically, Annex VIII of the Basel Convention encompasses a list of 
                                                                                                                                            
Convention and the EU regulate end-of-life autos as hazardous if the liquids have not been removed. 
The Port of Rotterdam frequently contacts the US competent authority to notify them of what they 
consider to be an illegal shipment. The US EPA has no legal authority, however, to compel an exporter 
to take back the shipment. Nevertheless, exporters often try to hasten their shipments’ return as the 
ports charge large storage fees.  
123 Recall that the Basel Convention stipulates that its guidelines are applicable to all signatories. 
However, the Convention also gives member countries significant leeway in their definitions of 
hazardous waste.  
124 The Rotterdam Convention regulates the transnational movements of hazardous chemicals. For more 
information see: http://www.pic.int/TheConvention/Overview/tabid/1044/language/en-US/Default.aspx. 
125 The European Commission’s Council Decision C(2001)107 contains codes explicitly distinct from 
Basel codes. The OECD Decision cancels out Basel’s classification of WEEE as hazardous; it says, 
“Basel entries A1180 and A2060 do not apply and OECD entries GC010, GC020 and GG040 in 
Appendix 3 Part II apply instead when appropriate.” Basel code A1180 is the WEEE item on the 
hazardous list. OECD replaced the WEEE deemed hazardous in Basel under codes (GC010, GC020 and 
GG040) that are listed as “green control,” which means that they are treated more as commercial 
products than as hazardous waste as long as they remain within the OECD. 
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substances, including forms of e-waste that are considered to be hazardous. At the 
same time, Annex IX—which lists non-hazardous materials—exempts the very same 
forms of e-waste listed in Annex VIII, so long as these materials pass tests for hazards 
defined in Annex III. Annex III, however, states that there are no conclusive tests to 
measure flammability and toxicity (Lepawsky & McNabb, 2010, p. 5). Thus, as 
Lepawsky & McNabb aptly conclude, “the Convention remains highly ambiguous 
when it comes to common e-waste materials (and many others) and leaves a great deal 
of room for ‘flexible’ interpretation of its intentions to halt the transnational 
movement of them” (2010, p. 4) 
Though a lot of e-waste is exported illegally and without record, making it 
administratively invisible and thus untraceable, the lack of harmonization in 
classifications makes legal shipments almost equally challenging to monitor (Ayodeji, 
2011). Most reports on e-waste—be it about domestic generation or transnational 
flows—include the caveat that all data on used and end-of-life electronics is based on 
estimates.126 This is beginning to change, however, as attempts to track flows have 
increased in recent years.127 Still, the data is of poor quality. The lack of reliable data, 
                                                 
126 Reports on e-waste frequently attempt to quantify its existence. One commonly used method for 
quantification is using the number devices put on the market to estimate the amount of e-waste 
generated. Another common method involves looking at trade statistics for shipments of electrical and 
electronic devices and then using the price-to-weight ratio of containers to estimate whether the devices 
being shipped are new or used. Fischer et al. (2008) use the latter method, looking at the export value of 
shipped goods to determine whether they are new or used equipment, or even e-waste (Fischer et al., 
2008, pp. 56–59). 
127 Previously, there were no mechanisms in place to track flows of discarded electronic items, although 
now various groups are working on establishing mechanisms for future tracking. For instance, Valerie 
Thomas of Georgia Tech University is working on developing a system in which Universal Product 
Codes (UPC) barcodes or RFID (radio frequency identification) are attached to every electronic item. 
Angie Leith of the US EPA is also working on this issue.  
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in turn, makes it difficult to monitor and evaluate the economic and environmental 
impacts of these shipments, key goals of existing e-waste regulations.128 
Coordination and Enforcement 
Coordinating and monitoring activities pertaining to international flows of e-waste 
also poses a great challenge. There is very little communication among responsible 
authorities in export, transit and importing countries. This lack of communication is 
explained by language barriers; the fact that the agencies responsible for implementing 
and enforcing the regulations often lack resources to do their own jobs effectively, let 
alone coordinate with other agencies; and resistance to working and exchanging 
information with agencies in other countries because doing so is often perceived as a 
threat to national sovereignty. Not only is communication between international 
agencies challenging, but cooperation and communication between and among local, 
regional and national agencies is often also wanting (Fischer et al., 2008; Grossman, 
2007; Hieronymi, Kahhat, & Williams, 2012; Pellow, 2008; Secretariat of the Basel 
Convention, 2011; Wang et al., 2012).129 For instance, there is often minimal 
coordination between police and customs within individual countries. As with 
                                                 
128 Importantly, e-waste’s complex materiality poses serious challenges for classificatory systems and 
definitions. E-waste is not a traditional waste stream. For instance, in the United States, regulations 
were developed to address more “traditional” materials such as sludge or slag. The Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) places the burden on the generator to test the waste if it is not 
expressly listed in Subtitle C. To perform the Toxicity characteristic leaching procedure (TCLP) test, 
the generator must grind up the waste if it is solid and then test it for toxicity, corrosivity, leachability or 
pyoritic characteristics. However, if a laptop, for example, is ground it is already rendered waste before 
it can be tested. One solution would be to list laptops as hazardous, but depending on their design, they 
might not test as hazardous (and could thus be labelled as such by the manufacturer). Thus, these newer, 
non-traditional waste streams, such as ship recycling outputs, end-of-life electronics or construction and 
demolition debris pose a serious challenge to regulators. 
129 For more on this, see the European Electronics Recyclers Association website at: www.eera-
recyclers.com. 
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transnational shipments, concerns about jurisdiction and lack of resources hamper 
coordination. 
Port authorities also often lack the resources to monitor, let alone, test items. 
At the same time that awareness of the negative social and environmental effects of e-
waste export has grown in Germany, the German government has cut funding for 
water police and customs. Officials at the port of Hamburg complain that they simply 
cannot check every container that passes through the port (personal communication, 
December 23, 2010; March 4, 2010). One respondent confided in me that customs 
uses sophisticated software to calculate the probability that any given container held 
waste. The budget for this software had recently been cut, claimed my contact 
(personal communication, March 4, 2010; February 2, 2013). Authorities in other 
major European ports face similar conditions (Espejo, 2010). The Rotterdam Harbor in 
the Netherlands, for instance, hosts one of the world’s largest and most important 
container transport ports. Over seven million containers pass through the harbor every 
day, yet they employ under twenty inspectors to monitor this cargo (Juan, 2009). The 
low ratio of controllers to containers in Hamburg and other major European ports 
confirms that in practice governments devote very few resources to actually enforcing 
the regulations that prohibit unauthorized transnational shipments of e-waste (BCRC, 
2005; IMPEL-TFS, 2006; Juan, 2009). 
In cases where customs officials actually identify a waste shipment, exporters 
rarely face any consequences. Often illegal exporters only receive a small fine and are 
ordered to take back their cargo. Denied at one port, exporters simply try to ship the 
same materials from another harbor (Deubzer, 2011, p. 69; Espejo, 2010). Moreover, 
exporters rarely face legal action. The few court cases involving illegal shipments of 
e-waste out of Germany have all been dismissed on the grounds that existing 
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regulations make it difficult, or even impossible, to legally define the difference 
between waste and commodity. 
Even if port authorities had enough resources to enforce the laws, they face the 
challenge of identifying the perpetrator. Shipments go from harbor to harbor and 
repeatedly change hands, making it difficult to determine who “owns” a given 
shipment. This is particularly true if the materials pass through the Hong Kong port 
where shipments often vanish from administrative records without a trace. According 
to German law (and this holds true for most other European countries), if customs 
officials cannot identify and find the owner of any illegal shipment, then the 
municipality in which the harbor is located must cover the costs of disposal. In other 
words, if the water police or customs find an illegal shipment but cannot find its 
owner, the city of Hamburg has to pay for the proper disposal of the cargo. This 
creates a strong disincentive for local authorities, who are perpetually struggling under 
budget cuts, to enforce e-waste regulations as their city will ultimately carry the cost 
of detecting the infraction. 
In addition, officials also struggle to enforce compliance with domestic 
provisions. It is difficult to ensure that domestic processors act according to e-waste 
regulations and handle e-waste locally and in the most environmentally sound way 
possible, as stipulated by German law. In a recent report evaluating Germany’s e-
waste handling system, engineer Otmar Deubzer explains, “the treatment operators are 
audited and certified annually by third party auditors in order to ensure that they have 
adequate technology, know-how and organization for a state-of-the-art treatment of e-
waste. It is, however, difficult to prove whether treatment operators actually make use 
of their abilities in daily operations” (Deubzer, 2011). Economic factors play a large 
role in treatment operators’ decisions to employ the most environmentally sound 
techniques, as it is often costly for operators to follow specified procedures and 
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regulations. Deubzer (2011, p. 62) continues, “It would be difficult to prove if a 
treatment operator shreds entire LCD displays, for example, instead of removing the 
mercury-containing backlights before. Such incompliance would save cost for 
expensive manual disassembly of the LCD displays, and the small amounts of mercury 
would evaporate and be diluted in the waste stream.” During a telephone conversation, 
Deubzer expressed his concern that on non-inspection days, German recyclers cut 
corners and sometimes even sent entire containers of e-waste to the developing world 
in order to cut costs (personal communication, November 21, 2011). The inability to 
enforce existing regulations and to successfully sanction violators thus helps explain 
the high incidence of export of e-waste (Bodeen, 2007a, 2007b; Juan, 2009, p. 13). 
Consistently monitoring and enforcing regulations in importing countries poses 
an even greater challenge. As I explained above the Basel Convention and the OECD 
Council Decision permit export of certain types of e-waste for disposal from one 
signatory country to another as long as exporting countries obtain prior informed 
consent (PIC). However, notions of consent become meaningless when a country 
racked with poverty has no real choice but to accept imported e-waste as a much-
needed source of income. 
Moreover, the policies require assurances that the waste will be treated in 
environmentally sound manner in the importing countries (see article 11, paragraph 1 
of the Basel Convention). However, the regulations only vaguely define the criteria for 
“environmentally-sound management” (Josh Lepawsky & McNabb, 2010, p. 3) and 
rarely, if ever, does anyone actually control disposal practices in non-OECD importing 
countries. In fact, as a number of my interviewees explained, once items arrived in 
importing countries in the global South, they simply vanished administratively 
speaking. This makes it difficult to ensure that they are being handled according to the 
international agreements. As one interviewee explained, 
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But there’s also the environmental side. The environmental side is how we—
and this is one of the biggest challenges—how can we ensure that the same 
standards of recycling—and again I’m just using China as an example—are 
used in China and in Germany? In Germany you have a very—well, I wouldn’t 
say a very, but a solid enforcement strategy for recycling scrap metals. I’m not 
sure this is the case in Nigeria. The biggest challenge for people that are 
involved in recycling somehow is how we can ensure that recycling is done 
according to the same or similar standards across the globe. (personal 
communication, March 9, 2010) 
My respondents blamed the disorganization, lack of motivation and rampant 
corruption in import countries for this problem. The same respondent quoted above, 
claimed that the biggest problem was . . . 
. . . . corruption and that people just don’t know how to enforce; people do 
things because it’s written in a law, but they are not behind it. From their gut 
feeling, they say, “Why the hell should I do it? I’ll just dump it. Fine.” [. . .] 
They are forced by international agreements. You know, governments—people 
in governments are usually well-educated. They have friends in western 
countries, who then tell them, “Hey, the environment”—and then they 
understand that a certain habit can then have a negative impact on the globe. A 
shop owner, somewhere in the middle of somewhere—in the middle of 
nowhere—doesn’t see the consequences of what he’s doing. And it’s not only 
education, I think if you can help, you should do it. But it’s the same here—I 
was raised on a farm, a long, long time ago, and do you know my father used 
to spill the oil from his tractor—just put it on the field. Because he didn’t see 
an impact. The impact came that a little bit more—unfortunately he had people 
that came and enforced the regulation on him, and then he started to rethink. 
So it’s a matter of—even people in Europe, and in Germany sometimes or 
many times are not behind an environmental regulation. They try to make a 
dollar fast, or a fast dollar, or whatever you call it, and then they go their way. 
They don’t care about the environment. (personal communication, March 9, 
2010) 
Many of my interviewees argued that they could not overstep foreign 
sovereignty to ensure proper disposal in importing countries. As privileged Germans 
they were in a bind. They could not make sure that the critical provision in the policies 
allowing controlled export in other countries without being paternalistic. However, it 
is precisely these provisions that differentiate controlled export from dumping. 
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Materiality 
Finally, e-waste’s materiality plays an important role in determining to what extent 
legal provisions are successfully implemented. For one, it is easier to test the 
functionality of some products than others. A cell phone, for example, is easier to test 
than a base station, which can only function as part of a larger system and cannot 
simply be plugged in and run on its own. German authorities are aware of this problem 
and have attempted to address it, for instance, by giving customs officers clear 
protocols for various categories of equipment. In practice, however, despite these 
specifications and protocols, port authorities still have trouble testing certain items that 
require additional expertise and time to evaluate. 
To complicate matters even further, as noted in chapter three, new technologies 
often contain different concentrations of key materials than were present in earlier 
models. For example, mercury was a key component in EEE when the Basel 
Convention was written, but it now represents a much less significant ingredient in 
newer models. This means that even if regulators put all their resources into 
classifying e-waste, the dynamic material composition of electronics makes it hard for 
laws to effectively regulate their export. 
Conclusion: National Regulations, Global Unmaking 
While I was researching for my dissertation, the StEP initiative commissioned me to 
write a white paper on transnational e-waste shipments. In my role as author, I 
participated in numerous conference calls with stakeholders from across the globe. 
The stakeholders I communicated with—ranging from academics, to industry 
representatives (manufacturers and waste processors), to government officials—
agreed that the most effective and realistic approach to fixing the problem of unwanted 
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export was to systematically address each loophole I outlined above.130 My questions 
about underlying causes and drivers of export faced silence and, at times, 
exasperation. As one engineer from China, clearly frustrated by my repeated efforts to 
question the status quo, finally exclaimed: “I don’t understand what you mean by 
underlying problems. We just need to optimize protocols!” 
This engineer and his colleagues wanted me to focus on “realistic” and 
“practical” solutions. Again, the implication here was that these terms were synonyms 
with rational. They asked that I concentrate on finding ways to develop a clear global 
definition of and classification system for e-waste. I should look into what it would 
take to create clear protocols and increase funding for enforcement agents, improve 
coordination among competent authorities and find mechanisms for regulations to 
keep up with the changing composition of equipment. Once the regulations addressed 
these hiccups, an ideal transnational system of unmaking would emerge—one that 
took e-waste hybridity as valuable good and toxic bad into account. This ideal system 
would also take advantage of each country or region’s strengths to create an efficient 
and productive global division of labor. 
Despite the theoretical promises of such an idealized arrangement, however, in 
practice addressing the issues individually will likely only incrementally improve the 
status quo.131 The problem is that on the one hand, national governments strive to 
                                                 
130 Projects such as the Partnership on Computing Equipment (PACE), the Open-ended Working Group 
of the Basel Convention (OEWG) and Country-Led Initiatives (CLI) of the Basel Convention also favor 
this approach. 
131 There exist alternative proposals such as the Best of Two Worlds Project that acknowledge the 
complex global system. Other proposals include setting up a system that incentivizes the re-export of 
secondary raw materials to the global North and putting in place a ‘buffer loan scheme’ in which 
individuals from the informal sector in the developing world are immediately financially compensated 
as a means to bridge the gap towards the payment of the integrated metal smelters in the global North. 
These possible solutions represent an important step in the right direction, yet they continue to run the 
risk of capitalizing on and thus reinforcing global inequalities rather than offering a socially- and 
environmentally-just solution. 
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implement policies that will render their countries more environmentally sustainable. 
However, these countries are integrated in a larger set of unequal global political, 
economic, cultural, and environmental relations. The cost of labor, regard for human 
health and the environment—or at least the technological and economic capacity to 
protect them—as well as the values of critical minerals, components and waste differ 
drastically from place to place. Given this, as Larry Summers observed two decades 
ago, in a liberalized economy, the ‘natural’ tendency is for the externalized costs of 
capitalism to flow from rich to poor countries as a means to maximize profit and 
reduce costs. 
Multinational agreements such as the Basel Convention arose as a means to 
counter the tendency of rich nations to displace the social and environmental costs of 
their consumption onto the developing world through the channels of a liberalized 
global economic system. That is, these agreements represent an effort to keep the free 
market in check. However, multilateral agreements such as Basel Convention rarely, if 
ever, manage to make true on their promises. This is because these regulations are 
only enforceable at the level of the nation-state. 
Political-economic unevenness means that different countries vary in their 
capacity to implement regulations that should, in theory, be uniform. For instance, 
European countries, at least in theory, follow streamlined export and import 
procedures. However, in practice the ability to implement such complex procedures 
varies considerably from country to country, depending on available resources, 
priorities and knowledge. This means that while the Basel Convention, the OECD 
Council Decision and the WSR provide guidelines for national regulations, each 
member state has considerable discretion in how they implement and enforce the 
regulations. Consequently, some countries like Germany have stricter regulations and 
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are better able to enforce these regulations than others (Juan, 2009, p. 81; Widmer et 
al., 2006, p. 30). 
Processing times also vary from country to country, despite the fact that they 
should, at least in theory, be the same across the globe in order for the regulations to 
be effective. Companies or individuals seeking permission to ship discarded 
equipment out of or into a given country can wait anywhere from weeks to years for 
the proper paperwork to be processed, in which time the re-use value of the equipment 
can be dramatically reduced or eliminated altogether. 
As soon as a shipment of discarded equipment exits Germany, it is no longer 
regulated. Adaptable exporters—driven by the profit incentive—capitalize on this 
regulatory and bureaucratic no man’s land. They look for countries and ports where 
regulations are less stringent or where authorities do not enforce the regulations 
completely. When regulations tighten in one port, they quickly shift operations to 
another. Exporters also go out of their way to ship items from countries that have 
faster processing times in terms of paperwork. In other words, the tightening of 
controls in a country like Germany is only marginally effective because exporters can 
easily evade them by shifting their shipments to ports in more lenient countries. 
In practice, this means that transnational networks of unmaking are structured 
so that unwanted digital equipment flows to the developing world. Though some items 
are repaired and reused, they eventually also become waste, resulting in the net flow 
of e-waste to the global South. European mining companies fight to gain control of the 
valuable components and materials in e-waste such as circuit boards, whereas the less 
valuable materials such as cathode ray tube glass lined with lead or plastic drenched in 
brominated flame retardants amass in poor areas. Moreover, despite the stipulation 
that exports of hazardous waste must be responsibly handled in import countries, these 
provisions cannot be enforced. Thus, despite the promises of a global system of 
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unmaking that builds on the strength of each individual country, in reality a form of 
consented dumping ensues. 
In sum, a close look at Germany’s efforts to regulate its networks of unmaking 
makes analytical contributions that extend beyond the specific case of e-waste and 
Germany. It touches on a key issue of our times: the tensions and implications of 
national formulations of environmental policies in a profoundly interconnected and 
uneven global topography. The world we live in today is not only interwoven through 
waterways, the atmosphere, flora and fauna, but also through globalized networks of 
production and unmaking as well as through flows of people, capital and information, 
which are interconnected themselves (Langston, 2011). 
The tension between a Westphalian system and a world that is interconnected 
on so many levels poses both a regulatory and a methodological challenge.132 Closely 
examining the everyday practices that make up the global unmaking of e-waste—
where the materials being exported are simultaneously valuable and toxic—
encourages those who write about global environmental relations to look more closely 
at the particular manifestations and mechanics of the unequal relations of production 
and unmaking they write about. 
                                                 
132 For more on how I address the methodological and theoretical dimension of this quandary see 
Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: UNMAKING DEMATERIALIZATION 
Overview 
The belief that social and economic activity has “gone virtual” with the advent of ICT 
equipment such as cell phones, iPods and computers is widespread. According to this 
narrative of dematerialization, digital technologies have made it possible to live and 
work online, ushering in a wire-less, paper-less and resource-less world in which 
social and economic life has been effectively decoupled from the physical. Computers, 
smart phones and the Internet represent gateways to unlimited, un-tethered and more 
sustainable virtual existences. 
Despite the promises of digitalization, global consumption of information and 
communication technologies such as personal computers, cell phones and iPods relies 
on a resource intensive and often environmentally destructive socioenvironmental 
infrastructure in which the costs of dematerialization are unevenly distributed across 
the globe. As material studies scholar Neil Maycroft explained over a decade ago, the 
virtual world is dependent on “the materiality of the computer technology which 
generates” it (Langston, 2011). Yet the physical infrastructures, the environments and 
people who make it possible to go wireless remain mostly imperceptible.133 We 
remain, paradoxically, deeply ignorant about “the resources with which [we] are 
otherwise intimately familiar” (Bridge, 2009, p. 2). 
                                                 
133 The literature—both popular and scholarly—that draws out attention to the social and environmental 
costs of our seemingly virtual lives is abundant (Grossman, 2007; Josh Lepawsky & McNabb, 2010; 
Pellow, 2007; Williams, 2003). It unsettles “the claim that—by contrast to the old economic sectors of 
iron, steel and auto, for example—electronic production processes are clean and safe for ecosystems 
and workers” (Pellow, 2008, P. 225–226). The growing popular and scholarly attention to the negative 
social, economic and environmental impacts of the digital revolution makes important inroads to 
unsettling the regime of perceptibility that promotes the idea of a friction-free, resource efficient digital 
world. It also disputes the linear association between technological development and environmental 
sustainability underlying the dematerialization narrative (Hayes, 1989, Kuehr and Williams, 2003, 
Williams, 2003, Smith et al., 2006). 
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In this concluding chapter, I use Michelle Murphy’s concept of “regimes of 
perceptibility” to analyze the invisibility of the material underpinnings of digitization. 
I also explore how the theme of hiding and concealment runs through my analysis of 
the unmaking in the previous chapters. I argue that the invisibility of the material 
underpinnings of digitization in general and of the process of unmaking specifically 
reinforce dominant narratives about modernity, North-South relations and capitalism. 
The invisibility of digital waste also reinforces a number of “tactical separations” at 
the conceptual level: namely that between nature and society, nature and technology, 
technology and society as well as waste and resource (Pritchard, 2011, p. 23). The 
visibility of e-waste in recent years, in turn, signals that we are living in a time in 
which fissures and gaps in the dominant narratives are becoming apparent. It is in 
these spaces that change can take place. 
The Promise of Dematerialitzation 
An article published in 2011 in Forbes magazine lauds the many environmental 
advantages of the digital revolution: 
As many businesses are now digital, and operate virtually versus physically, 
there’s a potentially significant degree of resource consumption that no longer 
takes place, that hasn’t been tracked. Perhaps, we’ll realize, for every kWh 
computers and data centers consume, they give back x number of kWhs. 
Consider e-commerce, something that has been around in force for well 
over a decade now. How many physical retail stores have not been built, and 
do not operate, due to e-commerce? (For purposes of this argument, I’m using 
the term “online economy” fairly broadly, to cover all types of computing that 
invokes services from someone else’ servers, including cloud computing, e-
commerce, Internet computing, and social networking.) 
Or consider other potential hidden benefits of the online economy. How 
many automobile trips and additional office space is no longer necessary due 
to telecommuting and remote work? How much travel is no longer necessary 
because of online college courses? How many trees are no longer cut down 
because of electronic documents, PDFs, and collaborative solutions? 
(McKendrick, 2011) 
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The author draws attention to the environmental benefits of economic 
dematerialization through digitalization. Economic digitalization refers to what, at 
least at first glace, appears to be “less materially intensive” but equally productive 
(Hilty et al., 2006, p. 1618). Economic dematerialization occurs through greater 
efficiency, which is in turn attained through technological improvements; the quantity 
of energy and raw materials decreases as production speeds up. A shift from the 
production of commodities to the provision of services is also key for economic 
dematerialization. The shift to a more service oriented economy, or a tertiary economy 
is made possible by replacing an economy centered on the manufacturing of things 
with the provision of ethereal commodities such as information, consultation, 
experience and conversation. Concomitantly, financial, educational and health services 
take up a larger percentage of the overall economy. 
Particularly noteworthy is the increasing importance of financial services or, to 
use a different term, the financialization of the economy. David Harvey (2006) 
explains that the financialization of the economy occurs when trade in stocks, bonds 
and shares as well as claims on non-circulating commodities or future property rights 
takes on more importance than the things they represent. What results is an economy 
largely based on “fictitious capital” which Harvey describes as “money that is thrown 
into circulation as capital without any material basis in commodities or productive 
activity” (Harvey, 2006).134 
There is another sense in which the economy is seemingly dematerialized: 
trade is no longer constrained by geographic and temporal limits. The term “friction-
free flow” is often used to describe this phenomenon. Alternately, one can speak of 
“space-time compression.” According to Harvey, the drive for profit in capitalist 
                                                 
134 The danger of economic dematerialization, explains Harvey, is that it leads to a very fragile economy 
that is susceptible to collapse, as evidence by the 2008 financial crisis. 
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systems leads to the (attempted) erasure of any barriers (be they spatial, temporal or 
biological/physical/chemical) to the creation of profit (Harvey, 1989, p. 240). 
According to this narrative of dematerialization, digital technologies have not 
only launched social and economic life into the realm of the virtual, but in replacing 
physical things such as stores, books, letters, traveling time and commodities with 
their virtual counterparts, these technologies hold the key to humankind’s 
environmental salvation. Environmental economists and green capitalists Paul 
Hawkins, Amory and Hunter Lovins (Hawken, Lovins, & Lovins, 1999), among 
others, argue that dematerialization through digitization are making societies more 
green because they reduce consumption resources and energy. As such 
dematerialization plays a central role in reconciling capitalist growth and 
environmental sustainability (Maycroft, 2000; Pellow, 2008). 
A dematerialized society, they contend, is one in which economic growth is 
separated from excessive resource consumption, pollution and unbridled waste 
production. In this way dematerialization provides a substantial challenge to the dire 
predictions of the influential 1972 Club of Rome report Limits to Growth (1972), 
which assumed that economic growth would inevitably mean ever more consumption 
of non-renewable resources. Dematerialization is a key source of hope for proponents 
of green capitalism as it “gleefully suggests” the marriage of unbridled capitalist 
growth and environmental sustainability (Maycroft, 2000, p. 143) 
Grounding the Cloud (or Taking Digitization Out of the Green Box) 
Despite these promises of friction-free economic activity, the digital world is 
profoundly material. Digitization relies on a complex technological infrastructure. For 
instance, the experience of being un-tethered is contingent on a material infrastructure 
that actually constrains the seemingly limitless possibilities of wi-fi. The wi-fi 
infrastructure includes everything from the router and the computer’s wireless adaptor 
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(which are made up of plastic, metal and knowledge, among other things) to the 
Ethernet cable that connects the router to a system of cables and wires, to radio waves, 
to electricity, to the people who design, operate, repair and disassemble wi-fi systems. 
Analogously, the dematerialization of the economy is only made possible 
through computing and communication capabilities (Gille, 2007). Increased 
efficiency, financialization and the rapid, apparently barrier free global market is made 
possible by often times invisible, yet important technological systems that are 
simultaneously comprised of knowledge, people, artifacts, environments, cultures and 
societies. 
Moreover, as the growing body of literature on the environmental impact of 
digitization evidences, the technologies we use to access the apparently virtual, 
dematerialized world are highly resource-intensive and polluting throughout their 
entire lifecycles (Kuehr & Williams, 2003; Josh Lepawsky & McNabb, 2010; Pellow, 
2007). For instance, environmental engineers estimate that the production of a single 
personal computer uses over 240 kg of fossil fuels, 1500 kg of water and releases 
significant amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere (Kuehr and Williams, 2003). 
Importantly, the resource intensiveness of production extends to labor. Manufacturing 
of ICT equipment relies on exploitative labor conditions (Moore, 2012; SACOM, 
2011). Not only is labor cheap in countries in which resource extraction and 
production takes place but environmental standards are also often less stringent or not 
enforced. As a result, the export of production magnifies the social and environmental 
impacts of production. 
ICT equipment is also resource intensive during the use phase. While ICT 
manufacturers design more energy efficient products every year, net energy 
consumption associated with ICT use has increased rather than decreased in the last 
decade as the technologies perform more functions and are more widely used. 
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Furthermore, while many believe that the Internet has ushered in an era of virtual 
limitlessness, the environmental dimensions of the web are rarely acknowledged. For 
instance, the web server farms that enable Internet searches use an exorbitant quantity 
of energy to run and cool the servers. According to one article recently published in 
the New York Times, worldwide server farms use the energy equivalent to what 30 
nuclear power plants produce each year (Glanz, 2012). Anthropologist Jane Ann 
Morris vividly describes just how resource intensive seemingly friction-free Internet 
escapades are. She writes, 
At server farms, zillions of complexly linked computers constantly juggle 
electrons storing messages, texts, songs, web sites, advertisements, film clips, 
birthday cards and other cultural effluvia. The mission of each server is to 
prevent captive electrons from doing what all free electrons want to do: 
dissolve back into the electromagnetic ether to hook up randomly. All that data 
coded into electronic pluses and minuses enables you, at any moment, to get 
the latest information about a massacre in Colómbia, a cancer cluster in New 
Jersey, or the current address of your high school sweetheart. Considerable 
server effort is devoted to articulating Brad [Pitt]’s dimples. Server farms are 
double-dippers. There, colonies of warehouses packed with rows of racked, 
stacked computers draw electricity like black holes suck light. That’s the first 
scoop. Because the heat generated by this conglomeration of circuitry, unless 
dispersed, will damage the equipment, server farms are air conditioned to a 
brisk temperature. That’s the second scoop. A typical server farm uses at least 
half of its electricity for cooling. Imagine a refrigerator wrapped around an 
electric stove, and you have the essence of a server farm: a pig-in-a-blanket 
that consumes electricity in almost unimaginable quantities. (Morris, 2008) 
The desire to underscore the underlying materiality of ICT use has led some 
researchers to speak of the carbon footprint of internet searches (Leake and Woods, 
2009). The argument that Internet searches have environmental impacts is easily 
extended to capture the environmental impacts of digitalization. In this case, one can 
refer to the ecological footprint of digitization or, alternately, apply the notion of 
taking digitization out of the green box. 
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The concept of the green box builds on the idea of the black box. It draws 
attention to how environmental language is used to conceal the unmaking of digital 
technologies as well as the environmental implications that this concealment has. I 
apply the notion of the green box to discarded computers in Germany in three ways. 
First, it involves challenging the inevitability of a technology’s design uncovering the 
decisions that have been made—whether explicit or implicit—about how to design 
computers in regards to their disposability and environmental impact. Exposing the 
historical and social contingency of ICT design is simultaneously an analytical and 
political act. It is political because by unsettling the notion of inevitability it makes 
space for considering alternatives; in other words, computers could potentially be 
designed in such a way that their disposal would be less environmentally damaging. In 
addition, taking a digital technology out of the green box involves interrogating why 
and how historical actors as well as analysts studying digital technologies (including 
me) become interested in taking the design of computers out of the green box at 
particular historical junctures. 
Second, taking the computer out of the green box means bringing to light 
computers as imminent environmental hazards. It also involves investigating the 
everyday discursive and material practices that attempt to conceal the environmental 
risks associated with computers as waste products and understanding the motivations 
of the actors who transform obsolete computers in Germany in this way. 
Finally, applying green boxing to the laws governing computer disposal and 
contemporary computer recycling practices, involves bringing to light how 
environmentalism in the North relies on pollution in the South. These three forms of 
green boxing are related and continually enable and reinforce each other. Drawing 
attention to the material underpinnings of digitization takes digital technologies out of 
the green box in all three senses of the term. 
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In brief, as the literature that takes digitization out of the green box evidences, 
the narrative of dematerialization through digitization—the idea that digital 
technologies facilitate untethered, resource-less and hence more environmentally 
sustainable societies, is “naïve and specious” (Maycroft, 2000, p. 143) at best and 
dangerous at worst (Bridge, 2009; Grossman, 2007; J. Lepawsky & Billah, 2011; J. 
Lepawsky & Mather, 2011). The supposedly virtual world is anchored in a complex 
and resource intensive system that is simultaneously social, cultural, political and 
material, in both an organic and an inorganic sense of the term (Pritchard, 2011). 
Importantly, scholarship on the socioenvironmental basis of digitization has, until 
recently, maintained a narrow focus on the production and use phases of ICT 
equipment. However, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, the resource-
intensiveness of digital technologies is not limited to its functional lifetime but extend 
throughout a technology’s lifecycle: production, use, and unmaking, which themselves 
form a seamless continuum. 
Regimes of Perceptibility 
Michelle Murphy’s notion of regimes of perceptibility is a useful tool for analyzing 
the invisibility of the material basis of digitization and the other invisibilities I have 
written about in the previous chapters. In her book, Sick Building Syndrome and the 
Problem of Uncertainty: Environmental Politics, Technoscience, and Women Workers 
(2006), Murphy introduces the concept of “regimes of perceptibility.”135 She uses the 
                                                 
135 Other fields also engage with notions of regimes that are applicable to my discussion of e-waste. For 
instance, the food regime literature (Friedman & McMichael, 1989; McMichael, 2009) focuses on the 
ways in which food and agricultural systems reinforce and shape the world capitalist system. This 
perspective could be applied to waste in the sense of examining how waste and processes of unmaking 
maintain systems of capital accumulation. Though I do not directly engage with the food systems 
literature, I address this question in the section of this chapter. Perhaps more importantly, Zsuzsa Gille’s 
(2007) concept of waste regimes is also relevant to my work. Gille’s concept represents an attempt to 
move away from what she refers to as “a too-rigid, mode-of-production-type” approach to studying 
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concept to underscore the partial and incomplete character of scientific and lay 
interpretations of the phenomenal world. Murphy contends that actors and analysts 
work within regimes of perceptibility, and as such, some things are visible while 
others remain imperceptible (Murphy, 2006, p. 10, Hecht, 2009b, p. 899;). 
What distinguishes Murphy’s concept is her emphasis that regimes of 
perceptibility extend beyond the conceptual level. The regimes she writes about are 
“assemblages of social and technical things” (idem). In other words, the blind spots 
associated with a particular regime cannot merely be dispelled through additional 
information and increased awareness. Historical actors’ and analysts’ beliefs about 
what is real and what is imagined crystallizes into material structures and objects. 
Physical objects and structures, in turn, set the parameters of what kind of information 
actors can collect, thereby reinforcing common perceptions of what is real and what is 
not (Murphy, 2006, p. 24). 
For instance, Murphy explains that in the case of sick building syndrome there 
were few tools or concepts to measure people’s (often women’s) experience of this 
condition.136 Consequently, for a long time their complaints were dispelled as 
imagined and illegitimate because they could not be measured. Yet, at the same time, 
                                                                                                                                            
waste. Instead, the concept simultaneously underscores the “production, representation and politics of 
waste.” Like Murphy’s regimes of perceptibility, Gille’s concept explicitly transcends the rigid binaries 
between meanings. It also allows for spatial and temporal comparisons of various waste regimes. I 
choose to use Murphy’s concept, however, because I am interested in narrowing in on issues of 
visibility/invisibility. I plan to explore the ways in which my research on the unmaking of digital 
technologies builds on and reworks understandings of food regimes and waste regimes in future 
publications. 
136 The US Environmental Protection agency defines sick building syndrome as a condition in which 
“building occupants experience acute health and comfort effects that appear to be linked to time spent 
in a building, but no specific illness or cause can be identified. The complaints may be localized in a 
particular room or zone, or may be widespread throughout the building.” These symptoms include 
“headache; eye, nose, or throat irritation; dry cough; dry or itchy skin; dizziness and nausea; difficulty 
in concentrating; fatigue; and sensitivity to odors” (Hanie, Aryan, MohammadReza, & Elham, 2010) 
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the tools to measure and study this illness remained unavailable as sick building 
syndrome was deemed the invention of hypochondriacs. 
In her envirotechnical analysis of the Rhône, Pritchard develops Murphy’s 
concept further by including technologies and landscapes in her discussion of 
technological regimes, thereby emphasizing additional dimensions of the materiality 
of regimes. She writes “The material manifestation of a regime helps to sustain—
perhaps even naturalize, both literally and metaphorically—the authority and interests 
of that regime, thereby making it more difficult to challenge” (Pritchard, 2011, p. 23). 
Hence, regimes of perceptibility shape material constraints, and these material 
constrains, in turn, reinforce such regimes. 
Importantly, regimes of perceptibility go beyond the descriptive. The word 
regime draws out the values, politics and ideologies in which dominant regimes are 
embedded and which they reflect and reinforce. Furthermore, there is always struggle 
over which regimes of perceptibility become dominant. Thus analysts can engage with 
and analyze uneven power relations and interrogate normative assumptions regarding 
the status quo. Put plainly, Murphy’s regimes of perceptibility allows the analyst to 
interrogate what, by whom, how and why things are hidden. 
Imperceptibility of E-waste 
One way to think about the previous chapters is to see them as an analysis of 
numerous imperceptibilities—imperceptibilities at the epistemological, 
methodological and empirical level. From this standpoint, the conceptual and 
epistemic project of this study has been to explore the causes and consequences of the 
absences I write about. The theme of invisibility goes hand in hand with waste. 
Popular texts on garbage often evoke the tropes of mystery, hiding and danger. 
From Heather Roger’s Gone Tomorrow: The Hidden Life of Garbage (2005) to 
Elizabeth Royte’s Garbage Land: On the Secret Trail of Trash (2005), popular texts 
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emphasize that it is not only that objects, once they are transformed into waste, are 
whisked away with little knowledge on our part as to where they go, but also that 
gaining access to waste and sites of waste processing is often challenging, if not 
dangerous. Once we place our rejected objects on the curb they seem to vanish without 
any idea of who handles them, how they are processed or where they go. 
Academic engagements with waste echo these popular observations. For 
instance, the first chapter of historian Martin Melosi’s seminal book Garbage in the 
Cities is entitled “Out of sight, out of mind.” This title foregrounds the 
imperceptibility of waste (Melosi, 1981). Moreover, sociologists and anthropologists 
explain that individuals and groups often go to great pains to hide their waste and 
prevent others from rummaging through it (Åkesson 2006: 42). Waste is associated 
with marginalized communities and criminality. It is something secret, private, dirty 
and hidden, a “public secret” (Hawkins, 2003 quoted in Moore, 2008) and a moral 
failing. As a result, refuse is largely imperceptible in our day-to-day lives (Åkesson, 
2006, p. 42, Hawkins and Muecke, 2003, p. xiv, Moore 2008, p. 602). 137 
The association between waste and concealment extends to my analysis of e-
waste in Germany. What is hidden? In addition to e-waste itself and the various sites 
of its unmaking, in Chapter 1, I argued that the concept of waste and the relationships 
between making, made and unmaking remain largely imperceptible. Reintroducing 
these themes opens up new frontiers for social scientific analysis. Specifically, 
reconnecting the making, made and unmaking extends and reworks concepts such as 
                                                 
137 Journalist Heather Rogers writes, “Each garbage collection system, transfer station, recycling center, 
landfill and incinerator is an expensive, complex enterprise that uses the latest methods developed and 
perfected at laboratories, universities and corporate campuses across the globe. An examination of this 
accumulation of technological innovation, scientific inquiry and geological and atmospheric study, 
coupled with unrelenting, disciplined public relations, community outreach and education, reveals much 
about this society’s priorities” (Rogers, 2005, p. 26). See also Dominique Laporte (2002) for more on 
the role technologies play in rendering waste invisible. 
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the black box, fetishization, materiality, technological lifecycles, and technological 
systems. Chapters 2 explains that the discourse around e-waste often ignores the 
global context in which the unmaking of digital technologies is embedded. In other 
words, the second chapter engages with methodological state centrism—that is, the 
tendency to use the state as a natural or given unit of analysis—as a form of 
camouflage. 
In the third chapter, I addressed two additional concealments. This chapter 
focuses on how environmental economists have attempted to reverse the invisibility of 
the social and environmental costs of production, consumption and unmaking—or 
what they refer to as externalities—through market-based environmental e-waste 
policies. However, these strategies render other relationships and processes, 
specifically the thriving informal sector and the uneven global geography, 
imperceptible. This chapter also examines what actors and analysts leave out in their 
engagements with the e-waste problem. With the exception of a few supposedly 
“radical” individuals, the issue of e-waste is never talked about as a problem of 
consumption or of capitalism.138 Instead, a lot of energy is invested in framing e-waste 
as a technological problem necessitating a simple technological fix. This techno-fix 
discourse suppresses the socio-political origins of the e-waste issue (Rogers, 2005, p. 
96). 
The process of creating value out of discarded digital technologies is far from 
straightforward and easy, as is often implicitly assumed in discussions of the 
throwaway society. In Chapter 4, I exposed the complex hidden social life of 
discarded technologies and analyzed the process of unmaking. I argued that the act of 
unmaking is riddled with conflict and contestation, and thus worthy of social scientific 
                                                 
138 The individuals who point out the connection between the current waste problem and mass-
consumption as viewed as ‘radical’ is itself a kind of elision.  
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analysis. Moreover, I criticized the tendency to elide how e-waste’s materiality shapes 
the struggle over the e-waste stream. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 I engaged with the issue of transnational movements of e-
waste. Specifically, in Chapter 5 I contended that the three dominant interpretations of 
export—the dumping, leakage and comparative advantage narrative—represent 
strategic social constructions of e-waste and global networks of unmaking. These three 
dominant discourses emphasize and hide different dimensions of e-waste—a 
particularly malleable object—in order to further their interests. 
Chapter 6 deals with the loopholes and leakages in existing local, national, 
regional and international regulatory systems that enable e-waste export despite efforts 
to the contrary. The majority of policymakers, academics and industry representatives 
who are working on solving the problem of e-waste export see the loopholes I outline 
in Chapter 6 as individual issues necessitating techno-bureaucratic solutions. I 
contended that addressing each loophole and leakage according to this view will yield 
limited results. As long as policymakers ignore the larger phenomenon—the outcome 
of the tension between national formulations of environmental policies in a deeply 
interconnected and uneven global system—there will unlikely be any meaningful and 
long lasting solution to the problem of transnational movements of e-waste. Finally, 
the first section of the conclusion drew attention to the hidden socio-material 
infrastructure that undergirds the seemingly ethereal cloud. 
In sum, as a whole, my research challenges two key disappearing acts. The 
first consists of the concealment of the complex social, material, political, economic 
and environmental afterlives of digital technologies. The second is the tendency to 
overlook the uneven global division of labor and ecology that undergirds systems of 
ICT making and unmaking. Following Murphy, an analysis of regimes of 
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imperceptibility is incomplete without addressing the questions of “who,” “how” and 
“why” things are hidden. 
Who is hiding e-waste? As I describe in the previous chapters, a wide range of 
actors are involved in creating competing regimes of perceptibility pertaining to e-
waste. These include academics, journalists, policy makers, government officials, 
informal waste handlers, NGO workers, activists and industry representatives. 
How do these actors render e-waste or dimensions of it imperceptible? By 
whisking e-waste away. By heavily guarding sites of e-waste transformation. By 
exporting the process of unmaking to the global South. By selectively socially 
constructing e-waste as a valuable good or toxic bad. By using vague and 
contradictory classification systems that make it nearly impossible to obtain reliable 
data on e-waste and its global flows. By framing of the problem of e-waste as a 
techno-bureaucratic issue necessitating a technocratic fix. And finally, by hiding 
server farms and perpetuating the idea that digitization’s material basis is immaterial. 
The Why 
The invisibility of the material basis of digitization in general and of the process of 
unmaking in particular is significant. As this dissertation shows, particular actors 
construct the regime of perceptibility of e-waste for particular ends. For instance, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, environmental organizations like the Basel Action Network 
frame e-waste as a toxic bad—hiding its value—in order to stop its export. 
Alternately, advocates of the Best of Two Worlds problem, which promotes a 
regulated global division of labor in e-waste unmaking, normalizes and thus elides the 
causes of low labor costs in the global South as a means to ensure maximum profit for 
multinational recovery firms. Importantly, the invisibility of e-waste, its characteristics 
and the process of unmaking are not natural or given. As anthropologist Lynn Åkesson 
writes “Lots of cultural energy is used to keep the hidden and disgusting at distance” 
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(Åkesson, 2006, p. 44). Not only cultural energy but also “vast resources [are] 
channeled into getting rid of our dead commodities” (Rogers, 2005, p. 11, see also p. 
26). 
Analyzing patterns of visibility and invisibility as they pertain to digital 
technologies offers insights into the value systems and power arrangements dominant 
in the particular society and historical period under examination. Thus, the questions 
follow: What explains this active investment in keeping e-waste out of sight and out of 
mind? How are we to understand the lack of knowledge about the materiality and 
afterlife of the technologies we use? How and why do actors and analysts 
systematically black box or mystify the unmaking of technologies? What are the 
analytical and political consequences of this concealment? In what ways does the 
camouflaging of e-waste, its making and processing, the people who handle it, and the 
environmental and social effects of its disposal, mystify and thus uphold uneven 
power relationships? In brief, what explains this lack of “direct sensuous engagement 
with the material world” that is so pervasive today in regards to the digital revolution 
(Maycroft, 2000, p. 158)? 
We must note, however, though regimes of perceptibility are dominant, they 
are not total. There are always competing narratives, forms of resistance, and critiques 
of the dominant vision of objects and social orderings. The same is true for e-waste. In 
the last few years, the processes of making and unmaking have increasingly become 
visible. The popularity of local food movements and “made in the USA” campaigns 
signal a growing awareness of and interest in the provenance of commodities. These 
movements reconnect the making with the made. Similarly, the growing media, NGO 
and policy attention to e-waste signal a move to reconnect the made with unmaking. 
While the people who write about e-waste talk about it as hidden, their collective 
works are in fact proof of waste’s growing visibility. That e-waste is becoming 
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increasingly perceptible is simultaneously a signal of a particular historical moment in 
which the dominant ideologies, values, power relations and infrastructures are being 
challenged and a window onto those changes. Specifically, the visibility of waste 
unsettles three narratives: the dominant narratives about modernity, North-South 
relations and capitalism. 
Waste and Modernity 
Waste represents the “abject of development” (Moore, 2008, p. 604). It is precisely 
because waste supposedly constitutes the antithesis of modernity that many cities 
introduced high-tech sanitation systems during the nineteenth century. The drive to 
create modern metropoles went hand in want with efforts to render waste invisible, as 
argued in Maria Curter’s history of waste in Berlin, as well as other works on the 
waste crisis of the 1900s (Strasser, 1999, Barles, 2005). In 1871, Wilhelm II decreed 
that no waste should be visible in Berlin as the metropolis of the newly formed 
German Empire needed to be clean and modern. It is for this reason that in 1895 the 
police decreed that all wastes—including industrial and household garbage, ashes, 
slag, excavated materials, debris, sweepings, dirty snow, kitchen and meat wastes, 
bones, rags and so forth—would have to be transported in completely opaque 
containers (Curter, 1996, p. 25). Other cities did the same during this period.139 To this 
                                                 
139 In The Sanitary City, Martin Melosi notes that there has long been a connection between cleanliness, 
beauty, and order and that the desire for these in urban areas has been a contributing factor in the 
development of urban infrastructure (Melosi, 2000). Similarly, in The History of Shit, Dominique 
Laporte argues that the articulation of such ideas goes back as far as Rome’s sewer system, which was 
considered not only a technological achievement, but also the ‘height of civilization” (Laporte, 2000 in 
Moore, 2008, p. 599). As Hawkins explains in reference to urban sanitation programs, “Here was a 
technology that would purify urban space, that would allow populations physical and moral escape from 
the unacceptable (Hawkins 2003:40, quotes in Moore 2008: 599). Importantly, though waste 
management systems did not eliminate waste altogether, they transformed waste into a technical 
problem, out of the sight and mind of ordinary citizens. At the same time they marginalized the 
scavenger and waste handler, if not rendered them obsolete. In this way, the establishment of formal 
waste management rendered refuse and civilization more compatible. As geographer Sarah Moore 
writes in her study on modern scavengers in Oxaco, not only is waste processed in marginal spaces but 
	
	176 
day, the idea of a modern Germany is connected to the imperceptibility of waste. 
Germany prides itself on being clean and green, hosting one of the world’s most 
efficient and effective waste management systems. 
The invisibility of waste is thus part of a larger phenomenon in which being 
modern is associated with being disconnected from the material basis of life. As 
anthropologist Argyrou writes: “At the most general level, the vision of the world in 
which litter appears to have no place presupposes a certain relation with the world. It 
is a relation in which one does not need to grapple with the world physically because, 
given the division between mental and manual labor, the economic necessity to do so 
has been effectively neutralized” (Argyrou, 1997, p. 160). This, in turn, perpetuates 
the idea of mastery over nature as the pinnacle of civilization (Argyrou, 1997, p. 159). 
In brief, fundamental to the narrative of modernity and development is the assumption 
that we live in an era in which modern societies have transcended the material.140 In 
fact, it is not just that people in their daily lives ignore the material, but that modern 
social theory is predicated on the idea that the social and environmental are separate 
(Latour, 2004). 
                                                                                                                                            
“the people who formed the squatter settlements around the dump are seen not as speaking subjects in 
Kristeva’s terms, but rather as abject others who pose a threat to the more civilized citizens of the 
central city” (S. Moore, 2008, p. 604). See also Donald Reid’s Paris Sewers and Sewermen: Realities 
and Representations (1991) 
140 A derivative of this dichotomy is the assumption that the technological and the environmental are 
separate, discrete entities. Here the crisis of e-waste makes plain that we cannot separate the 
technological and natural. Attention to e-waste re-embeds technologies environmentally by challenging 
the notion that the digital revolution will lead to more virtual, de-materialized, and therefore, more 
sustainable societies. Instead, we focus on what journalists and activists refer to as the “dark side of the 
digital age” (Mayfield, 2003) which brings to light that high-tech lifestyles are not detached from the 
environmental (Kuehr and Williams 2003; Lepawsky and McNabb 2009; Pellow 2007). E-waste 
demonstrates that far from enabling the transcendence of the environment, technologies are 
environmental themselves (e.g. Pritchard, 2011). Computers, iPods are ultimately made of nature. 
Furthermore, their use and disposal are socio-environmental processes. They have environmental 
impacts. They shape the landscape. 
	177 
The invisibility of digital waste in particular plays an important role in 
maintaining this conception of modernity. Understandings of modernity and the 
consumption of electronic technologies often go hand in hand. For instance, Pellow 
(2008, p. 227) writes that India’s quest to modernize largely translated into increased 
consumption of ITC technology. Often technology is treated as a synonym for ICT 
equipment.141 The reason that we conjure up images of high-tech digital technologies 
when we think of modern societies is partially because these technologies make it 
possible for us to dissembed, at least at first glace, from space and time. According to 
sociologist Anthony Giddens this dislocation is the defining characteristic of 
modernity (Giddens, 1981, 1984). Dematerialization in this sense is taken as proof that 
humankind is not only modern, but has developed to the point of becoming 
omnipresent and all knowing. Geography, temporality, biology—most, if not all, 
physical and material constraints to human existence—appear to have become 
irrelevant for social life. The visibility of e-waste, in turn, poses a particularly potent 
threat to modernity. Images of polluted e-wastelands littered with the innards of ICT 
equipment represent the dark side of the digital age. These images directly confront 
notions of friction-free, untethered digital technologies and draw attention to the 
environmental consequences of digitization. 
Importantly, the idea of the social as separated from the environmental is 
historically specific. The rift between the social and the material is contingent on the 
economy—during economic downturns people become more aware of the material 
underpinnings of their lives. Geographer Gavin Bridge maintains that between the 
1970s and the late 2000s the material basis of modern lives was largely invisible. This 
changed with the global financial crisis of 2008. Using the example of indium, which 
                                                 
141 I am grateful to Sara Pritchard for pointing this out to me. 
	178 
is vital for the manufacturing of LCD monitors, Bridge explains, “Rising raw material 
prices brought the material underpinnings of economic activity sharply into focus, 
exposed the economic and political geographies of resource flows, and drove a 
renewed debate about the relationship between economic growth and the availability 
of key resources” (Bridge, 2009, p. 2). Thus, following Bridge, we see that the 
visibility of e-waste signals that we are entering a particular historical juncture in 
modernity, where the longtime invisible material basis of social life is starting to come 
sharply into focus. 
The Perceptibility of Waste and North-South Relations 
The imperceptibility of waste and waste handlers, particularly informal ones, not only 
perpetuates the image of cities such as Berlin as clean, green and modern, but also 
reinforces the image of Northern metropoles as modern and sustainable in opposition 
to Southern cities. This is not merely an issue of representation and images. In fact the 
global political economic system makes it possible for Germany to export the most 
socioenvironmentally costly aspects digital technologies’ lifecycles; the making and 
unmaking of German ICT equipment is mostly outsourced to countries in the global 
South. 
The German government official I wrote about in Chapter 3 illustrates that the 
invisibility of waste and the people who handle it continues to be important for 
perpetuating Germany’s identity in opposition to other places. To recall, the official 
stated, “The problem in Germany is that we can’t imagine, let alone accept, that we 
have an informal sector. We can see informality in developing countries. We can even 
accept that there is informality in France, but not Germany” (personal communication, 
March 4, 2010). Here, the official underscores that any type of waste that is not 
sanitized through modern, high-tech handling systems and any form of informality—
in this case the people who handle this unsanitized waste—is inconceivable because it 
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challenges the idea of Germany as the apex of civilization in opposition to other 
places. 
Much like the modernist severance of the social and the material, the tactic of 
displacing the problem of consumption spatially (through export) and temporally 
(through landfills) is beginning to come undone. Temporal displacement through 
landfills was the initial mechanism to handle waste. However, Germany, like many 
other countries, quickly ran out of space for landfills and so the act of temporal 
displacement was supplemented and sometimes even replaced with spatial 
displacement—that is, export. Export has become increasingly untenable because 
waste importing countries are running out of space. In addition, global awareness 
about the social and environmental harm caused by waste has risen, as the people in 
these countries are pushing back, thanks largely to the communication possibilities 
afforded to them by ICT equipment. As discard studies scholar Max Liboiron 
explains, we often say that rubbish is thrown “away.” Yet these spaces of away—be 
they landfills, ocean floors or the atmosphere—are diminishing (Liboiron, 2013). 
Not only that, but we are living in a moment in which the environment is 
“biting back” (Latour, 2000). The effects of years of pollution are becoming ever more 
apparent in the form of climate change and flows of toxins. As images of dumping 
grounds in the South circulate back North, so too are the toxins that were exported. 
For instance, pollution in an estuary in Ghana next to the informal e-waste dumping 
ground in Agbogbloshie market returns to Europe through fish. Plastics recycled from 
discarded computers in China are used to make water pipes and toys, which are then 
exported back to Europe. Disused electronics sent to Nigeria or Ghana to disappear are 
not lost; instead savvy locals collect hard drives and glean the sensitive data they 
contain to their advantage. During my research in Ghana, for example, I found hard 
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drives from the US Army and the UK NHS with the sensitive information unencrypted 
and easily accessible. 
By “erode[ing] some of the distinction between the civilized and the 
uncivilized that became the basis for modern urban citizenship. . . .” (Moore, 2008, p. 
601), the perceptibility of e-waste threatens the dominant representation of the global 
topography in which countries in the North are modern, high-tech, clean and green, 
and Southern countries are backward, informal, dirty, polluted and virtually “off the 
map. ” Rather than see these two hemispheres as discrete units, recent attention to 
waste flows unsettles narratives of separation. It makes visible the many ways in 
which the North and the South are profoundly intertwined and coproductive. 
The Perceptibility of Waste and Capitalism 
The imperceptibility of e-waste supports the idea that capitalism is an effective and 
just way of organizing the world’s economic activities. Marxist environmental 
sociologists have for a long time drawn attention to the negative social and 
environmental consequences of capitalism. Unbridled consumption depletes resources, 
production causes pollution, and the mountains of waste created during production, 
use and unmaking are immense and often toxic. Many argue that direct confrontation 
with these socio-environmental consequences of capitalist relations could, at least in 
theory, work as feedback mechanisms to curb consumption and challenge the 
capitalist system (Liboiron, n.d.). This holds particularly true for garbage, as it 
represents the “visible interface between everyday life and the deep, often abstract 
horrors of the ecological crisis” (Rogers, 2005, p. 3). The logic is that if people saw, 
smelled, tasted and felt the garbage they produced and were aware of how their 
consumption patterns were based on the exploitation and ill health of vulnerable 
populations and environments, they would start to question their lifestyles and 
capitalist social relations. There would be a drive to consume less and a demand for 
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the restructuring of relations of production so that the drive for profit would not 
supersede all other values. This is particularly true for digital technologies, as they are 
now so profoundly integrated into our daily lives. Thus, rather than see pollution as 
something “out there and disconnected from (people’s) daily routines” a focus on e-
waste helps us see that the environmental consequences of unbridled consumption of 
ICT is an everyday issue, one that is intimately connected to our mundane individual 
lives (Pellow, 2008, p. 225). 
In addition to temporal and special displacement of the problem of e-waste, 
sanitization of unmaking has weakened the feedback mechanism between waste and 
capitalism. As historian Joel Tarr explains for the United States, only during the crises 
period of 1960s and 1970s did Americans link the waste problem to affluence and 
mass-consumption. However, even then they “were still trying to learn how to manage 
the solid waste problem, not solve it” (Tarr, 2005, p. 16). Tarr’s distinction between 
managing and solving the waste problem is crucial here and applies to e-waste as well. 
The mountains of e-waste scattered around the world could be interpreted as a 
problem with consumption. Most often, however, policymakers and industry 
representatives quickly redefine the problem of e-waste as a logistical or technical 
matter necessitating a bureaucratic or technological “fix.” 
As I discuss in Chapters 6, the United Nations’ Solving the e-waste problem 
(StEP) program concentrates much more on managing the problem of e-waste than on 
addressing the underlying issues that are causing it. The StEP members, German 
government officials and even NGOs representatives I interviewed, engaged very little 
with the option of reducing consumption, extending product lifetimes, reusing and 
repairing. Though these “solutions” could potentially make a significant impact, they 
remain imperceptible. Within this regime of perceptibility, the images of e-waste are 
translated to fit the dominant narrative in which consumption and environmentalism 
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are compatible and any challenge to capitalism is not even considered or discussed. 
Instead powerful actors with interests in maintaining the capitalist status quo 
reconfigure the problem of waste in general and e-waste in particular as a technocratic, 
apolitical problem to which there are only technoscientific, market-based solutions. 
While Germany’s official waste policy places reduction and reuse at the top of 
its environmental waste policy, recycling—basically a management strategy—takes 
precedence in practice. 142 In fact, to recall, whenever I mentioned strategies for waste 
minimization such as decreased consumption, longer product lives and reuse, most of 
the individuals I interviewed, including representatives of environmental NGOs, 
dismissed these ideas as naïve impossibilities. In narrowing the parameters of the 
debate over e-waste in this way, these actors leave little room to question capitalism’s 
role in creating the waste problem. As Rogers writes, “the social, political and 
financial power that drives ever-more sophisticated attempts to annihilate discarded 
commodities is staggering. The more efficient, the more ‘environmentally responsible’ 
the operation, the more the repressed question pushes to the surface: What if we didn’t 
have so much trash to get rid of” (Rogers, 2005, p. 26)? In this case, we are again 
talking about a regime, in the sense that the terms of what is “realistic” are being 
defined very concretely by the state and individuals in positions of power for 
particular purposes. 
Finally, e-waste’s materiality is yet another dimension of the particular 
historical juncture in which we currently find ourselves. E-waste is not simply 
abundant, but is also materially complex. A product of late capitalism, this modern 
refuse is highly toxic. Unlike kitchen waste, for example, this waste cannot be easily 
cycled back into the environment. As Gille explains, modern waste is not merely 
                                                 
142 Here recycling refers to the dismantling of equipment to retrieve raw materials whereas reuse refers 
to extending the life of still-functional technologies by promoting second-hand use. 
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characterized by its abundance, but also by its physical properties. She writes, “it is the 
complexity of linkages, both among different scales and among different materials in 
circulation, that renders today’s waste problems so much more daunting than they 
were for the nineteenth-century sanitary movement (Melosi, 1981; Tarr, 1996). This 
complexity therefore is of a hybrid nature; it is the convergence of ever-more 
numerous and complex materials, today’s means of communication and exchange, and 
the new social structures that facilitate today’s unprecedented global connections” 
(Gille, 2007, p. 27). E-waste in many ways represents the apex of modern waste in that 
it is highly complex and highly toxic. This form of waste is an expression of the 
developing capitalist system, which, in its pursuit of newer frontiers of 
commodification, not only produces successively more quantities of waste in 
successive eras, but also more toxic waste.143 
Conclusion 
Dematerialization—the idea that we have detached from the physical world—is not 
only analytically inaccurate, but also socially, politically, economically and 
environmentally destructive. The notion of dematerialization is analytically 
problematic because it green boxes key socio-environmental relationships that are at 
the foundation of digitized and seemingly virtual modern existence. The concealment 
of the material basis of social life functions to make us blind to the social and 
environmental inequalities on which our social system is based (Martinez-Alier, 2009, 
p. 1100). Further, the assumption of dematerialization hides the fact that increasing 
global reliance on digital technologies, at least in the form they take now, is actually 
                                                 
143 As world historical political economists, Jason Moore explains, “it is not only that every phase of 
capitalism is produced by a new bourgeoisies, but also that every phase of capitalism produces qualities 
and quantities of waste/codification that are historically specific and cumulatively mounting” (Personal 
communication, May 5, 2012).  
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counterproductive to environmental sustainability (Hilty et al., 2006, p. 1618). In 
contrast, taking the virtual out of the green box and analyzing the socioenvironmental 
process of unmaking brings politics back it; it exposes and challenges these 
inequalities. 
Importantly, I am not suggesting that e-waste is at the center of the crisis of 
modernity, North-South relations and capitalism. Rather, it is one of many symptoms, 
a lens onto a larger process. This crisis in the narrative of separateness extends beyond 
the issue of waste. In fact, it would probably be more accurate to say that the issue of 
e-waste is a partial manifestation of a larger phenomenon in which modern capitalist 
society’s bad checks are starting to bounce. Perhaps the biggest and most obvious bad 
checks are exposed through climate change, the economic crisis and the growing 
resistance of the world’s poor. 
Still, over the past two decades, there has been a slow, yet pervasive 
“penetration into our daily lives of almost invisible technological gadgets” (Trinova, 
1996, p. 167 cited in Bakker & Bridge, 2006, p. 16). It follows that tracing the second-
life of such intimate technologies is a powerful way to link the everyday with larger 
global trends and processes. Waste is not just about waste. It is a critical lens onto 
society’s “larger values and priorities” (Tarr, 2002, p. 8). The act of wasting is a 
transformative and transforming process (Åkesson, 2006, p. 39). During this process 
priorities are set, social orders are re-created, values are articulated, identities—both 
individual and collective— and relationships are forged (Gregson et al., 2007, pp. 4, 
19, 25). Waste also makes the historical changes in classification and their relationship 
to larger social transformations visible (Lucas, 2002, p. 10). In addition, waste 
represents a powerful way to think about the relationship between humans and nature. 
As Heather Rogers explains, 
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Through waste we can read the logic of industrial society’s relationship to 
nature and human labor. Here it is, all at once, all mixed together: work, 
nature, land, production, consumption, the past and the future. And in garbage 
we find material proof that there is no plan for stewarding the earth, that 
resources are not being conserved, that waste and destruction are the necessary 
analogues of consumer society. (Rogers, 2005, p. 3) 
At the same time, e-waste, or rather computers, networks and cell-phones, enable the 
global poor to push back against the system and allow researchers such as myself to 
discover the interconnectedness of the global system. 
This dissertation has sought to increase understandings of the afterlives of 
digital technologies. Beyond this, my goal has been to connect that which is 
continually conceptually disassociated. It underscores the co-productive interaction 
between technologies and environments, in terms of the resources needed to 
manufacture and use them, as well as in terms of the social and environmental impact 
of their afterlives. It also reconnects the made with the unmade, making and 
unmaking, people with things, green landscapes with toxic e-wastelands, and the 
affluent high-tech lifestyles in the global North with the impoverished, poisoned 
existence in certain parts of the South. 
In reconnecting that which has been disconnected and thus making visible that 
which has been hidden, my goal has been to help unearth the sources of our current e-
waste problem. It is my hope that exploring the fissures and cracks in the existing 
system of unmaking of discarded digital technologies will support efforts to create 
socially just and environmentally sustainable solutions to the growing problem of e-
waste. 
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